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As the community of global leaders from business,
government, media, academic and civil society
gathers for the 35th annual meeting of the World
Economic Forum in Davos, we are pleased to present
the second Global Governance Initiative report.
As it did last year, the Initiative provides an
assessment, in the form of a numerical score, of
the level of effort being made towards achieving the
world’s goals by all the actors on the international
scene: governments, international organizations,
the private sector and civil society. This year, the
text of the report pays particular attention to one
actor: business.
It is clear that the primary responsibility for fulfilling
the Millennium Declaration Goals rests with
governments. But it is equally clear that the
business sector has a key role. Business has a
powerful impact on all the areas covered by the
Millennium Declaration: security, human rights,
environment, poverty, hunger, health and education.
The World Economic Forum takes particular interest
in fostering a dialogue encouraging private sector
leaders to think deliberately about how their
activities can contribute to greater progress towards
the goals. We hope that this year’s report will
stimulate greater action in this direction.
The Global Governance Initiative is possible
because of the collective efforts of scores of
renowned experts and global figures. The Forum is
deeply grateful to the six Expert Groups, under the
extraordinary leadership of their chairs. The
Groups have dedicated significant time and energy
to this effort and have committed significant
resources from their respective institutions,
particularly the International Institute for
Sustainable Development, the International Food
Policy Research Institute and the International
Crisis Group. The Forum is also grateful to the
engagement of the Initiative’s eminent Steering
Committee members, many of whom are
simultaneously involved in other global efforts and
have shared their tremendous expertise. Their
guidance and feedback have helped make this
year’s report a truly original and stimulating
product, which should shape creative thinking on
global governance in the coming year and beyond.
The Global Governance Initiative depends on the
leadership of the project director, Ann Florini, senior
fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington,
and the project manager, Parag Khanna, on
secondment from the Forum at Brookings. They
were assisted over the past year by researchers
Peter Kanning, George Kargiolakis, Bogdan
Tereshchenko and John Boomgard. This year the
GGI also benefited enormously from the expertise
of Harvard University’s Jane Nelson on the role of
the private sector.
The Initiative’s innovative work would not be
possible without the generous and continued
support of the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation, the Centre for International
Governance Innovation in Canada and the United
Nations Foundation.
The Initiative is one of a number of significant
public-private initiatives sponsored by the Forum
through its Global Institute for Partnership and
Governance. The Global Institute was created by
the Forum to advance the spirit and practice of
global citizenship by providing a platform for
multistakeholder partnership in three dimensions:
catalyzing action, improving governance and
bridging perspectives through dialogue. Other
major undertakings include the Global Greenhouse
Gas Register, Financing for Development Initiative,
Global Health Initiative, Partnering Against
Corruption Initiative, Water Initiative and Council of
100 Leaders West-Islamic World Dialogue.
The Forum would like to thank all involved in the
Global Governance Initiative for their dedication.
We hope that their work will indeed generate
greater movement from aspiration to action on
humanity’s shared goals.
Richard Samans
Managing Director
Global Institute for Partnership and Governance
World Economic Forum
Preface
 
vE
xe
c
u
tive
 s
u
m
m
a
ry
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
Two years ago we launched the Global
Governance Initiative to call attention to the
appalling gap between global aspirations—as
embodied in the UN Millennium Declaration and
the Johannesburg Summit—and global actions.
The initiative’s assessments of the world’s efforts
to achieve its goals take the form of a numerical
score on a zero to 10 scale. Ten is merely a
passing grade—an indication that in the past
calendar year, the world did what it needed to do
to be on track to reach a given goal. Every
number below that represents a greater shortfall
in global effort, with one indicating essentially no
meaningful effort and zero signaling actual
retrogression.
The good news is that all the scores for the past
year are above zero. The bad news is that they are
barely so, ranging from two to four. In no case did
the world put forth even half the effort required to
be on track to achieve its goals. And in no case did
the score improve from 2003—for peace and
security, the score actually fell. Each such shortfall
compounds the investments that must be made in
future years to compensate.
Goals and scores
Peace and security score: 2
Goals: free all peoples from the scourge of war,
both within and between states; seek to eliminate
the dangers posed by weapons of mass
destruction; take concerted action against
The world’s leaders have made solemn promises to humanity. They are
breaking those promises. In multiple declarations spanning decades, the
world’s governments have agreed on a comprehensive agenda to turn the
world away from environmental overload, unnecessary pandemics,
pervasive malnutrition and poverty, and war. Some promises, such as the
Millennium Development Goals, are specific commitments to achieve
such targets as halving global poverty and hunger by 2015. Others,
dealing with such topics as peace and security, are broader. But all are
essential. They are the building blocks of global stability in what has
become a tightly interconnected world. It is thus inexcusable that they
are being honored far more in the breach than in the observance. 
international terrorism; end illicit traffic in small
arms.
Hunger and poverty scores:
Poverty: 4
Hunger: 3
Goals: halve the number of people suffering from
hunger by 2015; halve the proportion of people
whose income is less than $1 a day (in purchasing
power parity) between 1990 and 2015.
Education score: 3
Goals: Ensure that by 2015 children everywhere,
boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full
course of primary schooling; eliminate gender
disparities in primary and secondary education,
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no
later than 2015.
Health score: 4
Goals: stop and begin to reverse the spread of
HIV/AIDS and malaria, and reduce by two-thirds
the under-five mortality rate and by three-quarters
the maternal mortality ratio, by 2015.
Environment score: 3
Goals: stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system;
implement conventions related to the conservation of
biodiversity; halve the proportions of people without
access to water and sanitation by 2015.
Executive summary
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Human rights score: 3
Goals: uphold international human rights standards,
with particular attention to the prevention of torture
and ill treatment, protection of the rights of
migrants, human rights in daily life, and corporate
accountability.
The private sector
The analyses in this year’s report have a special
theme: the role of the private sector. As we risk
falling farther and farther behind in reaching many
of these goals, neither governments nor civil
society nor intergovernmental organizations can
ignore the potential contribution of private
enterprise. Profitable and responsible businesses—
from multinational companies to microenterprises—
offer enormous potential to drive innovation, create
wealth, share technology, raise living standards and
improve the quality of life for millions of people
around the world. Conversely, bad or corrupt
business practices contribute to conflict, poverty,
human rights abuses and environmental decline. 
In the wake of major corporate scandals, the
business community faces a strong need to rebuild
trust. Unfairly or not, the very public exposure of
cases of corporate malfeasance affecting millions
has tarred business as a whole. Companies also
find themselves under scrutiny for their broader
social, economic and environmental performance.
And because business is directly affected by the
progress, or lack of progress, towards the
international goals, it is in the interests of business
leaders to be part of the debate—and part of the
action. Businesses need new markets and
business opportunities to remain competitive, and
those opportunities require healthy, educated,
prosperous populations in stable societies
throughout the world. Some of the most promising
future markets for business are in today’s
developing countries—where the nearly three billion
people living on less than $2 a day make up an
enormous untapped market—and in new
technologies designed to meet social and
environmental needs. 
Corporations can contribute in four ways: 
• Through core business practices, developing
innovative new products and markets to tackle
environmental challenges and finding profitable
ways to deliver affordable goods and services
to the poor.
• Through hybrid business/philanthropic
activities that have an economic rationale,
though less than would be needed for a pure
business case and thus include an element
of philanthropy. These include corporate
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs
that extend beyond workers to include their
communities, some microcredit funds,
public-private water partnerships that clean
up watersheds to the benefit of both water-
consuming industries and citizens in nearby
communities, and technologies that foster
the growth of millions of small farm
enterprises.
• Through strategic corporate philanthropy and
social investment, especially on issues most
relevant to the needs and interests of a
company’s operating environment or industry
(logistics companies supporting transportation
needs, pharmaceutical companies supporting
healthcare, technology companies addressing
the digital divide).
• Through transparent and responsible business
engagement in public policy dialogue, rule-
making and institution-building, operating
individually, through industry and trade
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associations, or in partnership with
nonbusiness actors.
How can a company’s management or board of
directors position the firm to play a more
meaningful role? The answer is to think through
the company’s risks and opportunities with
respect to the international goals in these four
modes of engagement—and then to make a
substantial commitment to action in at least one
of them. The greatest leverage for society and the
firm may be found through the application of the
firm’s own tangible assets (equipment, distribution
networks) or intangible assets (management
expertise, branding and marketing strength) rather
than through the issuance of a check. Indeed,
some of the most successful partnerships have
involved the in-kind application of company
resources, which often permit a larger corporate
commitment.
Business is at worst only part of the problem and at
best can be only part of the solution—the prime
responsibility for achieving global goals rests with
governments. But within a framework of government
leadership, there are great opportunities to make use
of the energies of the private sector to a far greater
extent than has been contemplated.
The year’s biggest failures and missed
opportunities
• The atrocities in Sudan, the deteriorating
situation in Iraq, and the continued rise in
serious terrorist attacks from Madrid to Beslan
showed that international peace and security
mechanisms—from preventive diplomacy to
humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping—
are unresponsive, inefficient and inadequate.
• The scandal involving U.S. military personnel
and private contractors in Abu Ghraib prison in
Baghdad as well as mounting reports of
torture in many countries conducted in the
name of the “war on terrorism” pointed to the
erosion of fundamental rights.
• The privatization of certain economic functions
such as basic water supply and even core
military operations raised serious concerns
over accountability and adherence to
international human rights norms.
• The Doha “Development Round” has yet to
produce results, because high agricultural
subsidies in OECD countries continued to
hamper growth in the poorest countries.
• Donors delivered less than 10 percent of the
additional $5.6 billion needed each year to
achieve universal primary education; only 12 of
countries targeted under the “Fast Track
Initiative” have received FTI aid.
• Only a small fraction of global businesses
engaged meaningfully in assessing how their
core business practices could advance progress
towards the Millennium Goals, adopting codes
of conduct or disclosing nonfinancial
performance. Corporate scandals continued to
undermine trust in the business community.
• Competing priorities and turf battles among
governments and donors hampered progress
and accountability in delivering basic health
services. The four million new cases of
HIV/AIDS in 2004 demonstrated that even
the increased resources dedicated to this
disease remain billions of dollars short of the
need. The problem was compounded by a
lack of coordination between bilateral
donors, particularly the United States, and
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria.
• Continued subsidies for environmentally
harmful practices, such as fossil fuel use and
land clearing, undermined progress towards
key environmental goals—from reducing
emissions to preserving biodiversity. Few
industrial countries are on track to achieve
their greenhouse gas emission reduction
targets by 2010.
The year’s successes
• Economic growth, a key ingredient to poverty
and hunger alleviation, continued or rose in
many developing countries such as China,
India, Uganda, Viet Nam, Thailand, Brazil and
Chile, reflecting improved policies. 
Business is at worst only part of the
problem and at best can be only part
of the solution
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• China, India, and several African countries
initiated policies focusing on rural and agricul-
tural investment, the key to reaching the poor
and hungry who still live predominantly in rural
areas.
• Elimination of school fees, a crucial step
towards universal primary education and
gender parity, moved forward in Kenya,
Zambia, Nigeria and the Philippines, with India
and Pakistan also moving in that direction.
• With Russia’s ratification, the Kyoto Protocol to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions finally took
effect. The European Union’s Emissions
Trading System was launched at the very end
of the year, affecting 12,000 industrial facilities
in 25 countries.
• Several major companies, including Merck,
Anglo-American and Imperial Life Financial in
the Bahamas, have invested in long-term
partnerships to boost AIDS treatment. Private
foundations, notably the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, have vastly increased the
global resources dedicated to global public
health.
• Some businesses took important leadership
roles on key environmental issues such as
climate change, with companies such as
Dupont and BP meeting emissions reductions
targets beyond any government requirements.
The financial sector showed growing
environmental sensitivity. 
• Libya’s nuclear weapons program was
dismantled.
• The International Criminal Court launched
investigations into possible war crimes in
Congo and Uganda, signaling worldwide that
impunity might be a thing of the past.
What to look for in 2005 
2004 was a bad year for the world’s goals. But
2005 could be a turnaround year. Two key sets of
freshly minted recommendations await global
action. On peace and security, the UN High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change made
more than 100 recommendations to reform the
United Nations and its related agencies to manage
threats to international peace and security more
effectively. On development issues, the Millennium
Project has put forward a comprehensive analysis
of the strategies needed to attain the Millennium
Development Goals. 
The Asian tsunami at the end of 2004 triggered a
global outpouring of sympathy and assistance,
creating a golden opportunity to focus global
attention on long-term development needs. And
trade negotiations under the Doha Round are
supposed to dismantle the rich world’s agricultural
subsidies. Will the world’s governments, business
and civil society organizations seize these
opportunities? Or will all too many of them continue
to shirk their commitments and responsibilities?
2004 was a bad year for the world’s
goals. But 2005 could be a
turnaround year
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More than four years ago, in the Millennium
Declaration, the world’s governments set forth a
comprehensive agenda to turn the world away from
environmental overload, uncurable pandemics,
pervasive malnutrition and poverty, and war. Not
mere aspirations, these were concrete necessities,
for the alternative was grim. Failure to make real
progress towards these objectives would leave few
feeling secure. Unchecked poverty and hunger in a
world of unshared riches heighten social and
political unrest. Widespread environmental
degradation and natural disasters devastate
societies and generate massive economic costs.
And an unhealthy, oppressed, heavily armed society
anywhere in the world becomes a tinderbox of
exploitation and resentment. Yet as this report
makes very clear, the world is allowing far too many
opportunities to address these problems to slip
through our collective fingers.
It does not have to be this way. The Millennium
Declaration’s aims are achievable, and many
players are trying in earnest to move in the right
direction. Some governments, rich and poor alike,
have committed more resources to policies
focused on equitable development. Some regional
and international institutions are coordinating and
harmonizing important initiatives. Some civil society
organizations—both internationally and locally—are
providing crucial services and persuasive advocacy.
And some private companies are implementing
systems to manage the social and environmental
impacts of their investments and operations—
responsibly.
But declarations at summits are more audible than
progress on the ground. The world’s promise on
genocide—“never again”—rings hollow in the
dithering response to the growing casualty count in
Sudan. Years, even decades, of promises by the
world’s rich countries to reduce agricultural
subsidies and increase their aid budgets remain
more rhetorical than real. Limited governmental
capacity and pervasive corruption in much of the
world undermine progress in countries large and
small. Greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise,
and the world’s biggest source refuses to adhere to
the one agreement that the rest of the world has
adopted to begin constraining those emissions.
Two years ago, we launched the Global
Governance Initiative to call attention to the
appalling gap between the rhetoric of global goals
and the reality of so little effort. Each year the
Initiative brings together leading experts from
around the world to assess the contributions of all
the types of actors on the global stage:
governments, intergovernmental organizations, the
business community and civil society. It looks
broadly across the full range of security, human
rights, development and environmental issues so
fundamental to global peace and prosperity. Those
issues include but go beyond the development-
oriented goals that have come to be known as the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
For calendar 2004 the Global Governance Initiative
evaluated humanity’s efforts to achieve goals in six
overarching categories:
• Peace and security: free all peoples from the
scourge of war, both within and between
states; seek to eliminate the dangers posed by
weapons of mass destruction; take concerted
action against international terrorism; end illicit
traffic in small arms.
• Poverty and hunger: halve the proportion of
people living in extreme poverty (less than $1 a
day income) by 2015; halve the number of
people suffering from hunger by 2015.
• Education: ensure universal primary education
by 2015, eliminate gender disparities in
primary and secondary education by 2005 and
in all levels of education by 2015.
• Health: stop and begin to reverse the spread of
HIV/AIDS and malaria and reduce by two-thirds
the under-five mortality rate and by three-
quarters the maternal mortality rate, by 2015.
• Environment: stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system;
Introduction
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implement conventions related to the
conservation of biodiversity; halve the
proportions of people without access to water
and sanitation by 2015.
• Human rights: uphold international human
rights standards with particular attention to the
prevention of torture and ill treatment,
protection of the rights of migrants, human
rights in daily life, and corporate accountability.
The scores for 2004
To make its findings as readily comprehensible as
possible, the Initiative gives the world a score, on a
zero to ten scale for each issue area, grading
humanity on how hard it is trying to achieve its
most important aims. Ten is simply a passing
grade, indicating that the world is investing the
effort to be on track to achieve the goals in a timely
fashion. Every step below 10 indicates an
increasingly significant shortfall in the necessary
level of effort. At one, the world is doing essentially
nothing, and zero signifies retrogression.
The good news for 2004 is that the world is above
zero in all issue areas. The bad news is that it is
barely above zero. Across the board, in all major
issue areas, humanity is doing roughly a third of
what it should have been doing to be on track to
achieve the goals. These numbers are similar to the
scores for 2003. As long as the effort remains so
low, the world will continue to slip further behind,
and the burden on future years will continue to grow.
This year’s report explains why the world earned
the scores it did. The explanations vary by issue
area, but a few common themes stand out. One is
that many promises have been made over the
years, but they are rarely kept in full. Evaluating
progress entails keeping track of the transition from
rhetoric to binding commitments, to concrete policy
designs backed by the required budgetary
allocations, and finally to implementation activities
that lead to impact on the ground. Because only a
few years have passed since the goals were
adopted, most actions still fall into the early stages
of this continuum.
Moving towards policy initiatives and investment
actions is now critical. As the education, health
and poverty and hunger chapters show, policy
too often falters somewhere around the transition
from commitments to concrete policy designs
with full budgetary allocations. For this reason,
the agreement in July 2004 to undertake serious
negotiations to dismantle the rich world’s
entrenched system of agricultural subsidies,
which leaves poor farmers unable to compete,
does not by itself substantially raise the score for
efforts on poverty alleviation. And even though
the coming into force of the Kyoto protocol on
climate change is a much needed first step,
environmental treaties have so often been more
honored in the breach than in the observance
that the environment score must remain a lowly
three. The picture on peace and security was so
dire across the board, from Iraq to Darfur, that
the world’s score fell to two.
New opportunities and risks
Cynics see the gap between global aspirations and
global actions as what should be expected from a
world of selfish humans divided into contending
countries. But they are wrong—emphatically wrong.
Conditions have never been more right for the world
to do much better. Over the past two decades
economic globalization, political liberalization and
technical innovation have created new opportunities
for solving many of the most pressing problems. For
the first time in history, more than half the world’s
people live under freely elected governments. And
over the past decade some three billion people
moved from living in state-controlled economies to
economies operating on market principles. The new
opportunities are unparalleled.
Even so, pursuing the world’s goals needs
deliberate, coordinated efforts involving everyone.
But the structures to support and channel those
efforts are weak. The world’s intergovernmental
organizations depend for resources and mandates
on member governments that often put short-term
self-interest ahead of the global interest—or simply
show little interest.
The good news for 2004 is that the
world is above zero in all issue
areas. The bad news is that it is
barely above zero
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Moreover, governments, intergovernmental
organizations and advocacy groups are all set up to
deal separately with issues that are deeply
intertwined. It is almost impossible to make
sustained progress towards any one of the goals if
the others are ignored. Some of the health goals,
particularly for HIV/AIDS, have moved up on the
global priority list—but progress on health actually
depends heavily on many other improvements. The
most basic health indicator, life expectancy, is
strongly correlated with economic status, rising
dramatically as people emerge from poverty and as
per capita GNP reaches $2,000 and more. The
poorest are less likely to have adequate housing,
nutrition, potable water or sanitation—and 80% of
disease can be traced to inadequate sanitation.
Other chapters point to the connections between
climate change and poverty, peace and access to
water, education and terrorism, and the myriad other
ways that link the elements of human well-being.
Just as the problems are linked, so are the
problem-solvers. There is no doubt that the primary
responsibility for achieving the goals lies with
governments. Governments exist to solve exactly
the kind of public goods problems the goals
address. Governments are the rule-setters, the
regulators, the tax authorities, the enforcers. But
they cannot do the job alone. Perhaps the most
important flaw in our current approaches for
achieving global goals, and certainly the least
recognized, is that structures and policies are not in
place to channel the enormous energies of private
enterprise. That is why this year’s report has a
special focus on the private sector. As the next
chapter argues, and as all the subsequent chapters
illustrate for various issue areas, there are great
opportunities to use the energies of the private
sector.
Looking forward
2004 was a tough year for most of the goals. But it
is crucial—and quite possible—for 2005 to be a
turnaround year. Attention now focuses on the
December 2004 report of the UN Secretary-
General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, “A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility,” which made more than 100
recommendations to reform the United Nations and
its related agencies to more effectively manage
threats to international peace and security. Deadly
conflict and mass violence are not inevitable. Well
targeted conflict prevention, peacemaking,
peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts—by
governments and intergovernmental organizations
acting with the strong support of the private sector
and civil society—do make a difference.
The Millennium Project, an ambitious effort to
advise the United Nations and the world on
strategies to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals, released its recommendations early in
2005. In fall 2005 the United Nations will hold a
high-level review of progress towards the
Millennium Declaration’s goals, an opportunity for
the international community to focus on what it is,
and is not, doing. One potentially crucial advance
could occur on trade: the July 2004 Framework
Agreement on agricultural subsidies is intended to
lead to a new Agreement on Agriculture involving
cuts in domestic agricultural support that distort
markets and much deeper cuts in export
subsidies.
The United Kingdom plans to leverage its
simultaneous chairmanship of the G8 and EU to
fulfill the promises of its High-Level Commission on
Africa, launched in May 2004. The G8 plans to
expand its initiative to combat famine in the Horn of
Africa through new national food security
frameworks. It also pledged to improve worldwide
emergency assessment and response systems and
to foster rural development and agricultural
productivity across Africa.
Now that the Kyoto Protocol is in effect, its
signatories will have to report before the end of the
year on their progress towards Kyoto’s climate
change targets—and few are on track. The
European Community’s Emission Trading System
kicks off in 2005, but leaves out the transport
sector and aviation industry.
Pursuing the world’s goals needs
deliberate, coordinated efforts
involving everyone
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Multiple efforts are under way to align international
development objectives, Global Compact norms
and private investment flows. Some leading
European investors have committed 5% of their
research budgets—more than $7 million in 2005—
to commission studies on social responsibility and
governance and their impact on long-term financial
performance.
These recommendations and promises, and others
like them, could make a significant difference—if
they lead to action. In last year’s report, we wrote:
“History is likely to judge all of us more for our
progress towards these goals than for marginal
changes in GDP or the rise of stock indices. Given
the record in 2003, history’s judgment is unlikely to
be flattering.” 2004 was not an improvement. It is
up to all of us to ensure that 2005 is different.
These recommendations and
promises could make a
significant difference—if they
lead to action

The role of the private sector
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Operating in a world of new risks and
opportunities
The world’s goals cannot be achieved without the
private sector. As we risk falling farther and farther
behind in reaching many of these goals, neither
governments nor civil society nor intergovernmental
organizations can ignore the impact of private
enterprise. Profitable and responsible businesses—
from multinational companies to microenterprises—
offer enormous potential to drive innovation, create
wealth, share technology, raise living standards and
improve the quality of life for millions of people
around the world. Conversely, bad or corrupt
business practices—or the pursuit of illegal profit—
contribute to conflict, poverty, human rights abuses
and environmental decline.
But business is at worst only part of the problem
and at best can be only part of the solution—the
prime responsibility for achieving global goals rests
with governments. Indeed, even the most efficient,
innovative and responsible business can
accomplish little in the absence of good
governance. Governments have the core
responsibility for establishing accountability
structures and mobilizing the resources to achieve
key international goals.
Within such a framework of government leadership,
the private sector can help governments and their
citizens achieve these goals. And within such a
framework private enterprises and their industry
associations can be held accountable. Having said
this, the business community can, and should, be
far more proactive. In a global economy of more
than 60,000 multinational companies with some
800,000 affiliates in more than 190 countries, the
corporate sector has an important role in helping
achieve peace and security, human rights,
eradication of poverty and hunger, better access to
education and healthcare, and environmental
sustainability.
Given that private enterprise is directly affected by
progress, or lack of progress, towards these
international goals, it is in the interests of business
leaders to be part of the debate—and part of the
action.
In today’s global economy, companies need to
develop new markets and business opportunities
to remain competitive, and that requires healthy,
educated, prosperous populations in stable
societies throughout the world. Some of the most
promising future markets are in today’s developing
countries and in new technologies designed to
meet social and environmental needs. Most
companies also benefit from a reasonably stable
and secure operating environment, with the rule of
law, effective institutions and a predictable
regulatory framework.
At the same time, most companies need to
manage new risks and protect their reputations. In
the wake of recent corporate governance
scandals, the business community needs to build,
or rebuild, trust. Unfairly or not, the public
exposure of corporate malfeasance affecting
millions of people has undermined the credibility of
business as a whole. Companies are likely to face
continuing demands for greater transparency and
accountability, not only in their corporate
governance, but also in their broader economic,
social and environmental performance. These
demands are likely to come not just from
regulators but from a growing array of
stakeholders, including increasingly sophisticated
activists, with strategies ranging from shareholder
The role of the private sector
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proxies and consumer campaigns to litigation and
investigative journalism.
At a minimum, governments and companies must
ensure that business activities do not undermine
progress towards international goals. Such actions,
detailed in this report, include regulatory and
voluntary efforts to prevent environmental
degradation, corporate complicity in human rights
abuses, bad labour practices, business support for
repressive regimes, the funding of corruption and
conflict, profiteering in times of war or crisis, or
having an undue or unaccountable influence over
rule-making.
But avoiding harm is not enough. There is
enormous potential to harness the energies of
private enterprise in ways that provide exciting new
opportunities to develop profitable products and
markets and engage in strategic philanthropy and
responsible public advocacy. Given the right
incentives and institutional support, private
products, services, technologies, resources,
competencies and networks can contribute much
to international goals, whether it is developing
innovative new products and markets to tackle
environmental challenges or finding profitable ways
to deliver affordable goods and services to the
poor. Large companies or their business
associations can also use their influential voices to
urge policymakers to ensure that national and
global rules truly serve the broad public interests
that, in the long run, are of benefit to the business
community itself.
One of the great opportunities of our time is
therefore to find new ways to engage private
enterprises in achieving public goals—in ways that
make sound business sense. For businesses and
societies to prosper in the coming decade and
beyond, leaders from governments, citizen groups
and the business community should:
• Promote greater awareness of how business
benefits from achieving the global goals.
• Understand and harness the biggest
contributions of private enterprise.
• Manage the negative impacts of privatization
and market liberalization.
• Create a better environment for private
investment.
Purchasing power parity
in U.S. dollars
Tier 1
Population in millions
Tiers 2–3
Tier 4
> $20,000
$1,500–20,000
<$1,500
75–100
1,500–1,750
4,000
Four billion people at the base of the
pyramid
Source: UN Commission on the Private Sector and Development
2004. 
• The production of safe and cost-effective products and
services in a manner that creates local jobs and wealth,
supports training and technology transfer and reflects
international standards and values in such areas as cor-
porate governance, ethics, the environment, labour,
and human rights.
• Business-led solutions to improve access to medicines,
water, technology, clean energy and credit for low-
income families and other underserved markets.
• The development of new environmental technologies to
improve environmental conditions.
• The work of social entrepreneurs who apply business
models and disciplines to meet social and environmen-
tal challenges.
• Efforts to align corporate philanthropic and community
investment programmes with a company’s core com-
petencies, skills and purpose—going far beyond simply
writing checks.
• Business leaders and business groups advocating
publicly for the international goals and supporting
efforts to build capacity in countries with weak and
underresourced governance systems.
Examples of companies and entrepreneurs
making positive contributions
One of the great opportunities of
our time is to find new ways to
engage private enterprises in
achieving public goals
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• Experiment with and scale up new business
models and new types of partnership.
How businesses benefit from supporting
international goals
Globalization has transformed the economic
landscape of almost every country, bringing private
enterprise to the heart of economic growth and
development. It has increased the reach and
influence of the private sector, just as it has
challenged the ability of nation states to govern the
global public domain. It has conferred new rights
and opportunities on global companies, just as it
has created new competitive pressures and risks
and led to greater demands for greater corporate
responsibility, transparency and accountability.
As UNDP and the International Business Leaders
Forum argue in their report, Business and the
Millennium Development Goals, it makes good
business sense to contribute towards the
achievement of international goals for at least three
reasons: to improve the operating environment, to
lower direct costs and risk, and to harness new
business opportunities and markets.2
Improving the operating environment
Most legal enterprises benefit from stable and
secure societies. They benefit from access to a
healthy and competent workforce and to
prosperous consumers and investors. Productive
and competitive companies benefit from open, rule-
based, reasonably predictable and
nondiscriminatory trading and financial systems and
a noncorrupt and well-governed economy. Failure to
achieve international goals will undermine some or
all of these crucial pillars of business success.
Lowering direct costs and risks
Business leaders face new and often unfamiliar
risks. The risks include working in countries where
there is weak or bad governance, under-resourced
public administrations, high levels of bribery and
corruption, poor records on human rights,
inadequate implementation of environmental, safety
and labour standards, and high levels of poverty,
inequality and illiteracy. They also include HIV/AIDS,
global climate change, ageing populations, game-
changing technologies and new security threats
ranging from international terrorism to cyber-
assaults. Moreover, corporate reputations and
brands can be seriously damaged if companies are
proven, or even seen, to be part of the problem
rather than part of the solution on such global
issues as poverty, peace and environmental
protection.
Harnessing new markets and business
opportunities
Business leaders face ongoing pressure to deliver
short-term financial performance and to remain
profitable in more competitive and less certain
conditions. In a growing number of industries,
some of the key opportunities for future growth and
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“Corporate responsibility is not only a business challenge. Even more
important, it concerns the relationship between business and society, the
respective rights and obligations of different social sectors and actors—
government, the media, and civil society organizations, as well as business—
and the relative efficacy of voluntary versus regulatory approaches to meeting
social needs. Questions of governance are involved at every step of the way.”
—John Ruggie, Harvard University1
Extending the coverage of crucial health services, including
a relatively small number of specific interventions, to the
world’s poor could save millions of lives a year, reduce
poverty, spur economic growth, and promote global securi-
ty. …We estimate that by 2010 around 8 million lives per
year, in principle, could be saved—mainly in the low-income
countries—by the essential interventions against infectious
diseases and nutritional deficiencies recommended here.
…We estimate that approximately 330 million disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) would be saved for each 8 mil-
lion deaths prevented. Assuming, conservatively, that each
DALY saved gives an economic benefit of one year’s per
capita income of a projected $563 in 2015, the direct eco-
nomic benefit of saving 330 million DALYs would be $186
billion a year, and plausibly several times that. Economic
growth would also accelerate, and thereby the saved DALYs
would help to break the poverty trap that has blocked eco-
nomic growth in high-mortality, low-income countries. This
would add tens or hundreds of billions of dollars more per
year through increased per capita incomes.
Source: Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
2001, introduction and pp. 11–12.
The economic benefits of good health
provision
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market development lie either in innovative new
technologies that address major economic, social
and environmental challenges—or in expanding to
today’s developing economies, especially those
with large populations, abundant natural resources
and good governance. The World Bank estimates
that in the next 25 to 30 years, some 40% of global
income will come from the developing world.3
Some of the world’s most successful companies
are developing new technologies, products and
services—and in some cases even transforming
their core business models—to respond to
development challenges and in some cases turn
those challenges into profit-making opportunities.
Producing affordable products and services for the
estimated 3 billion people who live on less than $2
dollars a day, for example, offers a multibillion dollar
business opportunity, as outlined in chapter 2 on
alleviating poverty and hunger. Spreading the
benefits of information technology, and developing
environmental technologies that help meet the
world’s growing demand for energy, food and water
sustainably and affordably, also offer new business
opportunities.
Business’s biggest contributions to
international goals
Profitable and responsible private enterprises have
an unprecedented opportunity to contribute to the
countries and communities where they operate.
But they need to do this in a way that mobilizes
business competencies and makes sound
business sense. Business cannot substitute for
good government. And the push to involve
business in achieving global goals should not raise
unrealistic expectations of private capacity and
capability.
The most important contribution of companies to
international goals is through their core business
activities, complying with laws and standards to
minimize the negative impacts of their activities and
finding innovative and profitable business solutions
to development challenges. Those core business
activities can expand economic growth, create
employment and training opportunities, share
technologies and serve as a major source of tax
revenues thus improving living standards in the
communities where they operate. While this is a
vital contribution in and of itself, it is clear the
private sector can and should do more, leveraging
its core business operations and resources to
address public problems that have an important
bearing on the business climate in which they
operate.
There are four types of business contribution, each
of which can be achieved through individual
corporations acting alone or in a variety of
partnerships with other businesses, governments,
or non-profit groups.
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The financial risks of climate change offer one example
where the private sector has a strong and direct stake in
bringing about progress towards a major international goal.
The Investor Network on Climate Risk established in 2003,
brings together investors in the United States with more
than $800 billion under management. Its Investor Guide to
Climate Risk states: “Global climate change poses major
risks and investment opportunities for shareholders and
companies. The risks come primarily in two forms—physi-
cal risks and policy risks. Weather-related catastrophes
topped $55 billion in 2003. As global warming continues,
the annual toll could reach $150 billion in the next 10
years—and $300 billion a year by 2050. The French insur-
ance company AXA estimates that about 20% of global
GDP is now affected by climatic events and that ‘climatic
risk in numerous branches of industry is more important
than the risk of interest rates or foreign exchange risk.
Governments around the world, and regionally in the
United States, are enacting policies to reduce emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs).
Regulation of GHGs poses an additional financial risk,
especially in sectors with significant GHG emissions, such
as electricity, oil and gas, and automobiles.’”
Source: Investor Network on Climate Risk 2004, foreword.
The financial risks of climate change
Profitable and responsible private
enterprises have unprecedented
opportunity to contribute to
countries and communities where
they operate
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• One type is fully commercial, as in some of the
“bottom of the pyramid” examples described
in the chapter on poverty and hunger, where
companies are providing profitable products
and services to the poor, or some of the
products and technologies being developed to
address environmental challenges outlined in
the chapter on the environment. In these
cases, the profit motive is sufficient to engage
business, but corporations may not be aware
of the opportunities or have not yet devised
business models able to capitalize on them. In
such cases, governments and non-profits may
work with businesses to develop appropriate
incentives and knowledge.
• Second, and among some of the most
innovative new approaches being undertaken
by business, are hybrids of fully commercial
investments and philanthropic or social venture
capital endeavours. Some practices,
partnerships or business models have a clear
business case even though they may not
initially meet the company’s normal investment
hurdle rates of forecasted profitability and
therefore require an element of philanthropy,
social investment or public funding. These
include corporate HIV/AIDS prevention and
treatment programs that extend beyond
workers to include their communities, some
microcredit funds, and public-private water
partnerships that clear up watersheds to the
benefit of both water-consuming industries
and citizens in nearby communities.
• Third, companies can make a meaningful
contribution to addressing international goals
through their strategic corporate philanthropy
and social investment initiatives, especially when
they address issues most relevant to the needs
and interests of their operating environment or
industry (for example, logistics companies
supporting transportation needs, pharmaceutical
companies supporting healthcare, technology
companies reducing the digital divide).
• Fourth, companies can contribute through
transparent and responsible business
engagement in public policy dialogue, rule-
making and institution-building, operating
individually, through industry and trade
associations, or in partnership with non-
business actors.4
In all these areas, business can most effectively
promote positive change when it works in
alignment with others. But business can work in
partnership with others only in an environment of
mutual respect and trust.
The negative impacts of privatization and
market liberalization
Over the past 20 years privatization and market
liberalization have transformed the economies of
almost every country. They have led to a growing
reliance on market-based strategies and on private
financing and management for the delivery of
public goods. In many cases this transformation
has resulted in increased efficiency, effectiveness,
availability and accountability of service delivery and
products. But not always.
Privatization and market liberalization have also
created or worsened social, environmental and
economic problems. Examples include corruption
and crony capitalism in some countries, job losses
from industrial restructuring in both developed and
developing economies, poor ethical, environmental,
labour and human rights standards, and real and
perceived inequalities in the privatization of such
essential services as water, infrastructure, education
and healthcare. Such problems are especially likely
where there are weak social safety nets and transition
strategies—or where there are market distortions,
excesses and externalities from unregulated or
underregulated markets, or from nontransparent and
unaccountable corporate practices. Having adequate
institutions in place to manage the process of
privatization is crucial. A private enterprise system
depends not only on having individual private owners,
but also on a system of rules and institutions that
enable the market to function.
Concerns about privatization have repeatedly hit the
headlines in recent years, raising serious questions
The most important contribution of
companies to international goals is
through their core business
activities, finding innovative and
profitable business solutions to
development challenges
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Social investment and philanthropic activities
Mobilize core competencies and resources such as money, products, 
skills, premises and people to help support or strengthen local 
communities by:
• Supporting education, training, youth development, environmental and 
health and nutrition projects in local communities.
• Building capacity of community leaders and social entrepreneurs.
• Training local technical specialists in environmental management.
• Building the governance capacity and voice of local civil society 
groups and media organizations.
• Supporting multicultural education programmes.
• Assisting with voter education initiatives.
• Establishing and supporting microcredit programmes and small 
business support.
Core business activities
Business can contribute to 
international goals in many ways 
through its core operations. This 
includes: producing safe and 
affordable products and services, 
creating jobs, generating local 
income and investment, paying 
taxes, training employees, 
transferring technology, building 
links with micro, small and medium 
enterprises, spreading international 
business practices, and establishing 
physical and institutional 
infrastructure. At a minimum, these 
activities should comply with the 
law, manage risks, and minimize 
negative social and environmental 
impacts, while remaining profitable. 
Policy dialogue and advocacy activities
Take individual and collective action to influence the enabling environment and support 
systemic change at a local, national and international level by:
• Working with governments to improve social infrastructure by supporting healthcare and 
education reform and quality improvement.
• Addressing environmental regulatory and fiscal policies with governments and civil 
society.
• Engaging in global dialogue on issues such as climate change and biodiversity.
• Supporting local and national governments to achieve: the elimination of bribery and 
corruption; efficient public administration and service delivery; fair and transparent 
regulations; and respect for human rights.
• Helping to increase ability to attract and retain foreign and domestic investment.
• Advocating for improved access for developing country exports to OECD markets.
• Advocating for increased levels of donor government aid to developing countries.
• Increasing transparency of private payments to government in the form of taxes, royalties 
and political campaign finance.
Hybrid activities
Some of the most innovative approaches being undertaken by business are hybrids of commercial investments and philanthropy 
or social venture capital. Certain practices, partnerships or business models have a clear business case even though they may 
not initially meet the company's normal investment hurdle rates and therefore require an element of philanthropy, social 
investment or public funding. These include some microcredit funds, corporate HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programmes 
that extend beyond workers to include their communities, and public-private water partnerships that clear up watersheds to the 
benefit of both water-consuming industries and citizens in nearby communities.
Source: Adapted from Nelson 1996, 2002 (International Business Leaders Forum and United Nations). 
Spheres of business impact and influence
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about how to provide public goods, ensure that the
poor have adequate access, and hold accountable
private firms that are serving essentially public
functions. Concerns range from continuing debate
about the costs and merits of privatizing water (see
chapter 5 on the environment) to concerns about
the behaviour and accountability of private military
and security services operating in Iraq and
elsewhere (see chapter 1 on peace and security
and chapter 6 on human rights). These very
different cases both illustrate the limits of markets
and private enterprise in the absence of good
governance, sound regulation and transparent and
effective accountability frameworks.
The job transfers associated with off-shoring
manufacturing and service jobs from OECD
countries offer another example of the inevitable
business challenges and policy dilemmas of
operating in a highly competitive global economy.
Outsourcing and offshoring can increase
employment in low-income countries by creating
jobs, especially for educated young people. In a
world where half the workforce earns less than $2
a day, such opportunities are crucial. But they are
generating some job losses and major social and
political debate in the United States, and
increasingly in Europe. Critics argue that offshoring
will in time depress living standards in rich
countries and increase exploitation in poor
countries. An alternative view is that it will increase
global wealth and productivity to the long term
benefit of all economies—as incomes rise in the
insourcing countries, and as outsourcing
economies adapt and generate replacement jobs
by developing new industries, technologies,
products and services.
But do governments and employers offer new
employees fair wages for equivalent work and
comparable and safe working conditions? And are
the jobs lost “at home” compensated by new jobs
or other means, such as retraining or business
development opportunities? For both questions,
governments have an important regulatory and
public policy role. They can also create fiscal and
other incentives to engage employers in finding
appropriate solutions.
A better environment for private investment
Business needs a better enabling environment for
private investment and enterprise if its potential
contribution to the global agenda is to be fully
realized. Part of the responsibility of governments is
to create that enabling environment, to the benefit
of business small and large, domestic and foreign.
This includes appropriate macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies, rule of law, private
property rights, antibribery and anticorruption
measures, fiscal and market incentives, and other
regulatory and institutional frameworks.
Several major reports in 2004 focused on this
challenge: the World Development Report 2005: A
Better Investment Climate for Everyone; the report
of the UN Commission on the Private Sector and
Development to the Secretary-General; the World
Bank’s Global Monitoring Report 2004, focusing on
progress towards the Millennium Development
Goals, and the World Bank’s Doing Business in
2005 on removing obstacles to growth. These and
other reports all emphasize that stronger economic
growth is essential to meeting international goals,
that the private sector is crucial to driving this
growth, and that public policy reforms must be
accelerated and improved to ensure a better
climate for private sector development and
investment.
Doing Business in 2005 benchmarked regulatory
performance in 145 nations. It found that poor
nations, through their administrative procedures,
still make it twice as hard as rich nations for
entrepreneurs to start, operate or close a business.
It also found that businesses in poor countries have
half the property rights protections available to
businesses in rich countries. The report cites that,
“on average, it takes a business in a rich nation six
procedures, 8% of income per capita and 27 days
to get started; in a poor or lower-middle-income
economy, the same process takes 11 procedures,
122% of income per capita and 59 days. In more
Privatization and market
liberalization have transformed the
economies of almost every country
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than a dozen poor countries, registering a new
business takes more than 100 days.”5 There is
growing evidence that heavy regulation, corruption
and weak property rights have an especially
negative impact on the poor, excluding many of
them from doing business, particularly younger
people, and particularly women.
Developed country governments can also do much
to improve the environment for business in
developing and transition economies. How? By
lowering trade barriers, increasing development aid
and providing export and risk guarantees to
“home-based” companies that can provide
business solutions and investments to tackle
development needs in poorer countries.
But it is developing country governments that have
the core role in creating a better investment climate
that benefits all private enterprises, not just the
large, powerful or well-connected. Without sound
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies,
without the rule of law and property rights, without
reliable regulatory and financial institutions, without
transparent public finances and efforts to tackle
corruption—it is unlikely that domestic or foreign
private enterprises can make a meaningful
contribution to achieving international goals.
New business models and partnerships
New types of partnership between business,
government and civil society organizations can
draw on the strengths, resources and
competencies of each to help drive economic
growth, spreading its benefits more widely, and
ensuring that it is environmentally and politically
sustainable. Some of the world’s most exciting
institutional, organizational and technological
innovations are a result of such alliances.
These multistakeholder alliances and partnerships
are not a panacea. Nor are they easy to establish
or sustain. They require a difficult balance of
idealism and pragmatism, creative visioning and
practical implementation, a strong commitment to
purpose and a ready willingness to compromise.
Many have high transaction costs, and fail to live
up to their hype and expectations. But if they can
be made to work, they can be a powerful force for
change and a vital tool for ensuring greater
leverage and legitimacy in bringing different
stakeholders together to achieve international
goals. They need to be better understood, to know
what works and what doesn’t. And they need to be
better supported with appropriate institutional
frameworks and incentives to bring different
partners to the table. One of the greatest
challenges is taking successful pilot projects to
scale and ensuring that their impacts are more
systemic.
Three categories of partnership offer great potential
for engaging private enterprises in achieving
international goals:
• Mobilizing private resources and innovation for
specific projects.
• Improving governance, by creating an enabling
environment for investment or by improving
standards, transparency and accountability.
• Engaging companies in national business
coalitions.
Mobilizing private resources
Some of the most innovative examples of new
alliances are the wide range of public-private and
corporate-NGO partnerships that have emerged in
recent years to mobilize financial and in-kind
resources to support specific development needs
and projects. Some aim to deliver a profitable or
charitable solution to a problem. Others aim to help
governments to build public management and
delivery capacity for addressing a specific
development need, such as access to medicines or
clean water, or improved quality of education or
nutrition.
Human Development Index
Ease of doing business
0 30 60 90 120 150
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Simpler business regulation, more
human development
Source: World Bank and IFC 2004. 
Business needs a better enabling
environment for private investment
and enterprise if its potential
contribution to the global agenda is
to be fully realized
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Examples abound in the health field, as described
in the health and poverty chapters. They include
the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria; the Global Business Coalition on
HIV/AIDS; the Accelerating Access Initiative and the
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition. In education,
partnerships are moving beyond corporate
philanthropy to address education reform, quality
improvement, and large-scale access. Examples
include the Education Quality Improvement
Programme (EQUIP) run by the National Business
Initiative in South Africa, the Instituto Qualidade no
Ensino, led by the American Chamber of
Commerce in Brazil, and the partnership of UNDP,
Cisco Systems, and others to expand the Cisco
Networking Academies to some of the world’s least
developed countries.
Public-private partnerships are also emerging to
mobilize business support for development more
generally. These include the UN Global Compact,
the World Bank’s Development Marketplace, the
International Finance Corporation’s Corporate
Citizenship Facility, the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development, the International
Business Leaders Forum, the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s Global Development
Alliance and the World Economic Forum’s Global
Institute for Partnership and Governance. All aim
to create a space for new types of cross-sector
dialogue, and multistakeholder funding
mechanisms and development projects that
combine the resources and competencies of
business with other actors.
Improving governance
Creating an enabling environment for investment.
As discussed above, an appropriate enabling
environment or set of framework conditions is an
important pre-requisite for engaging the private
sector in supporting international goals. If
companies can barely survive—due to bad public
policies, weak public institutions or lack of
incentives and poor access to key resources and
markets—they are unlikely to address broader
social, economic and environmental issues. A key
challenge is the need to attract foreign direct
investment to some of the world’s least developed
countries. This has led to a number of innovative
public-private partnerships. Examples include
UNDP’s recently established Growing Sustainable
Business for Poverty Reduction initiative and an
alliance between the International Chamber of
Commerce and UNCTAD to improve investment
information and services for foreign investors in
countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali and
Mozambique.
Multistakeholder partnerships are also being
created to devise innovative ways to attract
investment to achieving environmental goals. As
the environment chapter details, several new
alliances have emerged to create the framework
conditions for addressing climate change. Business
The UN’s Commission on the Private Sector and
Development, Report to the Secretary-General of
the UN: Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making
Business Work for the Poor
Convened in 2003 by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the
Commission was co-chaired by Paul Martin, Prime Minister of
Canada, and Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico. It
included 15 members from government, business, civil soci-
ety, international institutions and academia. Its final report in
2004 stated:
“The Commission believes that any approach to private sec-
tor development—and the policy and action recommenda-
tions that accompany it—should be grounded in the realiza-
tion that the savings, investment and innovation that lead to
development are undertaken largely by private individuals,
corporations and communities. The private sector can allevi-
ate poverty by contributing to economic growth, job creation
and poor people’s incomes. It can also empower poor peo-
ple by providing a broad range of products and services at
lower prices.”
World Development Report 2005: A Better
Investment Climate for Everyone
The 27th in the Bank’s flagship series, the Report looked at
what governments can do to create better investment cli-
mates for their societies. Drawing on new research—includ-
ing surveys of nearly 30,000 firms in 53 developing countries,
other new data, and country case studies—it introduced its
findings as follows:
“Private firms are at the heart of the development process.
Driven by the quest for profits, firms of all types—from farmers
and microentrepreneurs to local manufacturing companies
and multinational enterprises—invest in new ideas and new
facilities that strengthen the foundation of economic growth
and prosperity. They provide more than 90% of jobs—creating
opportunities for people to apply their talents and improve
their situations. They provide the goods and services needed
to sustain life and improve living standards. They are also the
main source of tax revenues, contributing to public funding for
health, education and other services. Firms are thus central
actors in the quest for growth and poverty reduction.” 
The potential contribution of the private sector
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and environmental NGOs have collaborated, for
example, to create an internationally recognized
standard for the measurement of carbon emissions
through the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development and World Resources Institute Green
House Gas Protocol. The World Economic Forum’s
partnership-based Global Greenhouse Gas
Register is another example that provides
standards for disclosure of emissions. The financial
sector has played a growing role through collective
investor-led initiatives such as the Investor Network
on Climate Risk and the Carbon Disclosure Project.
Government-led actions—such as the Kyoto Treaty,
Clean Development Mechanisms, emissions trading
systems and the Global Environment Facility—have
also made a concerted effort to engage the private
sector. All these alliances serve to create new
mandates, markets, incentives and information for
companies to tackle carbon emissions in a more
strategic and systemic manner.
Improving standards, transparency and
accountability
In response to civil society campaigns demanding
change in corporate practices on everything from
worker rights to environmental sustainability to
information disclosure, most large corporations
and many smaller companies have established
some type of code of conduct setting standards
for their environmental and social performance.
Some are aspirational general statements of what
corporations aim to do, while others lay out
specific requirements, sometimes including
arrangements for third-party certification of
compliance. But there are serious questions about
how much individual company codes of conduct
can accomplish. When compliance is unverified by
outsiders, the codes can lack public legitimacy.
But certification is expensive. When codes are
voluntary there are many free-riders, who do not
incur the expenses or exposure of the more
responsible companies taking a lead. And because
standards vary so widely from one company to the
next, there are limits to how much individual codes
can contribute, given the scale of the issues being
addressed.
For these reasons, a number of industry-led and
government-led alliances are being established to
tackle standards, transparency and accountability,
and several of these grew markedly in both size
and rigour during 2004 They include partnerships
aimed to ensure that major infrastructure
investments and natural resource projects are not a
cause of conflict, corruption, increased poverty or
environmental degradation. Key examples include
the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, the
Kimberly Process in the diamond industry, the
Equator Principles for project finance, the Chad-
Cameroon pipeline, and Transparency
International’s Integrity Pacts (see chapter 1 on
peace and security).
Another type of collective action gaining attention is
bringing together industry leaders to improve social,
economic and environmental performance more
systemically along global supply chains. Examples
include the International Council on Metals and
Mining and the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative.
Several major trade unions are starting to sign
Global Framework Agreements with multinational
companies to ensure more consistent
implementation of sound labour practices around
the world. In some sectors, partnership-based
certification and labelling schemes create market
incentives for improving social and environmental
standards. These include the Marine and Forest
Stewardship Councils and the Fair Labour
Association in the apparel sector.
Other multistakeholder alliances, such as the UN’s
Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative,
provide operating and reporting guidelines for
companies to follow to improve their economic,
social and environmental performance. The Global
Reporting Initiative, for example, brings together
representatives from a number of sectors and has
become a leading framework for public reporting
on sustainability performance. In a 2004 survey on
best practice in non-financial reporting carried out
by Standard & Poors, UNEP and SustainAbility,
some 90% of the top ranked companies were
Multistakeholder partnerships are
being created to devise innovative
ways to attract investment to
achieving environmental goals
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using the GRI framework. But, as the report
argued, “well over 50,000 multinational companies
still fail to report.”6
Engaging companies in national business
coalitions
One of the areas of greatest potential for engaging
more private enterprises in helping to achieve
international goals is the establishment of national
umbrella groups of companies focused on
achieving selected security and development
objectives, or using existing business networks and
associations, such as Chambers of Commerce and
Organisations of Employers, to address these
same issues at the country level.
A few longstanding nationwide “business in society”
organizations already provide useful models for
other countries. These include the National
Business Initiative in South Africa, the Philippines
Business for Social Progress, Instituto Ethos in
Brazil, and the Thai Business Initiative for Rural
Development. In all cases, these organizations
consist of a mix of foreign and domestic
companies, working with government bodies,
NGOs, academic institutions and the media, to raise
awareness about development among the business
sector, advocate for pro-development policies,
consult with governments on national poverty
reduction strategies and mobilize financial and
technical resources from business to achieve broad
national development objectives. These nationwide
initiatives have the advantage of being focused on a
particular geography where the companies have
direct investments and operations, and therefore a
clear interest in supporting a secure and prosperous
operating environment. The coalitions enable them
to achieve scale and legitimacy that would be
difficult for any one company on its own, however
large and responsible.
Often, national coalitions work with global partners.
The UN Global Compact has played a catalytic role
in the creation of over 40 national networks, many
of them in developing countries. These local Global
Compact networks are focused on working at the
country level to implement the Compact’s ten
principles in the areas of human rights, labour, anti-
corruption and the environment, and in some cases
on mobilizing private sector support for specific
development projects. Although it is still early days
for many of these networks, they offer an
interesting model worthy of further support and
analysis.
The challenge of HIV/AIDS has also led to the
establishment of national-level business coalitions
in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as active
engagement by the International Organisation of
Employers and its national networks, working in
partnership with the ILO and UNAIDS. The Global
Business Coalition Against HIV/AIDS (with a
membership of over 170 companies) and the World
Economic Forum’s Global Health Initiative are both
helping to build capacity and share good practices
across these national coalitions.
The World Business Council for Sustainable
Development, a global alliance of leading
companies, is another example that helps to
establish and support national business coalitions
dedicated to sustainable development. There are
now 50 national and regional Business Councils
around the world.
A call for stronger business engagement
This chapter has outlined the opportunities and
complexities of the business community’s role in
contributing to the achievement of global goals.
The Global Governance Initiative is founded on the
premise that these vital goals require additional
effort from everyone—not only public institutions
but also companies and non-profit groups. As the
GGI scores this year and last make clear, the
international community, including the business
community, is exerting only about one third of the
effort necessary to achieve the goals.
Yet there is good news. A small vanguard of
companies and business leaders have pioneered
new models of accountability, partnership and
leadership. In many cases they have directly
One of the areas of greatest
potential is the establishment of
national umbrella groups of
companies focused on achieving
selected security and development
objectives
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supported the achievement of international goals.
There are also governments and other actors—
from institutional investors and stock exchanges, to
nongovernmental organizations and trade unions—
that have fostered more responsible business
practices through a combination of regulations,
market mechanisms, civic action and new types of
partnership.
But the vanguard companies number a few
thousand at most. This is far short of the UN’s
estimated total of 60,000 multinationals, let alone
the many millions of large, medium and small
companies that operate around the world. Voluntary
business participation in new types of partnership—
and voluntary “take-up” of the burgeoning variety of
corporate responsibility principles, standards,
guidelines and certification systems—remains too
low in most cases to reach the scale needed for
real impact on the goals targeted.
Critics of business argue that large companies
continue to exert undue influence on national
political processes and global rule-making. They
argue that the lobbying and political activities of
these companies too often undermine or
contradict the ethical, social and environmental
contributions that the same companies have made
through their corporate responsibility and
citizenship programmes. Commonly cited are
contradictory corporate or trade association
positions on climate change and energy, and on
access to drugs.
At the same time, many business leaders argue
that they face unrealistic demands from
stakeholders, in what is already a struggle for
profitability in an unforgiving and fiercely
competitive global economy, especially when they
are operating under conditions of weak or bad
governance. They also argue that pressures from
investors for quarterly, short-term financial
performance make it difficult to address longer
term societal challenges that do not have an
immediate or directly measurable impact on the
corporate bottom line and reputation. In addition,
they point out that in the absence of effective
baseline regulations and global frameworks, their
investment in responsible business practices may
put them at a competitive disadvantage with “free
riders” and emerging competitors from countries
such as China and India.
These pressures ensure that voluntary leadership
by business, while necessary, is insufficient.
Business cannot by itself address global and
national power imbalances, manage market
excesses and market externalities, or mobilize the
political will, public resources and civic action
required to achieve the type of systemic and
scalable change needed to meet international
goals. Strong and effective government and civic
activism are more important than ever. Public
institutions bear the primary responsibility for
leadership.
How, then, should a company’s management or
board of directors approach the task of positioning
a firm to play a more meaningful role? The answer
is first to think carefully about the company’s profile
of risks and opportunities with respect to the
international goals in each—or all—of the four
areas outlined below:
• Core profit-making opportunities.
• Hybrid business practices, partnerships or
business models that combine commercial
acumen and resources with philanthropy or
social investment.
• Philanthropy.
• Collaborative efforts to improve governance.
These four modes of engagement are not mutually
exclusive. Many companies find good reason to
simultaneously undertake a commercial investment,
enter into a sizable partnership with government
and NGOs, make a major philanthropic donation,
and participate actively in public policy dialogue to
address a particular development challenge. Some
firms find it more compelling and better aligned
with their business interests to make a contribution
in only one of these areas.
A small vanguard of companies and
business leaders have pioneered
new models of accountability,
partnership and leadership
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Regardless of the strategy adopted, making such
commitments will often be easier said than done.
Companies operating nationally or internationally
are increasingly besieged with requests for
assistance or engagement. But they need not feel
compelled to develop an exhaustive response to all
the world’s problems, or to commit a large amount
of cash. Instead, the place to begin is for directors
and managers to examine the risks of inaction and
opportunities for action in these four areas and
commit the company in a substantial way to at
least one of them.
The greatest leverage for society and the firm may
be found through the application of the firm’s
tangible assets (equipment, distribution networks) or
intangible assets (management expertise, branding
and marketing strength) rather than through a
check. Indeed, some of the most successful
partnerships have involved the in-kind application of
company resources, which often permit a larger
corporate commitment. Such steps are a good
starting point for what needs to become, in time, a
broader assessment of each company’s global role.
As President Bill Clinton argued at Davos in 2004,
“We know what the problems are. What we lack are
systemic and collective efforts to tackle them.”8 In
most cases, private enterprises cannot, and should
not, bear full responsibility for leading these systemic
and collective efforts. But they can play a crucial role
in supporting them. This calls for engagement in
new types of governance and accountability
structures, investment in new types of public-private
partnership and financing mechanisms, and
individual leadership at the level of the firm and on a
national or industry-wide basis. As the following
chapters show, while the challenges remain daunting
and current global trends give great cause for
concern, emerging models of accountability,
partnership and leadership offer cause for hope and
examples worthy of evaluation and emulation.
Endnotes
1. Speech by Professor John Ruggie at the launch
of the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, 4 March 2004. John Ruggie, former
assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations,
is Director of the Center for Business and
Government.
2. The material for the section on the “business
case” is taken directly from Nelson and Prescott
(2003).
3. Speech by World Bank President James D.
Wolfensohn at the Stern School of Business, New
York, 8 March 2004.
4. The “spheres of business impact and influence”
framework is adapted from Nelson (1996, 2002).
5. World Bank, International Finance Corporation
(2004).
6. Standard & Poors, SustainAbility and UNEP
(2004).
8. Speech by President Clinton at the World
Economic Forum annual meeting, Davos, January
2004.
References
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health.
2001. Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in
Health for Economic Development. Geneva:
World Health Organization.
Investor Network on Climate Risk. 2004. Investor
Guide to Climate Risk. [www.incr.com/
investor_guide/].
Nelson, Jane. 1996. Business as Partners in
Development: Creating Wealth for Countries,
Companies and Communities. World Bank,
United Nations Development Programme, and
International Business Leaders Forum. London.
———. 2002. Building Partnerships: Cooperation
between the United Nations System and the
Private Sector. United Nations and International
Business Leaders Forum. New York.
_____. 2004. The Public Role of Private Enterprise:
Risks, Opportunities and New Models of
“Because of the weakness of appropriate governance systems, corporate
responsibility initiatives are generally disconnected from wider frameworks.
As a result, they risk being little more than drops in the ocean when
compared to the scale of challenges. At worst, they may even undermines
long-term solutions by deflecting attention from the root problems.”
—SustainAbility and UN Global Compact 2004
15
T
h
e
 ro
le
 o
f th
e
 p
riva
te
 s
e
c
to
r
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
Engagement. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University. Cambridge, Mass.
Nelson, Jane, and Dave Prescott. 2003. Business
and the Millennium Development Goals: A
Framework for Action. International Business
Leaders Forum and United Nations Development
Programme. London and New York. [www.undp.
org/business/docs/mdg_business.pdf].
Pfizer Inc. 2002. “Global Health and Economic
Development.” The Pfizer Journal 3(2).
Standard & Poors, SustainAbility and UNEP (United
Nations Environment Programme). 2004. Risk &
Opportunity: Best Practice in Non-Financial
Reporting. The Global Reporters 2004 Survey of
Corporate Sustainability Reporting, London.
SustainAbility and the UN Global Compact. 2004.
Gearing Up: From Corporate Responsibility to
Good Governance and Scalable Solutions.
[www.sustainability.com/publications/
gearing-up.pdf].
UN Commission on the Private Sector and
Development. 2004. Unleashing
Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the
Poor. [www.undp.org/cpsd/].
UN Global Compact and SustainAbility. 2004.
Gearing Up: From Corporate Responsbility to
Good Governance and Scalable Solutions.
[www.sustainability.com/publications/gearing-
up.asp]
World Bank. 2004. World Development Report
2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone.
Washington, D.C.
World Bank, International Finance Corporation.
2004. Doing Business in 2005: Removing
Obstacles to Growth. Oxford University Press:
Washington, D.C.
1 Peace and security
Score
2
17
P
e
a
c
e
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
rity
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
1
On many fronts 2004 was a desolate year for peace
and security. The Iraq nightmare continued. A new
man-made catastrophe arose in Sudan’s Darfur.
Afghanistan emerged as a full-fledged narco-state
despite its successful election. The Israel-Palestine
conflict remained tragically stalemated. The situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo deteriorated.
Kosovo erupted again. Murderous terrorist outrages
occurred from Madrid to Beslan to Jakarta. And the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea quadrupled
its plutonium stockpile while Iran tested the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty to its limits. Key
governments and intergovernmental institutions
made some efforts to anticipate or respond to all
these events, but even more than in 2003, they fell
far short of what was needed to free the world’s
peoples of the scourge of war and mass violence.
The more hopeful news is that 2004 may prove to
be a watershed: a reality check and wake-up call.
With so much going wrong, the limits of what can
be achieved by unilateral action—and by less than
fully committed cooperative action—were starkly
revealed. As the year was concluding, there were
signs that lessons had been learned and the
wheels were beginning to turn. The United States
was establishing new machinery for coordinating
post-conflict state-building. Much thought was
being devoted to addressing the general problem
of failed, failing and fragile states. The African Union
was showing the way for other regional
organizations with its determination to act as a
force for peace, challenging the richer world to give
it the capacity to do so. Developed countries were
starting to look hard at how their armed forces
could become more responsive to contemporary
challenges. And much new attention was being
given to steps to restore the authority and
legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council.1
Performance of governments and
international organizations
In assessing how far actions in 2004 fell short of
what needed to be done, we focused on the five
goals spelled out in the Millennium Declaration,
taking as our benchmark in each case “what would
be the maximum achievable outcome, assuming full
competence and will of all relevant parties”. Simply
put, what could the world really have done this year
in each of these areas if it was really trying?
Eliminating wars between states
No new interstate war began in 2004, but the
impact of earlier ones continued to be felt—acutely
and distressingly. Trauma continued unabated in
Iraq. Security remained unrestored in Afghanistan.
The Israel-Palestine conflict moved no closer to
resolution. And peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea
remained extremely fragile. Only in the Kashmir
dispute between India and Pakistan was there a
significant reduction in tension.
Iraq was again the focus of the world’s attention in
2004. The occupying U.S. and coalition forces, and
foreign civilian contractors, were the targets of
attacks of ever-growing ferocity by both insurgents
and terrorists. But even more victims—some seven
times as many—were Iraqi civilians, as the
deliberate or incidental targets of bombings by Iraqi
insurgents and terrorists—and as innocent
bystanders to U.S. attacks on rebel strongholds.2
Coalition authorities formally handed over power to
an interim Iraqi government on 28 June, following a
Security Council resolution endorsing plans to hold
elections by January 2005 and authorizing the U.S.-
led multinational force to remain in Iraq subject to
the approval of the Iraqi government.3 Questions
remained about whether the security situation would
permit the conduct of credible elections, and the will
Peace and security
Score
2
Goals
Free all peoples from the scourge of war, both within and between states.
Seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.
Take concerted action against international terrorism.
End illicit traffic in small arms.
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of coalition countries was tested by hostage-taking
in Iraq and terrorist attacks at home.
Afghanistan struggled throughout 2004, with the
international community often failing in its promises to
provide security, and narcotics production careered
out of control. The Taliban and other insurgent
groups clashed with the U.S.-led coalition force in the
south and east while the north and northeast saw
regular factional fighting, starkly highlighting the
continuing lack of central government control.
Election workers, and international aid and
construction workers, were the targets of attacks by
the Taliban. Poppy cultivation, though illegal under
the new constitution, expanded to all of the country’s
32 provinces, making income from opium cultivation
and trafficking equivalent to more than half of
Afghanistan’s licit economy in 2004.4 The presidential
election in October proceeded fairly smoothly, despite
earlier concerns that had led to its postponement.
The next big test will be parliamentary elections
scheduled for April 2005. While Kabul remains
relatively stable, expanding the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force beyond the
capital has failed to have more than a superficial
impact on the security situation.5
The ongoing border dispute between Eritrea and
Ethiopia, which led to 70,000 lives lost in war in
1998, remains unresolved. Both sides refused to
give way on the demarcation issue, with Eritrea
insisting that the 2003 decision of the international
border commission to award the disputed village of
Badme to Eritrea be respected—and Ethiopia
insisting that it be revisited (though showing some
signs of more flexibility toward the end of the year).
The UN peacekeeping mission remains in place,
but the UN warned in July that it could not
continue to police the border indefinitely.
While Kashmir continues to be a flashpoint in
India-Pakistan relations, both countries have
declared their commitment to a negotiated
settlement. The diplomatic détente saw both
foreign ministers and heads of government
meeting bilaterally in September, and prime
ministers in November, though initial discussions
focused on general confidence building and
normalization rather than Kashmir. Tension has
been reduced with the restoration of
communication links and India’s decision to start
pulling some of its troops out of Kashmir, but
fighting continues between separatist groups and
the remaining Indian security forces.
Despite some decrease in terrorist incidents, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained wholly
unresolved, continuing to destabilize the region and
fuel Islamist extremism farther afield. Controversy
continued unabated on settlement expansion and
the location of Israel’s security wall within
Palestinian territory. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
announced a plan—supported by the Bush
administration—to unilaterally withdraw from the
Gaza Strip. But he faced opposition from his own
Likud Party, right-wing religious parties and Israeli
settlers,7 as well as those questioning his bona
fides.8 The plan intensified internal Palestinian strife,
as factions positioned themselves to take
advantage of Israel’s planned pullout. The death of
Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yasser Arafat in
November gave hope for renewed engagement by
the United States in the peace process in 2005 if
an orderly PA leadership transfer could be
achieved.9
Eliminating war within states
While there has been a significant overall downward
trend in the number of violent deaths from war
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within and between states, the destruction and
misery still wrought by individual conflicts—all of
them avoidable—remain depressingly high. The
devastating conflict and humanitarian crisis in the
Darfur region of Sudan killed tens of thousands and
put hundreds of thousands more lives at risk. Some
advance was made in winding back the long-
standing conflict in northern Uganda, but many of
the world’s other civil conflicts either deteriorated or
hung uneasily in the balance. 2004 saw renewed
violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Kosovo, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka; the
spread of fighting in Chechnya; and no let-up in
Nepal’s brutal civil war. And new militant violence
shook southern Thailand.
The crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region, which received
no sustained international attention until mid-way
through 2004, more than a year after it began,
raised Rwanda-like questions about the
international community’s capacity and will to
respond to catastrophic internal violations of human
rights. Even with some 30,000 killed outright, up to
10,000 a month ongoing deaths from disease and
starvation, up to 2 million displaced and little
evidence of sustained or willing cooperation from
the government of Sudan—the response of the UN
Security Council and member states was too often
too little too late. A spillover effect from Darfur was
to divert attention from and delay final signature of
the landmark peace agreement negotiated under
much international pressure, between the
government of Sudan and southern SPLA rebels.
An uneasy peace held in the Democratic Republic
of Congo during 2004, but just barely. The four-year
war that ended in 2002 and claimed more than 3
million lives, mainly from disease and starvation,
continued to have an impact in eastern Congo—a
lawless region where the transitional government
has been unable to exert its authority. The UN
peacekeeping force (MONUC) is stretched to the
limits in trying to maintain a degree of security in the
region, not always successfully. The fragility of the
peace in Congo was underlined in June, when rebel
forces briefly captured the town of Bukavu, leaving
more than 150 dead and causing waves of
refugees. Lack of international support for
MONUC—both in resources and mandate—left it
woefully unprepared to counter growing instability in
North and South Kivu. MONUC’s position improved
a little with a commitment of additional troops and a
strengthened mandate in October, but it is still not
adequately equipped to do the job being asked of
it. Sustained engagement by the international
community and a greater effort by Congo’s
transitional government and by Rwanda (which
continued to threaten cross-border intervention) are
required to ensure that this tense situation does not
escalate into another bloody war.
One positive development in 2004 was the
International Criminal Court’s announcement in
June of an investigation into possible war crimes in
Congo, focusing on the Ituri region. In July a further
investigation was initiated into possible war crimes
in Northern Uganda, where brutal fighting
continued between the rebel Lord’s Resistance
Army and the government, although there were
signs towards the end of the year that the situation
was stabilizing.
Côte d’Ivoire’s peace process suffered a major blow
with the massacre of more than 100 opposition
supporters in March, and the breakdown of a
compromise political deal in July. A new cycle of
violence erupted in November, with the death of
French peacekeepers, action in response against
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the government, and anti-expatriate rioting in
Abidjan, leading to UN sanctions. Ethno-religious
violence broke out in Nigeria’s central states,
claiming hundreds of lives, and low level ethnic
violence and banditry continued in the Niger Delta.
In Kosovo extremists took advantage of the
frustration by Kosovo Albanians with the glacial
progress in addressing final status issues, and in
March the province experienced its worst inter-
ethnic violence since 1999. There was no end to
the conflict in Chechnya, with almost daily clashes
between security forces and Chechen rebels, and a
horrific terrorist siege of a school in nearby Beslan,
North Ossetia, which left hundreds dead. Maoist
forces continued their insurgency in Nepal, while
renewed tensions kept Sri Lanka on edge. An
insurgency erupted in Thailand’s Muslim southern
provinces in January and escalated throughout the
year, claiming more than 500 lives—with the
government’s heavy-handed response fuelling
militant separatist grievances.
On the more positive side of the ledger, stability
was restored to Liberia with strong support from
the international community. The UN peacekeeping
mission UNMIL, which replaced ECOWAS forces in
2003, extended its control across much of the
country and disarmed thousands of ex-
combatants. There was also progress in Burundi’s
peace process, but a setback in August with the
massacre by Hutu rebels of 160 Congolese Tutsi
refugees. Meanwhile, despite making little headway
in ending the conflict with FARC rebels, Colombia’s
government entered peace talks with paramilitaries.
In Indonesia 2004 saw persistent violence in Aceh
and an outbreak of fighting between Christians and
Muslims in Maluku. But a smooth presidential
election in September and the strong mandate
given to new president Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono raised hopes for better government
response to Indonesia’s troubled regions.
Eliminating terrorism
Efforts to eliminate terrorism were largely
unsuccessful in 2004, with some of the most horrific
terrorist attacks since 11 September 2001 in Madrid
and Beslan, and with almost daily bombings in Iraq
killing, as in 2003, very large numbers of Iraqi
civilians10 and foreign troops and workers.11 The
Taliban was resurgent in Afghanistan, targeting aid
and humanitarian workers. The record suggests that
military, police and intelligence cooperation will not
make major inroads into the problem without more
attention to underlying political grievances and
economic conditions.
For 2003, the latest year with statistics available,
the number of significant terrorist events—those
involving human casualties—reached its highest
level in more that 20 years. The likelihood is that
the final figures for 2004 will be even worse.
Darfur’s troubles began in February 2003, when primarily eth-
nic-African rebels, inspired by events in the south to demand
more national political and economic influence, began attack-
ing government military installations. Khartoum responded
ferociously, and on any view excessively, turning loose prima-
rily ethnic-Arab Janjaweed militias, backed by its regular
forces. Indiscriminate killing, looting and rape—and massive
population displacements—followed.
After NGO agitation for many monthsa—led by Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and the International
Crisis Group—and statements from UN spokesmen in March
and April 2004 that Darfur was becoming the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis, a significant aid effort was launched;
there were high-profile visits by Secretary-General Annan,
Secretary of State Powell and others; the African Union
agreed to put monitors on the ground; and the Security
Council began deliberating.
But the international political response was painfully slow,
and the crisis ground on throughout the year. Fuelled by
Chinese, Russian and Islamic hostility to the U.S-led occu-
pation of Iraq, there was strong resistance in the Security
Council to applying serious pressure upon Khartoum, let
alone engaging in coercive intervention. A weak resolution in
July (Resolution 1556) was followed by only marginally
stronger ones in September (Resolution 1564) and
November (Resolution 1574)—though a Commission of
Inquiry was established to assess liability for genocide or
other crimes against humanity.b
The most committed response came from the African Union,
supporting negotiations between the government and rebels,
and offering up to 3,500 troops to monitor a ceasefire and
provide some civilian protection. But without strong interna-
tional logistical and financial support, its physical capacity
remains extremely limited.
a. See in particular Amnesty International (2003) and
International Crisis Group (2003).
b. For resolutions see www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.
For commentary, see International Crisis Group (2004a,
2004b).
The crisis in Darfur
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Although international efforts have failed to address
what are often argued to be terrorism’s key
underlying causes—including political hostility
generated by the occupations of Palestine and
Iraq—cooperation is improving in the development
and implementation of anti-terrorist measures.
Continuing IMF, World Bank and UN efforts have
been reasonably effective in restricting terrorist
finances.13 And UN Security Council Resolutions
have led to the appointment of a new Analytical
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team14 and
helped revitalize the Counter-Terrorism Committee.15
The perpetrators of much international terrorism in
recent times—al-Qaeda and its affiliates and
imitators—demonstrated their resilience during the
year. An organization claiming affiliation to al-Qaeda
carried out the March bombings in Madrid that
killed 191, the largest terrorist attack in Europe
since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing.16 Two
assassination attempts on President Musharraf in
December 2003 resulted in stepped up efforts by
the Pakistani authorities to eliminate al-Qaeda and
the Taliban from their Pakistani bases. While there
have been successes in disrupting al-Qaeda’s ability
to conduct attacks on its own, new recruitment may
be outweighing its losses.17 In Indonesia the 9
September bombing outside the Australian
Embassy in Jakarta highlighted the continuing
terrorist threat posed by extremist groups such as
the al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah. And the 7
October bombings of two resorts in Taba, Egypt,
near the Israeli border, killing at least 34, again
raised the spectre of al-Qaeda involvement.
Afghanistan became increasingly unsafe for aid and
humanitarian agencies, as Taliban remnants
systematically targeted and killed foreigners. A
leading humanitarian organization, Médecins Sans
Frontières, pulled out of Afghanistan after 24 years,
following the murder of five of its workers in June.18
Many parts of Afghanistan are now no-go areas for
aid and humanitarian workers because of the threat
from the Taliban and other insurgents. Bombings in
Uzbekistan in March and July were blamed by the
government on international terrorists linked to al-
Qaeda, but many international observers suspected
it was the work of homegrown Islamist groups
radicalised by the government’s repression.
Iraq saw more terrorist attacks than anywhere else
in 2004, and lost more lives to terrorism, with car
bombings the preferred modus operandi.19
Another particularly gruesome form of terrorism
was the kidnapping and beheading of foreign
workers.20 The allegiance of the attackers
remained murky—with attacks blamed variously on
foreign supporters of al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi (independently or jointly with al-Qaeda),
disenfranchised Baathists, Shia radicals, Sunni
fundamentalists or combinations of all of them.21
The attacks, steadily worsening since the 2003
invasion of Iraq, show no signs of abating.
Chechen terrorists were believed to be behind
bombings in Moscow, Ingushetia and Grozny—the
latter in May claiming the life of the pro-Russian
president of Chechnya. And in August 2004
Chechen terrorists carried out a shocking attack on
a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, holding around
1,200 children and parents hostage. The siege
ended catastrophically, with at least 339 children
and adults killed, and hundreds more wounded.22
There was some falling off in the number of suicide
attacks in Israel from the highs of the previous two
years. This was variously ascribed to Israel’s security
barrier, its policy of targeted killings of Hamas
leaders and dissension among the Palestinian
groups. In contrast, there was an increase in the
number of Palestinian civilian victims of violence.23
Eliminating weapons of mass destruction
2004 was a tumultuous year for arms control.
The good news was Libya’s rapidly implemented
Bad news—significant terrorist attacks
are increasing
Source: Centre for Human Security (forthcoming), based on the
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism reports.12
Iraq saw more terrorist attacks
than anywhere else in 2004,
and lost more lives to terrorism
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commitment to disarm, the removal of more than
1.7 tons of fissile material from Iraq and the
failure to discover any large stockpiles of
weapons (suggesting the success of UN
sanctions and inspection regimes), and the
exposure and presumed freezing of Abdul Qadeer
Khan’s global proliferation activities. The bad
news was the apparent failure of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea Six-Party Talks and
ominous new revelations about Iran’s nuclear
activities. Nor can any progress be reported on
the international conventions governing chemical
and biological weapons—or on the Conference
on Disarmament.
Libya’s December 2003 decision to disarm
occurred in the context of a “grand bargain”
negotiated by the United Kingdom. In return for a
comprehensive dismantlement of Libyan weapons-
of-mass-destruction capabilities, the United
Kingdom and the United States would lift
sanctions and restore diplomatic relations with
Tripoli. The implementation of the agreement was
swift, and international watchdog agencies started
destroying Libya’s declared stocks. By March
2004 Libya’s nuclear-related material was
dismantled and shipped off to the United States,
and Libya joined the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Libya’s disclosures exposed the global
underground nuclear blackmarket that supplied
sensitive nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, led by the
Pakistan metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan. In
February 2004 Khan confessed to having sold
nuclear technology with no authorization from the
government of Pakistan. President Pervez
Musharraf promptly pardoned him in exchange for
his continuing cooperation in rolling up the network.
But many questions remain, and new reports have
surfaced about possible Khan activities in South
Africa and Malaysia. The presumed freezing of
future Khan activities following his exposure is the
only silver lining in a very dark cloud.
More positively on the subcontinent, India and
Pakistan moved to more responsible nuclear
stewardship of their programmes, agreeing in June
2004 to improve communication and to continue to
work on nuclear risk-reduction measures. It was
notable that the improved dynamic in the region
was sustained through the political transition in
India.
Non-state actors were the explicit focus of UN
Security Council Resolution 1540, unanimously
adopted in April and requiring states to refrain from
supporting by any means such actors attempting
to acquire, use or transfer nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their delivery systems, and
requiring the establishment of domestic controls.
The year also saw growing international support for
the informal and voluntary Proliferation Security
Initiative, with many states committing themselves
to using all available sources of national and
international law to interdict on the high seas and
elsewhere illicit transfers of nuclear, chemical and
biological materials.
Other less formal efforts included the June attempt
by the G8 nations to advance their 2002 Global
Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction, but only the United
States, France and Russia are on time with their
pledges and the whole effort is $3 billion shy of its
$20 billion target. The partnership plans to add
Libya and Iraq as eligible countries. The G8 also
adopted an “Action Plan” to strengthen the Nuclear
Suppliers Group regime and promote a one-year
moratorium on new transfers of enrichment or
reprocessing material and technology to states with
no current nuclear infrastructure.
Less good news was the continuing immobility of
the Conference on Disarmament. The United
States announced in late July its commitment to
negotiate a legally binding fissile material cutoff
treaty, but without verification provisions. Space
talks remain blocked. And there were no new
signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Additional Protocol in 2004.
India and Pakistan moved to more
responsible nuclear stewardship of
their programmes
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Throughout the year, Iran sent conflicting messages
to the international community about its intentions
to remain in compliance with its NPT commitments,
and to pursue its rights to develop a nuclear energy
programme for peaceful purposes. Its on-again off-
again approach to International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspections and to ratification of the
NPT Additional Protocol raised serious concerns. In
September the IAEA Board criticized Iran’s lack of
compliance and erosion of trust, but had no hard
evidence to determine if Iran’s programme had
crossed any critical redlines. Subsequent
negotiations led by the United Kingdom, Germany
and France resulted in agreement by Iran to
suspend its enrichment activities. While sufficient to
forestall IAEA reference to the Security Council in
November, questions remained about the
seriousness and longevity of that commitment.
The Six-Party Talks made no visible progress in
keeping the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
from establishing a fully functioning nuclear
weapons programme. In February Korea reiterated
its “words-for-words”, “actions-for-actions”
approach, agreeing to freeze its nuclear programme
on the path to dismantlement in exchange for a
formal U.S. non-aggression guarantee and
resumption of heavy fuel oil shipments. The United
States for the first time in June 2004 sketched the
outline of a comprehensive package, insisting that
Korea agree first to total dismantlement in exchange
for energy supplies and other benefits in a second,
implementation phase. A major stumbling block
remains U.S. insistence on including Korea’s highly-
enriched uranium programme, which Pyongyang
denies having and says is “a demand which can be
forced on a defeated country only”.
Reducing the availability of small arms
Limited progress was made in efforts to reduce
and control small arms in 2004, while efforts to ban
landmines lost ground.24
The scale of the small arms and light weapons
problem remains staggering. According to most
recent UN estimates in 2002,25 approximately 639
million small arms are in circulation worldwide, with
some 30 million firearms in the 44 countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa.26 But the Small Arms Survey 2003
suggests that the total number of illicit military-style
guns in Sub-Saharan Africa is less than one million,
arguing heroically that they are not so common as
to render efforts at control pointless.27 The same
survey estimates “conservatively” the number of
guns in Iraq at some 7–8 million.28
2004 saw a variety of multilateral and regional
initiatives to control small arms and light weapons.
In January the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe hosted its first
intergovernmental conference on the threat posed
by Man-Portable Air Defence Systems to civil
aviation.29 An important African initiative was the
signing of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention,
Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light
Weapons on 20 April 2004 which requires
signatories to pass laws outlawing the illicit
manufacture, trafficking, possession and misuse of
small arms and light weapons.30 The Southern
African Development Community Firearms Protocol
(2001) was poised to enter into force in 2004.
UN negotiations on an international tracing
instrument got under way in June, as did the
incipient UN process for brokering (broad-based
consultations). The UN also commenced broad-
based consultations on the illicit brokering of small
arms and light weapons, with meetings in Geneva in
April and New York in June. Human rights
organizations stepped up efforts to put pressure on
the international community to adopt a global Arms
Trade Treaty in time for the next UN arms
conference in 2006. It would provide common
minimum standards for the control of arms transfers
and an operative mechanism for implementation of
these standards based on international law.31
Properly designed disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration (DDR) programmes are one of the
best ways to remove illicit small arms from
circulation in post-conflict countries. And several
such programmes started or continued in 2004.
The UN commenced broad-based
consultations on the illicit brokering
of small arms and light weapons
24
P
e
a
c
e
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
rity
1
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)32
restarted its programme in April, and efforts
continued to disarm combatants in Afghanistan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among
others, with very mixed results.
The Control Arms Campaign (www.controlarms.
org), though only one year old, recorded a big
success through lobbying and the collection of
millions of signatures. UK Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw led eight other nations in pledging support for
an Arms Trade Treaty to prohibit the sale of small
arms and other weapons to human-rights-violating
regimes. As the organization’s Guns or Growth?
report points out, such a treaty also forces attention
on the fact that the world’s largest arms exporters,
particularly the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council, have neglected to live up to their
promises in the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe’s “Principles Governing
Conventional Arms Transfers”, which commits
members to take into account the impact of arms
exports on sustainable development.
For landmines, considerable progress continued in
the clearance of existing mines and the destruction
of stocks. A report released by the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines in November stated
that more than 37 million stockpiled antipersonnel
mines have been destroyed since the 1997 Mine
Ban Treaty came into force. But 2004 saw a
significant backwards step in international efforts to
universalize the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and abolish
these weapons completely, once and for all. In
March, the Bush Administration reversed U.S.
policy of 10 years to eliminate all antipersonnel
landmines, permitting the use of self-destructing
mines without geographical restrictions, allowing
the long-lived mines to be used until 2010, and
abandoning promises to join the treaty by 2006.33
Forty-two countries remain non-signatories of the
treaty, including the largest landmine producing or
using countries: China, Russia and the United
States. Civil society groups continue to campaign
actively, but without the commitment of the major
players, further progress on abolishing landmines
will be limited.
Performance of business and civil society
Business and civil society organizations (CSOs)
both influence and are profoundly affected by
public policy decisions. In 2004 the dangers
escalated for civil society organizations and private
enterprises operating in Iraq, and conflict zones
everywhere, as the distinction blurred between
intervening forces, aid workers and private
contractors. CSOs continued to engage in
research, outreach, advocacy, lobbying, monitoring
and humanitarian activities. Some were
demoralized with the curtailment of opportunities to
influence policy in a harsher security environment,
but others took advantage of that harsh
environment to do even more.
Conflict prevention
Civil society organizations on the ground in
unstable areas far beyond the coverage of TV
cameras, engaged in early warning and analysis,
are indispensable to gathering and disseminating
the information so essential to the international will
to prevent and terminate conflicts. A major case is
Darfur. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch
and the International Crisis Group in particular
forced the public and the media—and eventually
governments—to attend to the humanitarian
tragedy there. Behind the scenes, various CSOs
promoted reconciliation and conflict prevention
from Darfur to Indonesia and the Philippines, from
Afghanistan and Nepal to Colombia.
Developing arms control and disarmament
regimes is essential in conflict prevention. With
governments focusing on proliferation threats in
Korea and Iran, CSOs have been concentrating
on nuclear weapons states. In preparing for the
next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference in 2005, most are opposing efforts to
back away from the 1995 and 2000 consensus.
Maintaining their two-track approach to
proliferation and disarmament, they push for the
entry-into-force of the test ban treaty and the
More than 37 million stockpiled
antipersonnel mines have been
destroyed since the 1997 Mine Ban
Treaty came into force
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“unequivocal undertaking” of nuclear weapons
states to eventually eliminate their nuclear
arsenals.
The private sector is doing more in arms control
and threat reduction—particularly in the arms
industry, but also in chemical, life science,
communications and information technology
companies. It works with governments to ensure
responsible, well-regulated and accountable
production and export of arms. It also ensures
secure and accountable handling of certain
biological and chemical weapons-grade materials—
and other “dual-use” science-based, nuclear,
transport or information technologies that have
both civil and military applications. And it works
with former military scientists and manufacturers in
high-risk regions to support civilian employment
and research opportunities.
Long-term economic growth and integration into
the global economy are powerful contributors to
conflict prevention. Multinational companies, the
primary drivers of globalization, stand accused of
being complicit with human rights abuses,
supporting repressive regimes and providing the
revenues that fund wars. But the statistical
evidence gathered by the University of British
Columbia’s Human Security Centre suggests that,
on balance, countries deeply integrated into the
global economy—the ones most globalized—are
less likely to be involved in civil wars than poor
countries that are not. Certainly the risk of civil
conflict falls with rising incomes. The centre’s
forthcoming Human Security Report puts it thus:
One of the most robust findings in the
statistical literature on civil wars is that strong
and growing economies are associated with
reduced risks of armed conflict. For the
poorest countries, the probability of being
involved in an armed conflict falls dramatically
as per capita income rises. For a country
with a GDP per capita of $1,250, the
average risk of being involved in an armed
conflict within five years is 4%, just a quarter
the risk of a country whose GDP per capita
is $250, and countries with a per capita
income of $5,000 or more have a less than
1% chance of experiencing civil conflict over
the same period.
All that said, there is also widespread agreement
that the governance of natural resource revenues—
a developing country’s dependence on the
exploitation and export of primary commodities,
such as oil, minerals and timber—is a key factor in
determining the risk of war. Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler of Oxford University have argued strongly
(although their thesis has not gone unchallenged)
for a “greed rather than grievance” position. Not
only is income from natural resources poorly
converted to growth in many conflict-prone
countries, they argue, but revenue from primary
commodities is actually a risk factor in civil war. An
important consideration is that valuable resources
can encourage regional secessions—and provide
finance for rebel movements.34
The private sector is doing more in
arms control and threat reduction—
particularly in the arms industry
At their June 2002 summit in Canada, the countries of the
G8 announced a major new initiative to prevent terrorists,
or those that harbour them, from acquiring weapons or
materials of mass destruction, pledging to raise $20 billion
over the next ten years to fund projects, initially in Russia,
to achieve this goal. Priority was placed on the destruction
of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommis-
sioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile mate-
rials and the employment of former weapons scientists.
Since its inception, a further 13 countries have decided to
join the Global Partnership as donors, and discussions are
taking place on expanding activities to include programmes
in other states.
NGOs and think tanks are playing a significant supporting
role, most notably through the Strengthening the Global
Partnership project, an international consortium of 21
research institutions working to build political and financial
support for G8-led efforts against the spread of weapons of
mass destruction.
Businesses, too, are becoming more involved. Although ini-
tially slow to invest in government funded non-proliferation
efforts, the business community has put up an estimated
$97 million in venture capital since 1994 for business part-
nerships between U.S. firms and those in Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, which now generate about $30
million in revenues a year. Of 60 completed projects with
government investment, 13 have been “commercialized”
and are now private sector enterprises.
The Global Partnership
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Several multistakeholder governance and
accountability frameworks aim to address this
challenge. For example:
• The Kimberley Process, aimed at reducing the
trade in “conflict diamonds”, is a joint
government, industry and civil society initiative.
Some 40 participating governments together
account for about 98% of the world trade in
rough diamonds. The decision was taken in
July 2004 to expel the Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville) from its participants list. A
voluntary peer review mission to the country
concluded that the country was not complying
with the provisions of the Kimberley Process
certification scheme.
• The Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, aimed at increasing the transparency
of revenue streams between extractive sector
companies and host governments, continued
to engage more countries and strengthen its
implementation processes. Governments in
Angola, Nigeria, Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz
Republic either publicly disclosed details of
payments they will receive from oil companies,
in most cases for the first time, or established
independent auditing frameworks,
implementation committees, national
commissions or consultation mechanisms.
Conflict management
Many CSOs complemented intergovernmental
efforts to mitigate the worst humanitarian
consequences of conflicts and lay the foundations
for their solution. They supplied emergency relief
and offered mediation, conciliation, and confidence
and capacity building. They promoted problem-
solving processes and applied international
pressure and leverage.
CSOs also continued to be involved in other major
conflicts that did not make the headlines.35 Groups
in the Indian subcontinent promoted reconciliation
and mutual arms reductions, including
denuclearization and troop pullbacks. Many
remained heavily engaged in conflict resolution,
conflict management and post-conflict
reconstruction training activities. The International
Peace Bureau organized a major discussion at the
Barcelona Forum 2004, where participants from
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, East Timor and Iraq
exchanged experiences on nonviolent conflict
resolution.
The role of private business in conflict management
has been more controversial—and problematic—
with attention in 2004 focusing on private military
companies. While occasionally in the spotlight in
the past for alleged misbehaviour in Sierra Leone
and elsewhere, they were gradually attracting
international interest as a means of meeting the
demand for professional military force in
circumstances where sovereign governments
acknowledged the need but were unable or
unwilling to meet it.36 Iraq seems, for the time
being at least, to have eroded support for private
Since the 1990s private military companies, operating from
Sierra Leone to the Balkans to Papua New Guinea, have taken
on roles that formerly were the sole preserve of governments.
This has been most noticeable in Iraq, where an estimated
15,000–20,000 private military personnel have been perform-
ing a wide range of security and support services alongside
130,000 Coalition soldiers, together amounting to the second
biggest contingent after the United States.
The line between civilian and military responsibility is stark.
Soldiers are constrained in their behaviour by strict codes of
conduct, backed by the threat of military discipline. Deserting
one’s post under enemy fire involves a lot more for a soldier
than breach of contract.
And soldiers’ conduct in war is directly regulated by interna-
tional humanitarian law, with established mechanisms to
apply it. By contrast, no ready legal infrastructure exists to
delimit the rights and legitimate activities of private citizens
working in a conflict.
This “legal twilight zone” may give rise to abuses, as occurred
in the Abu Ghraib prison, where private contractors were hired
to supervise and in some instances interrogate Iraqi prisoners.
Although private firms can usefully provide support functions,
such as catering and equipment maintenance, it has become
very apparent in Iraq—if not before—that there are serious
dangers in allowing contractors to provide security services
traditionally carried out by military personnel.
Private military companies may offer potential benefits to the
international community, but effective international order
depends on sovereign governments maintaining their
monopoly on the use of military force.
Source: Singer 2004.
Private military companies—solution or problem?
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military companies as anything other than suppliers
of support services.
Post-conflict peacebuilding and peacekeeping
Civil society involvement, by NGOs and business, has
long been indispensable in post-conflict
peacebuilding—meeting immediate humanitarian and
then development needs, reconstructing war torn
societies to create the conditions for sustainable
peace. Attracting and retaining private investment in
most post-conflict zones remains a challenge, even in
countries with rich natural resources and potentially
large markets. There have been some encouraging
recent examples, however. In Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,
Rwanda and East Timor foreign investors, CSOs and
local business associations and companies have
been cooperating to invest in post-conflict
reconstruction efforts and rebuild shattered
economies. The role of the financial sector is critical if
investment resources are to be effectively mobilized.
The transition from war to peace usually involves
peacekeeping forces with a mandate to monitor
and supervise ceasefires, often with accompanying
civilian governance responsibilities. It has
traditionally involved a large measure of working
cooperation between military and civil society
organization personnel, particularly those delivering
humanitarian assistance.
In 2004 the United Nations Environment Programme Finance
Initiative worked with the International Institute for Sustainable
Development and others to produce a framework for analyz-
ing the role of financial institutions in preventing and manag-
ing conflict and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. They
outlined areas where the financial sector, including banks,
insurance companies, asset managers and export credit
agencies, may either contribute to or worsen conflict: “The
finance sector can become entangled in conflict scenarios as
a consequence of longstanding investments or operations in
formerly peaceful countries, or through investment in projects
whose impacts may generate local grievances. Armed
groups and conflict entrepreneurs can misuse financial serv-
ices, and the financial sector can be associated with con-
tributing to or failing to prevent macroeconomic shocks that
weaken the state.”
The framework also provides examples where financial institu-
tions can play a positive role. These include: insuring and mobi-
lizing finance for key infrastructure and post-conflict recon-
struction projects, implementing guidelines to ensure that proj-
ects are implemented in a conflict sensitive manner, establish-
ing standards to tackle money-laundering, developing sophis-
ticated risk assessment, conflict prediction and early warning
systems, and managing funds from diaspora communities to
invest in post-conflict reconstruction. Two examples of collec-
tive action by financial institutions that have played a growing
role during 2004 in tackling conflict are outlined below:
• The Equator Principles, aimed at decreasing the social
and environmental risks of major infrastructure projects
through stricter guidelines and criteria for project financ-
ing, celebrated their first anniversary in June 2004.
Initiated by the International Finance Corporation and a
group of 10 banks, the number of signatories has
increased during the past year to more than 20 financial
institutions in 14 countries, creating a group that
accounts for around 80% of major project financing.
• The Wolfsberg Group, an association of 12 global banks,
aims at developing financial services industry standards
and related products for Know Your Customer, Anti-
Money Laundering, and Counter-Terrorist Financing poli-
cies. Initiated in 2000, with input from Transparency
International, the group has published a series of princi-
ples and statements and established a collaborative net-
work for addressing these challenges.
The good—and the harm—that the financial sector can do
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell recently described
CSOs as force-multipliers and vital members of the U.S.
team. USAID Administrator Andrew S. Natsios has, from a
different perspective, suggested the appropriateness of
some jurisdiction being exercised over CSOs that receive
money from the U.S. government. These statements have
contributed to a dangerous blurring of the distinction
between CSOs—including humanitarian relief agencies—
and military interveners.
Co-opting CSOs into the “hearts and minds” campaign
part of the war effort increases the risk that humanitarian
workers in the field will be viewed by belligerents as exten-
sions of the military forces. When five of its workers were
killed in an attack in June 2004, Médecins Sans Frontières
felt its neutrality had been fatally compromised and with-
drew from Afghanistan, after a presence of 24 years
through the Soviet occupation and Taliban rule.
There has always been a risk of CSOs being misunder-
stood, of their interests and objectives being seen as indis-
tinguishable from those of the countries they come from.
And that risk came to a head in 2004. It is crucial that gov-
ernments do everything in their power to diminish it.
CSOs and the military: the risks of blurring
the line
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6. Coalition casualties data gathered are from
iCasualties (2004). Foreign contractor data are
also from iCasualties; please note that the list is
incomplete. The data on Iraqi civilian casualties
are compiled from Iraq Body Count (2004). It is
very approximate and cannot be independently
verified; the actual number of Iraqi civilians killed
may differ significantly. While Iraq Body Count
does control for double counting, there is a small
degree of overlap. Data include deaths due to
terrorism, war, direct violence, crime, as well as
(some) indirect violence. Generalized data taken
from the Associated Press’s surveys of Iraqi’s
morgues—in Baghdad (mid-April 2003–31 August
and 1 October–31 March 2004) and Tikrit (Salah
ad Din), Kirkuk (Tamim) and Karbala (1 May
2003–30 April 2004)—were divided equally per
month. Morgue data for 1–30 September 2003
and 1–30 April 2004 were also added to the
monthly totals. Note there are no morgue data
after 30 April 2004.
7. For further details on the Bush administration’s
support for Sharon’s disengagement plan, see
White House (2004). For further details on settlers’
response to Sharon’s disengagement plan, see
Samet (2004).
8. Palestinian and international suspicions about
Sharon’s real motives in pushing Gaza withdrawal
were strongly fuelled by the statement in October
of his closest aide, Dov Weisglass, that the Gaza
plan “supplies the formaldehyde that is necessary
so there will not be a political process with the
Palestinians” (Financial Times 2004).
9. See International Crisis Group (2004c).
10. See graph above, “Casualties continue to
mount in Iraq”, and note 6.
11. As of 30 November 2004, 773 U.S. troops had
been killed since 1 January 2004 plus 53 soldiers
of other nationalities. The number of foreign
contractors killed during this same period is
estimated at 166. Data compiled is from iCasualties
In recent years post-conflict transition has proved
ever more difficult to manage, with peacekeepers
very often needing a broader military enforcement
mandate, to cope with unforeseen contingencies or
“spoilers” determined to undermine a peace
agreement. Enforcing the peace among multiple
contesting parties, as in Sierra Leone, has proved
very different from patrolling a well-accepted
dividing line, as for so many years in Cyprus. And
the post-conflict environments in Iraq and
Afghanistan have proved considerably more messy
and traumatic still. That has placed CSOs in the
firing line more than ever before. Just as
peacekeepers have had to become less neutral, so
it has become even more important that CSOs
preserve their independent identity, not only in the
heat of full-scale war but during the tension of
uneasy transition.
Endnotes
1. See UN Secretary-General (2004).
2. This estimate was derived from the total number
of Iraqi civilian fatalities between 1 January and 30
November 2004, calculated with data from Iraq
Body Count (2004), and the total number of
coalition troop fatalities from Iraq Coalition
Casualties, iCasualties (2004). For more detailed
information on the methodology used for the
calculation of Iraqi civilian fatalities, see note 6.
3. UN Security Council Resolution 1546, 8 June
2004 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm).
4. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2004).
5. Deployment following NATO’s June
commitment of an additional 3,500 troops
brought its in-theatre force up to 9,000 before the
October elections while the United States
announced additional deployment of 1,000 U.S.
troops for the election, bringing its numbers to
approximately 19,000. “ISAF augmentation in
support of Afghanistan’s Presidential elections is
complete” (statement by the NATO Secretary
General, 1 October 2004).
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(2004). See graph above, “Casualties continue to
mount in Iraq”.
12. In April 2004 the U.S. State Department
released Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, its
annual count of international terrorist incidents. The
report claimed that the 2003 total of 190 terrorist
attacks was the lowest since 1969, and that
terrorist attacks had declined 45% between 2001
and 2003. Shortly afterwards the methodology of
the State Department report was challenged by an
economist and political scientist: “[t]he only
verifiable information in the annual reports indicates
that the number of terrorist events has risen each
year since 2001, and in 2003 reached its highest
level in more than 20 years” (Krueger and Laitin
2004). The State Department subsequently agreed
that there were inaccuracies in the report and
released revised statistics in June 2004 correcting
them. See statement on State Department website,
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/.
13. Winer (2003).
14. Resolution 1526 (2004) calls on countries to
provide information concerning al-Qaeda members
and associated organizations to the Analytical
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. This
committee replaced the independent UN panel
headed by Michael Chandler. It published its first
report 25 August 2004, stating that the threat from
al-Qaeda-related terrorism “remains as great as ever,
but the nature of the threat has changed.” Security
Council Resolution 1566 (2004), passed after the
Beslan massacre, focused on measures to address
groups not already identified by this Monitoring
Team. For UN Security Council Resolutions, see
www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.
15. The establishment of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC) Executive Directorate under
Resolution 1535 (2004) enhanced the CTC’s
ability to assume a more proactive role, facilitate
the provision of technical assistance, and monitor
the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001).
According to Winer (2003), the country reports
received by the CTC regarding their
implementation of Resolution 1373 have
increased every year since the committee’s
establishment. Between January and May 2004,
the CTC had already received 69 reports. For UN
Security Council Resolutions, see
www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.
16. The 21 December 1988 bombing of a Pan Am
jetliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, killed 270 people.
Libya accepted responsibility for the attacks; it
agreed 13 August 2004 to set up a $2.7 billion
fund to compensate the victims’ families.
17. Johnston and Sanger (2004).
18. See BBC News (2004).
19. The website www.terrorism.com lists 137
terrorist incidents in Iraq from 1 January to 26
November 2004; the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge
Base lists 267 incidents between 1 January and 25
October 2004 (www.tkb.org/Home.jsp). Between
May 2003 and 28 November 2004, there have
been 153 mass casualty bombings (not including
roadside bombs), of which at least 94 were suicide
bombings. 1,545 people have been killed, 3,771
injured (see Brookings Institution 2004).
20. As of 30 November 2004, 16 hostages were
beheaded, 22 shot dead (1 unconfirmed). See
iCasualties (2004), Brookings Institution (2004), and
Associated Press (2004).
21. Some of the more devastating attacks include:
• 30 September 2004: Baghdad, Iraq—Series of
bomb blasts at the opening of a water
treatment plant killed at least 41, of which 32
were children, and injured 131 others.
• 14 September 2004: Baghdad, Iraq—47 people
died following car bombing outside main
Baghdad police headquarters; over 100 injured.
• 26 July 2004: Baqubah, Iraq—Suicide bomb
during morning rush hour kills 68.
• 24 June 2004: Baqubah, Ramadi, Fallujah,
Mosul, Baghdad, Iraq—Multiple bombings in
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Iraq killed 103 and injured 324. Targets
included police stations, the Iraqi policy
academy, and a hospital.
• 17 June 2004: Baghdad, Iraq—A suicide car
bomb killed at least 25 people and wounded
138 outside an Iraqi army recruiting centre.
• 21 April 2004: Basra, Iraq—Five suicide car
bombings near police facilities in and around
Basra killed at least 68 Iraqis (including 18
children) and injured about 100.
• 2 March 2004: Baghdad and Karbala, Iraq—
Multiple suicide bombings at two locations in
Iraq killed 181 and injured 430 (casualty figures
remain uncertain, with reported fatalities
ranging from 140 to 271) during Shia festival of
Ashura. Blame placed on al-Qaeda and pro-
Saddam insurgents.
• 1 February 2004: Arbil, Iraq—Two suicide
bombings in Arbil, Iraq, killed 109 and injured
at least 240. One attack struck a crowd
outside the offices of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan; the other struck the offices of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party. Each bombing
was carried out by an individual with
explosives strapped to his body. Ansar al Islam
and al-Qaeda were blamed.
22. See for example, Dougherty (2004) and CNN
(2004).
23. Until 22 September with suicide bombing in
northwestern Jerusalem, the city had been bomb-
free for seven months (see Anderson 2004).
Between January 2004 and 30 November 2004,
there were 12 suicide bombings (and 2 other bomb
attacks): 61 killed (excluding 16 suicide bombers)
and 339 injured. In 2003, there were 22 suicide
bombings: 144 killed (excluding suicide bombers)
and 641 injured. Statistics are compiled from lists
of attacks on the International Policy Institute for
Counter-Terrorism website (www.ict.org.il) and from
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
(www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/). Between 1 January and 21
November 2004, there have been 92 Israeli deaths
and 742 Palestinian deaths. 2003 totals: 190 Israeli
deaths; 647 Palestinian deaths. Data is compiled
from casualty lists on Middle East Policy Council’s
website (www.mepc.org/public_asp/resources/
mrates.asp).
24. While the issue in relation to landmines is one of
“elimination” or “reduction”, the Small Arms Survey
considers the small arms challenge to be one of
improving control at all points of the small arms
trade cycle (supply side) and addressing reasons
why people want small arms (demand side). 
25. See UN Secretary-General (2002, p. 2), which
used key findings from Small Arms Survey (2002),
chapter 2.
26. This includes civilian, insurgent and government
owners. See Small Arms Survey (2003, p. 80). 
27. Small Arms Survey (2003, p. 81).
28. Small Arms Survey (2004), chapter 2.
29. “Manpads” are small, light, missile-launching
weapons designed to be fired by an operator on
the ground against a target in the air. In November
2002 terrorists armed with Manpads fired on an
Israeli passenger aircraft as it took off from an
airport in Mombasa, Kenya. Although the missiles
missed their target, the event—as well as further
strikes on civilian and military aircraft in Iraq—
brought to the attention of the international
community the serious threat posed by Manpads
to civilian and military aviation. For details on
Manpads, see Small Arms Survey (2004), chapter
3. For details on the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe project on Manpads see
OSCE (2004).
30. For more information see the small arms
section of the Global Policy Forum website
(www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/2004).
31. For further details see the Control Arms website
(www.controlarms.org/the_issues/whats_wanted.htm)
and the IANSA website (www.iansa.org/action/
new_york/arms_trade_treaty.htm).
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32. For details on UNMIL see the United Nations
Mission in Liberia website (www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/unmil/index.html).
33. For the U.S. State Department press briefing on
new developments in the U.S. approach to
landmines from 27 February 2004, see www.state.
gov/t/pm/rls/rm/29976.htm. For calls urging the
Bush administration to reconsider its decision to roll
back U.S. landmine policies, visit the United States
Campaign to Ban Landmines (www.banminesusa
.org/). For an article by Handicap International
criticizing the decision see www.handicap-
international.org.uk/pdfs/Press_release_20_the_US_
will_carry_on_using_landmines.pdf. 
34. Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
35. See Médecins Sans Frontières (2004).
36. See, for example, the UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (2002).
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The world’s scores on poverty and hunger reduction
efforts remained the same as for 2003. Despite
some good initiatives in developing countries, the
rich countries have yet to level the economic playing
field or to provide adequate support for poverty
reduction. On the positive side, India’s rural poor
reasserted their voice in the summer elections.
China continued its impressive progress. The Asian
recovery from the crash of 1997–98 has been
accompanied by strong measures to protect the
poor. And both Africa and Latin America have
adopted regional plans on agriculture and related
matters. But the agreement concluded in July to
negotiate reductions in the rich-country subsidies to
agriculture—subsidies that make it impossible for
poor farmers in many developing countries to
compete—has not gone beyond a promise to talk.
And the increase in official development assistance
promised at the Monterrey 2002 Summit has yet to
be fulfilled.
Although scored separately, hunger and poverty are
analyzed together here. The root causes of hunger
and of poverty, and the strategies for combating
them, are closely intertwined. Hunger is one of the
first symptoms of absolute poverty, setting in
motion a vicious cycle, affecting the ability of adults
to work and give birth to healthy children and the
ability of children to learn and lead productive,
healthy, and happy lives.
The hunger situation
Around the world 842 million people suffer from
hunger, down 19 million in the last decade. Of the
hungry, 10 million live in industrial countries, 34 million
in transition economies, and 796 million in developing
countries. Half live in farm households, 22% are rural
landless, 20% reside in urban areas, and another 8%
are depend directly on natural resources.
China achieved dramatic results through its
reforms. And in the second half of the 1990s, Latin
America and the Caribbean significantly reduced
the number of hungry people. But India’s
favourable trends in the first half of the 1990s were
reversed in the second half. The number of hungry
people grew in Africa, the Near East, and the
transition economies.
If current trends persist, the proportion of people
who are hungry will be reduced to 11% of the
world’s population (a bit over 600 million) by 2015,
or not far short of the target of 9.9%. So meeting
the goal a challenging but realistic task. To reach
the more ambitious World Food Summit goal of
cutting the number of the hungry in half would call
for a reduction in the number of hungry people by
490 million by 2015. For that to occur, however,
the current pace of reductions would need to be
accelerated more than 12 times. Barring a
paradigm shift, this scenario will not materialize.
Indeed, hunger could worsen, particularly among the
most vulnerable. Today 136 million children in the
developing world are undernourished. The
International Food Policy Research Institute projects
that with reduced investments in agriculture and rural
development, increases in agricultural protectionism
and subsequent contraction of trade, and failures to
promptly address political discord and food
emergencies—all perfectly plausible developments—
the number of malnourished children worldwide
could increase to 184 million by 2015. 
The poverty situation
The proportion of the global population living on
less than $1 a day declined from 28% in 1990 to
21% in 2001. But that progress was not equally
shared by all. Strong performers include China,
Poverty and hunger
Scores
Poverty: 4
Hunger: 3
Goals
Halve the number of people suffering from hunger by 2015.
Halve the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day (in
purchasing power parity) between 1990 and 2015.
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India, Uganda, Viet Nam, Thailand, Brazil and
Chile. East and South Asia significantly reduced
the rates of poverty and the absolute number of
poor people. But in Latin America and the
Caribbean the proportion of poor decreased only
slightly, and the absolute number of poor people
did not change. The situation in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Eastern Europe deteriorated on both
fronts.
The number of people living below $1 a day has
been reduced by just 126 million in the last
decade—leaving 1.1 billion people in abject
conditions. On current trends, these geographical
disparities will continue. Only South and East Asia
are projected to reduce the incidence of poverty
substantially by 2015, with reductions in Latin
America and the Caribbean and in the Near East
and North America projected to be minimal. In
Sub-Saharan Africa the incidence of poverty is
expected to persist at 45%.
National strategies
Sustainable economic growth is essential to
achieving the poverty and hunger goals. The
International Monetary Fund has estimated that
global economic growth accelerated to 3.9% in
2003 and is forecast to reach 5% in 2004. But
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The international community has set itself a very modest goal
for reducing poverty: halving the proportion of poor people
between 1990 and 2015. Achieving this goal would reduce
the proportion of poor from 28% of the world’s population in
1990 to 14% of a much larger population in 2015. But the
actual number of poor people in the developing world would
decline by only one-quarter—from 1.2 billion to 900 million.
And this numerical improvement is due in large part to dramat-
ic success in a few large countries, particularly China.
Excluding China, the number of extremely poor people will be
higher in 2015 than in 1990 even if the goal is achieved. It is
thus crucial to remember that the goal is not meant to be a
numbers game that leaves more people in absolute poverty in
much of the world. The goal is a target point on a path toward
the eventual elimination of absolute poverty and hunger.
People are defined as hungry when they cannot consume
sufficient and healthy diets at all times. And they are defined
as absolutely poor when they have incomes of less than $1 a
day. The individuals who are hungry today or living below $1
a day changes over time. People fall into and climb out of
poverty, even if the numbers remain roughly constant. That
means that over time, the number of people affected is larg-
er than the total of any given moment, and those people suf-
fer long-term adverse consequences.
The number of people who live on less than $1 a day is cur-
rently 1.1 billion, but two and a half times as many people, 2.7
billion, live on less than $2 a day. Moreover, the number of
people living on incomes between $1 and $2 a day has risen
by 200 million in the last decade and by 600 million in the last
two decades. In all likelihood, this group comprises people
who have been barely lifted above the $1 threshold as well as
those on their way to sliding deeper into poverty. These 1.6
billion additional people, while not the target of the global
goals, are an extremely vulnerable group.
Those living in chronic poverty and those transiting in and out
of poverty require different types of strategies and assistance.
Consequently, strategies need to be tailored to the needs of
a broader and more diverse group of people than is typically
recognized, aiming at moving targets.
Source: Chen and Ravallion 2004.
Different strategies for diverse groups of the poor and hungry
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while Asia grew by 7.7% in 2003, and Africa by
4.3%, Latin America grew by only 1.8%.
But even in growing economies, poverty and
hunger do not simply disappear. Achieving the
goals requires both favourable structural conditions
and strategies targeted towards the poor and
hungry, with disproportionally higher investments in
the welfare of the most disadvantaged. The
location of growth matters, too. Rural growth in
South Asia and Africa, where most of the poor and
hungry live, is decisive.
At the national level, attacking poverty and hunger
requires investments in small-scale irrigation basic
education, health care and water and sanitation, all
of which are addressed elsewhere in this report. It
also requires:
• Improving governance to empower the poor
and allow private enterprise to flourish.
• Embarking on and agricultural and rural
development reforms.
• Protecting the poorest.
For many low-income countries, the necessary
multifaceted strategies are supposed to be
articulated in their Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSPs), an initiative launched by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1999
through which developing countries would involve a
wide range of stakeholders in formulating the
macroeconomic, structural and social policies and
programmes that governments will pursue to
promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty.
Evaluations to date indicate that macroeconomic
stability continues to outweigh poverty reduction in
many PRSPs, and that outreach to civil society and
the corporate sector has been limited. Questions
remain about how committed developing countries
are to the PRSP process, and whether the
development strategies in these papers are likely to
achieve the Millennium Goals.
Improving governance
Where the poor have opportunities to exercise their
political and civil rights, governments are more
attuned to their needs and demands. Providing a
voice to marginal and underrepresented groups in
elections and holding government officials
accountable thereafter help to secure the political
will of leaders to work to eliminate poverty and
hunger. In the last year, political and economic
changes have occurred in a number of countries
where poverty and hunger are widespread. For
instance, India’s election surprise has the potential
to lend voice to the rural poor. The new
government seems compelled to generate rural
growth and provide jobs and services for the poor.
And recent elections in several African countries
have been influenced, more than ever before, by
the concerns of the poor.
Governments also need to facilitate the
development of the private sector, where
operating in a formal setting becomes more
advantageous to private entrepreneurs than
belonging to a shadow economy, as most of them
do now. A transparent legal and regulatory
framework has to allow for unambiguous
protection of property rights and fair resolution of
disputes. Regulatory institutions must provide a
level playing field for all firms, ensure equal access
to markets and sources of credit, prevent
incumbent firms from abusing their market power
and define entry, exit, and bankruptcy regulations.
In addition, the public sector needs to allow
representatives of the emerging domestic private
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sector to voice their concerns and contribute to
shaping public policy.
Such progress depends, of course, on governments
fulfilling their most basic responsibility: ensuring the
physical security of their people. Violence and armed
conflict have a devastating effect on the stability of
national governments and economies. They disrupt
the provision of basic social services and the
production of food. They uproot entire communities.
And they deplete human capital. Increasingly,
civilians, many of them children, are drawn into
violent conflicts and by some estimates account for
90% of all deaths and injuries. As the peace and
security chapter makes all too clear, governments
are falling short. Old and new conflicts throughout
the world continue to disrupt development efforts
and further exacerbate the living conditions of
millions of people. The expanded operations of the
World Food Programme in 2004, building on a more
than 40% increase in funding in 2003, are a positive
international response. But the very need for this
expansion is an unfortunate sign of slow progress on
the hunger front.
Embarking on agricultural and rural
development reforms
With 75% of the poor people in developing
countries living in rural areas, productivity gains in
agriculture are critical to boosting rural incomes on
and off the farm. Increases in farm income in
developing countries promote strong income
increases in the rest of the economy. To the extent
that agricultural productivity gains lead to lower
food prices, they will benefit poor farm and
nonfarm consumers. They also help meet rising
food demand. And as water supplies become ever
tighter (see chapter 5 on the environment),
increases in agricultural productivity become even
more important—with irrigation, by far the largest
user of water, as a key.
Increasing agricultural productivity depends in part
on stable long-term macroeconomic policies at the
national level. Those policies can encourage
savings and investments, stimulate private-sector
activities and improve the terms of trade in favour
of agriculture. Farmers also need barrier-free
access to domestic and international markets. The
balance between the prices for inputs and the
prices from selling agricultural commodities is
decisive in stimulating agricultural productivity. The
large subsidies to agriculture in the industrial world
(see the discussion of trade, below) and national
policies that neglect agriculture in the developing
world stifle the much-needed advances in
productivity—and prevent the setting of
remunerative prices for agricultural commodities.
There are encouraging signs in policies being
adopted in several developing countries. In 2004 the
People’s Democratic Republic of Korea undertook
cautious steps towards market institutions. China
reduced agricultural taxes, increased agricultural
prices and raised the agricultural and rural
development budget. And Ethiopia embarked on a
new rural development and agricultural growth policy
that may lead to sustainable reductions of famine
risk in the countryside.
Further, recent experiences in Brazil, China,
Ethiopia, India and Uganda point to new ways to
develop and carry out rural initiatives. The push
towards decentralization and devolution, driven
both by strengthening democracies and market
forces, has increased the participation of the rural
poor in decisionmaking. Decentralization can yield
enormous benefits if it is accompanied by the
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organization of the poor into viable grassroots
institutions that can then work in partnership with
the local governmental institutions and the private
sector to assist the poor and protect their rights
and interests. But national resources overall remain
inadequate in too many places. Of the 20
countries with the worst levels of food insecurity,
only 10 have increased the proportion of public
spending on agriculture. The other 10 actually
lowered it.
The international community’s assistance to
agriculture can be crucial. The Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research—a network
of 15 research centres around the world—provides
new research-based knowledge for sustainable
agricultural development and hunger reduction.
After stagnating for several years, the annual
budget for these activities, mobilized by
international investors, increased by more than
10% from about $360 million to more than $400
million between 2002 and 2004. But overall, the
international community is not increasing support
to agriculture and the rural sector. World Bank
lending for agriculture remained steady in 2004,
compared with 2003, and rural development
investments declined somewhat.
The private sector can also support pro-poor rural
growth and hunger reduction thanks to food
market systems and technological developments.
Although most rural poor people depend on
agriculture for their livelihoods, many do so
indirectly by working in small rural enterprises
providing goods and services for farm families or in
agroindustries that add value to agricultural
produce. Many countries have set up institutions
for microcredit and small and medium enterprises.
The expansion of information and communication
technologies has further facilitated the development
of small enterprises, increasing the number of
opportunities for the rural poor.
In 2003 and 2004 supermarkets grew at double-
digit rates in Africa and Latin America. This places
new responsibilities on the international retail food
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China’s dramatic reduction in poverty and hunger was a result
of a sustained annual growth of 8% in per capita income—
combined with a policy framework that gave priority to
employment generation in conventional employment-inten-
sive manufacturing industries and basic services. A constitu-
tional amendment for the protection of property rights has
helped small and medium enterprises prosper. China’s efforts
are further advanced by the new policies that make it easier
for people to move to cities and between regions.
China has also improved the institutional and policy frame-
work for the development of small and medium enterprises
and encouraged the flow of foreign investments, without
liberalizing the financial sector as a whole, by improving the
investment environment for foreign direct investment
through an improved legal framework, tax incentives, mar-
ket access, profit repatriation, and protection of intellectual
property rights. China has followed an active policy of con-
taining corruption through its own efforts and also by urg-
ing international organizations to join these efforts. For
example, it joined the international efforts against money
laundering and has asked for international cooperation
against capital flight from China, part of which is corruption
money. To reduce corruption, China has also made signifi-
cant changes in recent years in the institutional arrange-
ments of poverty relief programs by giving relief subsidies
directly to the farmers, rather than distributing them
through various layers of government institutions.
Better policies in China
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industry, which increasingly caters to the poor and
has small farmers in its supply chain. Smallholder
producers, especially in Africa, are getting involved
through the supply chain to the retail supermarkets.
New procurement strategies are reshaping the
production, harvest and post-harvest practices of
developing country producers, particularly for
horticultural crops.
Smallholder farmers are coming together in local
cooperatives to ensure they produce enough for
the market and to organize transport together to
cut on costs. Supermarkets are dealing with a
known producers who internalize quality and safety
standards. This is reducing the need for
middlemen, enabling farmers to receive better
prices for their products. In Kenya, for instance,
many smallholder producers, who have traditionally
produced high-quality products for the export
market but are now losing out due to market
concentration, are now producing for domestic
supermarkets with excellent results.
For poor farmers to participate in growing global
markets for high-value food products—such as
horticultural produce, fish, livestock and processed
foods—they need access to specialized
information, technology and professional
knowledge. They also need infrastructure and
credit. Producer marketing cooperatives and
equitable contract farming schemes can help
assure that market organizations deal with small
farmers rather than go around them to larger
producers. Modernizing the entire food chain can
dramatically improve not only agricultural
productivity but also the lives of the poor.
Households involved in horticulture, either as
producers or as labourers in packing houses and
factories, have higher incomes than households not
involved in horticulture.
Biotechnology is not a fix-all solution for global
hunger and poverty, but it can advance food
security. In 2004 there was little progress, if any, in
bringing its benefits closer to small farmers and
poor consumers. In addition, the issues of access
and patent protection (especially for seed
conservation by poor farmers) must be closely
monitored to ensure that farmers are not locked
into completely dependent relationships with
biotech companies.
Sharing patented knowledge with the poor can be
a powerful contribution of the international biotech
industry, and some positive steps were taken in
2004. Among them: the launch of the African
Agricultural Technology Foundation in Kenya, which
aims to meet the needs of the rural poor in Sub-
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In response to Africa’s dire poverty and hunger, African lead-
ers and others have formulated new strategies addressing
the continent as a whole. In 2003, at the Heads of State
Summit of the African Union, African leaders adopted the
Maputo Declaration wherein they promised to spend 10% of
their public budgets on the agricultural sector within the next
five years. They followed up by articulating plans for agricul-
ture and food security at three summits in 2004.
• In February the Second Extraordinary Assembly of the
African Union adopted the Sirte Declaration on the
Challenges of Implementing Integrated and Sustainable
Development on Agriculture and Water in Africa, highlight-
ing the importance of agriculture and water in promoting
food security and alleviating poverty.
• In April an all-Africa conference on Assuring Food and
Nutrition Security by 2020 brought together more than
500 actors and stakeholders in Kampala, Uganda, to dis-
cuss strategies for prioritizing and implementing actions
for ending hunger and malnutrition.
• In July the African Union met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
and examined the progress that has been made towards
implementation of Comprehensive African Agriculture
Development Programme, including the development of a
monitoring mechanism to track the compliance of African
states with their commitments at Maputo.
Governments and others outside the region are also involved
in regional strategies. In 2002 the G8 Summit adopted the
Africa Action Plan to promote cooperation with the New
Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and
support its efforts to achieve peace and security in the region,
improve governance, and promote agricultural productivity
and sustainable development, among other goals.
In May 2004 a high-level Commission for Africa, set up by
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, began its work. Also in 2004
the G8 Summit launched new initiatives that aim to combat
famine in the Horn of Africa by supporting the new national food
security framework developed by the government of Ethiopia—
funding land reform in Ethiopia and investing in the country’s
rural infrastructure and agricultural markets. In addition, the G8
Summit committed to help improve worldwide emergency
assessment and response systems and to foster rural develop-
ment and agricultural productivity growth in African countries. A
passionate call to action for an African Green Revolution by the
UN Secretary-General in July 2004 is a strong signal of new pri-
orities for reducing hunger and poverty in Africa.
Strategies for Africa
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Saharan Africa by obtaining affordable
technological solutions through the use of royalty-
free license agreements and distributing them to
small farmers. In its operations, the new foundation
will collaborate with such public and private
organizations as the International Research Center
for Maize and Wheat and the Syngenta Foundation.
Protecting the poorest
Protecting the poor from unexpected income
reductions requires well-targeted safety nets and
comprehensive social protection policies. Safety
nets tend to provide immediate short-term
assistance that allows households to supplement
their income without selling assets, taking children
out of school or adopting a high-risk lifestyle. Social
protection mechanisms combine the use of safety
nets with explicit developmental goals, such as
advancing education and health care. When
tailored to the needs of the target groups and
designed in accordance with the monitoring,
administrative and budgetary capacity of the state,
safety nets and social protection programmes can
cushion the impact of temporary shocks and
promote longer term human development.
These programmes exist in a wide range of formats
and countries. Latin America has seen a
proliferation of conditional cash transfers in the past
few years. Among the most notable is Mexico’s
Oportunidades programme, which accounts for
46.5% of the federal government’s antipoverty
budget. Linking food and nutrition supplements to
required attendance at schools and requires visits to
health clinics, the programme serves more than 2.5
million families in rural areas and 1.5 million families
in urban areas. South Africa’s old-age pension
system is another well-targeted programme whose
benefits span the generations in poor households.
Recent estimates indicate that without the South
African pension programme, which costs the
government 1.4% of GDP, there would have been
2.24 million (5%) more people below the poverty
line. Various social pension schemes exist in
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Antigua, Bolivia,
Bangladesh, India and Nepal. And President Lula da
Silva’s Zero Hunger programme is also an important
example of providing food security to low-income
people in Brazil. The fast growing population of
HIV/AIDS orphans requires special attention in
social protection programs, especially in Africa.
The responsibility for safety nets and social
protection lies with governments, but the private
sector can help. It can share its expertise in design,
accounting, and monitoring activities. There is also
ample room for the private sector to extend formal,
if tailored, financial and insurance services to the
poor. And private enterprises can provide such
benefits as health insurance to their employees to
cushion vulnerability to various shocks.
A conducive global environment
Despite some positive developments in recent
years, the global economic system is not working
well for most developing countries. It does not
provide a level playing field or a truly competitive
environment, particularly for low-income countries
and poor people. The WTO framework has so far
liberalized trade in high-tech products, largely of
interest to developed countries. Simple
manufacturing, like textile and leather goods of
greater interest to low income developing countries,
are still subject to protectionist policies. The most
striking example of discrimination against the
weakest members of the international community is
agriculture, which most developing countries
depend on for their livelihood and exports.
The poverty and hunger goals and the associated
global goals that have come to be known as the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent
an unprecedented consensus by world leaders to
build a global compact to reduce poverty and
hunger, achieve universal primary education,
promote gender equality, improve health care and
ensure environmental sustainability. Because no
developing country can achieve these goals if the
global economic structure is stacked against it, this
compact contains explicit commitments on the part
of rich-country governments. In a series of
international meetings in the early 2000s (Doha,
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Business and poor people need each other
Businesses face the difficulties of catering to increasingly sat-
urated Western markets. And efforts to combat poverty and
hunger are failing given insufficient job creation, lack of skills
and knowledge, and underdeveloped basic infrastructure.
Attempts to expand the tax base for better provision of pub-
lic services fall short because of limited opportunities for
upward economic mobility among the poor. And in many
developing countries, the creation of the enduring middle-
class remains elusive.
The private sector can tap into previously unexplored markets
of the 2.7 billion people who live on less than $2 a day—the
aspiring poor with a high propensity to consume any addition-
al income. The private sector can also explore alternative pro-
duction technologies that require fewer natural resources and
are less harmful to the environment in these new markets.
Those now in poverty can benefit from improved infrastruc-
ture, especially in the areas of water and energy, from better
learning opportunities, from easier access to more affordable
consumer products and from broader opportunities for
employment as well as for establishing small businesses.
There is much evidence to show that business strategies to
create markets in poor countries can be decisive in spurring
development. Merely complying with the do no harm princi-
ple, essential as it is, barely scrapes the surface of the full
potential of the private sector to promote pro-poor patterns
of economic growth. Making a positive contribution entails
the adoption of business models that explicitly focus on the
needs of the poor as consumers, not as charity cases, and
the collaboration with other actors in a broad range of pro-
poor initiatives.
More harm is done to the poor by ignoring them than by
treating them as potential consumers.
According to C.K. Prahalad and his collaborators, the poor
represent an enormous latent market for goods and services.
Indeed, today’s developing countries are the future source of
growth for the private sector worldwide. What they call the
“Bottom of the Pyramid” in just nine countries—China, India,
Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and
Thailand—represents 70% of the developing world’s popula-
tion and $12.5 trillion in GDP in purchasing power parity terms.
In contrast to the current pattern of unevenly distributed FDI
flows focused on resource-rich countries, improving access
to basic goods and services such as water, energy, food,
healthcare, education and housing—and even more sophisti-
cated services such as cellular phones, retail banking and
internet connectivity—can elevate billions of people into the
realm of consumers. There are many examples of successful-
ly executed and often profitable ventures, such as Hindustan
Lever’s micro-packaging of soap, which has improved
hygiene and public health, and Hewlett-Packard’s learning
laboratories, which bring the internet into remote villages.
The Sustainable Livelihoods Initiative of the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development provides leading strate-
gies and examples on financing infrastructure related invest-
ments with weak capacity. It emphasizes a distributed capital
strategy, linking a wide range of investors and funding sources.
If foundations, development agencies, venture philanthropists
and businesses raise money jointly, they can limit risks, ensure
sustainability and shorten the time required to turn investment
into profit. From water projects in Brazil, to housing develop-
ments in Mexico, to electricity generation in Sub-Saharan
Africa, leading corporations have partnered to develop new
markets that employ—and thus empower—the poor.
The UN Commission on the Private Sector and
Development’s Unleashing Entrepreneurship report provides
guidance on how governments and companies can work
together to maximize the potential of private investment.
Businesses can help simplify and streamline regulations to
better ensure the rule of law and fair competition, improve
transparency to enhance the integrity of public institutions
and disseminate accurate information in real time to lower
the perception of investment risk. In Argentina new dispute
resolution mechanisms have expedited the processing of
cases. And in Colombia the debt collection process is now
much more efficient. Under such conditions the linkages
between global businesses and domestic small and medium
enterprises become more stable and profitable. And the
greater presence of entrepreneurs helps to set professional
standards and increase education and training in important
skills.
Corporations can also participate in partnerships that pro-
mote food security, better nutrition and rural development.
The Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) brings
together public, private and civil organizations to combat mal-
nutrition through food fortification. Private food companies, in
both the developed and developing worlds, play a major role
by fortifying their products with essential micronutrients and
marketing them to poor people. In 2004 GAIN will award
$13.7 million to national public-private partnerships in Bolivia,
Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Mali, Pakistan and
Uzbekistan for programmes that improve nutrition and
strengthen the economy by engaging the private sector.
In 2002 the UN’s World Food Programme joined efforts
with TPG—a Dutch company specializing in mail, express
Roles for business
42
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
Monterrey, Johannesburg), the leaders of
developed countries agreed to develop further an
open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory
trading and financial system to deal
comprehensively with the debt problems of
developing countries—and, in cooperation with the
private sector, to make available the benefits of
new technologies, especially information and
communication technologies.
While arguing that primary responsibility rests with
developing country governments, the rich world’s
leaders have acknowledged that developing
countries could not by themselves achieve these
goals unless the developed countries also followed
the rules of globalization and free trade by:
• Removing tariff and non-tariff barriers that
restrict market access for exports from
developing countries.
• Reducing agricultural subsidies that depress
prices in international and domestic markets
for agricultural commodities.
• Relaxing their rules that restrict access to
technology in such critical sectors as
agriculture and health.
It is also widely recognized that low-income
developing countries, burdened with heavy and
unsustainable debt, do not have adequate
resources to finance their essential development—
especially transport infrastructure—and social
needs and thus reduce poverty and hunger. The
partnership framework therefore contains important
pledges of action by the rich countries for more aid
and significant debt relief.
The various promises have not been fully kept.
Official development flows did increase somewhat in
2003. Global growth gained momentum. Prices of
many commodities recovered. Financial markets
became less volatile. And interest rates remained
low. But the improvement in the global environment
has had a more limited impact on low-income
countries and poor people. The tragic events of 11
September, the campaign against terrorism, and the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have, it seems, diverted
the attention and the resources of the international
community from the development goals. And the
post-9/11 travel curbs in the United States and other
countries have restricted labour mobility.
Foreign assistance
In 2003 the member countries of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) contributed $68.5
billion in foreign aid, which translates to a quarter of
1% of their combined income. This meagre 3.9%
increase from the previous year includes the
reallocation of a substantial amount of
reconstruction aid to Iraq. Wealthy countries remain
off-track in meeting the needs of the developing
countries, as reflected in their Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers. And they remain off track in
meeting their long-standing commitments, most
recently reiterated at the March 2002 ministerial
meeting on financing development in Monterrey,
Mexico, to work towards the target of contributing
0.7% of the gross national income to foreign aid.
Only five countries—Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden—have reached
the Monterrey target. Another six European
countries have voiced firm commitments to do so
in the future.
Citizens groups in the United Kingdom have
pushed their government to honour its Monterrey
commitment. In July 2004 the Spending Plan for
2005–2008 released by HM Treasury stated that
and logistics—to strengthen its ability to respond effective-
ly in emergency situations. TPG has been involved in pro-
viding relief to Sudanese refugees by carrying out three air-
lifts (two of them in 2004) into the affected areas. In June it
supplied enough food to last 13,000 children for a month,
and in September it carried out another airlift, providing
7,000 children with high-energy, vitamin- and mineral-forti-
fied food.
UNIDO’s multisector partnership programme is as an umbrel-
la for business schools, industry associations and others to
cooperate in improving the competitiveness of small enter-
prises, further integrating them into global value chains.
But business needs governments to set the conditions for
private enterprise to thrive. As Peruvian economist Hernando
de Soto has demonstrated, the lack of effective property
rights protections in many developing countries undermines
the ability of the poor to leverage the full value of their assets.
Businesses of all sizes can seize the latent economic oppor-
tunities at the bottom of the pyramid only if government
enacts and enforces the necessary rules.
Source: Brown and Davies 2004; Merchant 2004; Global
Alliance for Improved Nutrition; Maitland 2004; Prahalad and
Hart 2002; United Nations Commission on the Private Sector
and Development 2004; WFP.
(continued)
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the UK government will reach the 0.7% goal by
2013—or even sooner, if its International Finance
Facility proposal is adopted. The United Kingdom
explicitly maintains that its involvement in
international development is centred around the
Millennium Development Goals, with a particular
focus on poverty alleviation and achievement of
required health and education outcomes. In
addition, Prime Minister Tony Blair established a
high-level Commission for Africa in 2004, and its
first meeting was held in Ethiopia in early October.
Given that the British will hold the chair of G8 and
the EU Presidency in 2005, this degree of resolve
may prove extremely valuable in rallying other
member countries.
In March 2002 U.S. President George Bush
announced the creation of the Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) to channel U.S. foreign aid to
developing countries that meet criteria for good
governance and effective use of funds. He pledged
that the MCA would disburse $1.67 billion in 2004,
$3.34 billion in 2005 and $5 billion in 2006. While
promising, the MCA has generated concerns that
its criteria will favour countries that already receive
substantial U.S. aid, often for political reasons.
Moreover, the criteria are designed in a way that
may eliminate most of the least developed
countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa,
from the competition. Indeed, only 4 of the 41
poorest African countries (Gambia, Ghana, Malawi
and Senegal) will be eligible in the programme’s first
year. Due to allegations of corruption, other
developing countries, such as Kenya, Malawi,
Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda, home to a large
number of African poor, may be excluded.
Overall official development assistance has been
rising slightly, but the share going to the least
developed countries has actually been falling.
Middle-income countries, with lower rates of
poverty, and countries with poor governance
remain the main recipients. There is little evidence
of efforts to direct aid to countries most in need.
And aid remains much too fragmented, forcing
recipient governments to spend far too much time
and effort on small undertakings. In Tanzania
between 2000 and 2002, government officials and
civil society were overwhelmed trying to manage
1,371 projects from various donors.
Nor is aid always effectively targeted to alleviating
poverty and hunger. In the past few years, for
instance, food aid is going more to emergency relief
than long-term development. Aid to agriculture
dropped dramatically between the 1980s and the
1990s, and by the late 1990s it was roughly half the
level in 1982–86. Given that developing country
governments also tend to neglect agriculture in
favour of military and urban investments, there is a
real danger, without a dramatic shift in expenditure
allocation, of failing the rural poor. Preliminary OECD
data for 2003 indicate a further decrease in the
proportion of aid allocated to agriculture. The World
Bank rural development strategy released in 2002
renewed the commitment to the task of
strengthening agriculture, but this commitment is
yet to be reflected in resource allocations.
Debt relief
Forgiving debt can work better than providing new
aid. It is more likely to generate pro-poor growth. It
is not as unpredictable and cyclical as foreign aid. It
allows recipient governments greater flexibility with
regard to resource allocation. And it can circumvent
the tendency of foreign aid trends to reflect the
political goals of the donor countries rather than the
needs of the poor in the developing world.
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative, launched by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund in the fall of 1996, has
been supplemented by an enhanced HIPC
framework, which aims to relieve the poorest
developing countries’ debt burden. The countries
receive relief upon demonstrating adherence to the
national poverty strategies laid out in their Poverty
Reduction Strategies Papers, formulated in
consultation with the Bank and Fund.
So far, 27 countries have benefited from debt relief
under the HIPC initiative, of 42 countries eligible.
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providing new aid and it is more
likely to generate pro-poor growth
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Subsequent G8 summits in Cologne, Germany
(1999), Kananaskis, Canada (2002) and Sea Island,
United States (2004) have emphasized the
importance of debt relief and introduced parallel
development initiatives to assist the poorest
countries.
The debt problem is far from solved. Assistance
under HIPC was neither rapid enough nor
meaningful. In addition, the debt problems of non-
HIPC countries, such as Peru and Ecuador, are
becoming more serious. Very few PRSPs explicitly
tie the national development policies to the global
goals, which in turn affects the focus of the policy.
What is currently adopted by the international
organizations as a sustainable level of debt (150%
debt-to-exports ratio) is arguably an unrealistic
criterion. And some donor countries classify their
contribution to the HIPC initiative as development
assistance. In 2002 such debt relief constituted
29% of Italy’s official development assistance, 19%
for France, 15% for Austria, and 11% for Belgium.
This raises fears that debt relief will be used to
justify reductions in official development assistance.
One promising step in 2004 came from Britain. On
26 September the United Kingdom announced that
an earmarked portion of its aid budget will be
channelled to make payments on behalf of low-
income countries to the World Bank and African
Development Bank. It will pay 10% of the money
owed by 32 countries to these lenders until 2015
($180 million a year), roughly equivalent to Britain’s
portion of the debt. These actions are significant
not only because they relieve the burden on
developing countries but also because they might
persuade other creditor countries to follow suit.
The citizens’ group Jubilee Research has proposed
a Jubilee Framework, under which debt relief will
be determined case-by-case under the jurisdiction
of an insolvency court authorized to grant
protection to debtors from creditors. The court
would be overseen by the UN Secretary-General.
While these aspects of the framework are indeed
attractive, there is also a need to identify
mechanisms to ensure that savings from debt relief
are earmarked for pro-poor spending.
Foreign direct investment
There is no consensus on whether foreign direct
investment (FDI) is beneficial for growth in general
or for poverty and hunger reduction in particular. It
is viewed as a key way for a country to gain
access to valuable resources for development and
to transfer and implement the most beneficial
practices from around the world, since very few
countries have the luxury of relying solely on
domestic technological capabilities. If FDI is
handled properly, developing countries can benefit
from technological know-how and innovation, from
expanded local markets and business
opportunities and from a higher level of
competitiveness in the domestic arena. But to
channel FDI towards the required pro-poor
investment, the government must have the
necessary leverage to induce the transnational
corporations to share the needed assets and have
the competency to use these assets suitably.
International investment agreements have been
negotiated over the past decade to establish a
clear and transparent regulatory framework for
attracting international investors. Yet frequently,
even the countries which meet most of these
requirements do not see increases in FDI flows. It
then becomes a difficult challenge for the
government to determine how far to go in
“marketing” the country. Adopting a hands-off
approach with few regulatory controls may entice
foreign investors but also jeopardize efforts to
structure development around the needs of the
poor.
In 2003 the flows of foreign direct investment to
developing countries rose 9% over the previous
year—to $172 billion. Africa registered an increase
of 28% in 2003, reaching a total of $15 billion. Asia
and the Pacific also saw a healthy rebound of 14%
resulting in an overall inflow of $107 billion to the
region. China remained the largest recipient of FDI
in 2003, capturing $53.5 billion of the total inflows.
In 2003 the flows of foreign direct
investment to developing countries
rose 9% over the previous year—to
$172 billion
45
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
P
o
ve
rty a
n
d
 h
u
n
g
e
r
2
But Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe
both experienced reductions in FDI. Latin America
saw a fourth year of declining FDI, most recently by
another 3% to $50 billion in 2003, despite its
attempts to liberalize and adopt favourable policies
for foreign investors. In Central and Eastern
Europe, FDI inflows plunged by one-third (from $31
to $21 billion), mainly as a result of declines in two
major economies in the region.
FDI inflows continue to be unequally distributed,
only partly due to the investment climate in host
countries. In Africa, FDI mostly follows oil. Just five
countries—Angola, Algeria, Chad, Nigeria and
Tunisia—receive more than half of all inflows to the
region, and then not to an employment-intensive
sector. Among the least-developed countries, four
oil exporters—Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan
and Yemen—obtain about 45% of all FDI inflows.
Excluding the top 10 FDI recipients among the
least developed countries, the remaining 39
countries received very little FDI, and even that is
declining.
Trade
For many developing countries, trade is becoming
far more important than aid in their efforts to
accelerate growth and reduce poverty and hunger.
That is why the commitment by rich countries to
develop further an open, rule-based, predictable,
nondiscriminatory trading system is crucial. But
four years after the Millennium Summit, trade
policies of developed countries remain highly
discriminatory. Average tariffs by OECD countries
on manufactured imports from developing
countries are on average three to four times higher
than on manufactured goods from other OECD
countries. And large agricultural subsidies by rich
countries ($257 billion in 2003) encourage their
farmers to grow surplus commodities, some of
which are dumped on the international markets,
pushing commodity prices to levels that in real
terms are the lowest in decades. Since about 70%
of the world’s poor live in rural areas, their
livelihoods are being constantly eroded by these
subsidies.
U.S. cotton subsidies provide a stark example. In
2001 they amounted to $3.4 billion, distributed
among 25,000 American farmers, suppressing
global cotton prices and capturing 40% of the global
cotton market. In many West African countries that
depend on cotton exports for a substantial
proportion of their earnings, the U.S. policies
plunged an additional quarter of a million people into
deeper poverty. Similar debilitating effects have been
observed for rice subsidies in the United States and
for sugar subsidies and tariffs in Europe.
The Doha WTO Agreement of November 2001
raised hopes that the developed countries had
finally accepted the paramount importance of
cutting these subsidies—hopes dashed in
September 2003 when the WTO Ministerial
meeting in Cancun, Mexico, failed to make
progress on agricultural subsidies. In July 2004
there was agreement in principle on a new
framework to put the Doha Round back on track.
This was the first time that major developing-
country governments have presented a united
front, competently engaging in keen negotiations
that forced the hand of rich governments. The G20
group of countries, which included Brazil, China,
India and South Africa, secured several
concessions from the developed countries. The
G90, comprising the low-income countries, and
represented by Rwanda, reached a deal between
African countries and the United States on cotton.
Negotiations under the July 2004 Framework
Agreement are expected to lead, in the next two to
three years, to a new Agreement on Agriculture
that will lead to cuts in domestic support that
distort markets and to much deeper cuts in export
subsidies. There are concerns that the agreement
will allow permissible subsidies to expand and thus
neutralize the net effect of other cuts. But the July
Framework is a step forward. If faithfully and
effectively implemented, it could remove one of the
most important constraints to the efforts of
developing countries to reduce poverty and
improve food security.
For many developing countries,
trade is becoming far more
important than aid 
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The difficulties of entering global markets and
building up high-value agricultural production in the
developing countries are compounded by other
hidden trade barriers in industrial countries. Often,
the stringent quality and safety regulations for
agricultural products become a variation on trade
barriers. Part of the problem has to do with inability
of the developing countries to comply with all the
regulations because of their severe limitations in
resources and capacity. But recent WTO rulings
indicate that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations
in the developed countries are at times not
supported by risk assessments—and are thus
introduced more to limit market access than to
protect the health of the consumers. Because the
proportion of fruits and vegetables accounts for an
ever-growing proportion of developing countries’
exports, the issue of food safety regulations must
be resolved. This can be accomplished by basing
the rules on more realistic risk assessments and
assisting the developing countries in building up the
capacity to comply with regulations.
Trade liberalization is also important for developing
countries. Since about one-third of developing
countries’ trade is with other developing countries,
the subsidies and tariffs of other developing
countries do a fair amount of harm. New trade
policy initiatives among developing countries. The
new free trade agreement among the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, is noteworthy.
And India and Thailand have recently signed a free
trade agreement, agreeing to gradually eliminate
tariffs on more than 80 products by 2006.
Recent research findings at IFPRI indicate that
eliminating trade barriers by the developed
countries alone would result in a $37 billion
increase in export income and $14.5 billion in
agricultural GDP for the developing countries.
Mutual trade liberalization would add an additional
$15 billion to export earnings and raise the
aggregate increase in GDP to $40 billion.
Production and exports would intensify for the
developing countries, and their consumers would
pay lower prices for agricultural products. But not
all would win from liberalization. Those small
farmers which lack access to markets need to get
connected through better infrastructure and market
institutions to share in the benefits from trade.
Another important development this year has been
the European Union’s enlargement. It may have a
positive impact on the poor in the former Soviet
Union and in the new members of the EU through
trade channels and opportunities for migration,
which indirectly reduce poverty in poor countries
through remittances.
Conclusion
Globalization has created many new opportunities
for investment and growth—but only countries with
a strong industrial base and competitive
infrastructure have been able to take advantage of
these opportunities. This is mainly because the parts
of the global economic system do not all move in
the same direction. There is freer movement of
goods, information and to some extent capital. But
labour movements are severely restricted, the more
so following 11 September. Unless steps are taken
to eliminate or mitigate policies and actions that
discriminate against the weaker and poorer
members of the global community, the poverty and
hunger goals will be difficult to achieve.
Over the past year developing countries have
initiated more significant actions and policy
changes than the high-income countries. While that
is encouraging, it is time for the high-income
countries to play their part in facing the major
challenges facing humanity. The last year has seen
some progress in the international environment and
some promising actions in Africa and South Asia.
But the impact on the poor and undernourished
has yet to be seen. Clearly the business community
can undertake bigger concerted efforts with
governments and other civil society actors.
Because the primary responsibility for achieving the
poverty and hunger goals rests with the countries
that suffer most from poverty and hunger, it is
crucial that their governments choose their own
Globalization has created many new
opportunities for investment and
growth—but only countries with a
strong industrial base and
competitive infrastructure have been
able to take advantage of these
opportunities
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strategies. Growth alone is not enough. There are
many proposals for assessing the value of a
particular strategy and corresponding policy
instruments. Investments in combating malnutrition
and HIV/AIDS prevention have been shown by the
Copenhagen Consensus to be highly cost-effective.
The Interim Report of the UN Millennium Project’s
Hunger Task Force suggests criteria for picking the
most appropriate strategies to eliminate poverty
and hunger. The final decision, however, must rest
with national governments, tailored to each
country’s political and economic climate and to its
historical, cultural and geographic characteristics.
The type of poverty and hunger—whether transient
or chronic, in rural or urban areas, among children
or elderly—dictates a particular approach for a
country or a given region. The full range of policy
instruments must be deployed as needed within a
favourable international environment.
The gap between goals and effort, much too wide,
need not remain so. There are many ideas for bringing
new resources to bear. Although any general scheme
of international taxation is unlikely to materialize at this
stage, specific initiatives may fare better, perhaps
modelled on the Global Environmental Facility created
after the 1992 Rio Summit on Environment and
Development. In September 2004—at a Summit for
the Action against Hunger and Poverty Initiative, which
builds on the Geneva Declaration adopted in January
of this year and is led by the presidents of Brazil,
France, Chile and Spain, and the Secretary-General of
the UN (“Quintet against Hunger”)—more than 100
countries signed the New York Declaration to reaffirm
their commitment to the global fight against poverty
and hunger and to endorse the campaign to gather
additional funds through both traditional and
innovative mechanisms. Proposals for innovative
mechanisms to finance poverty and hunger alleviation
included taxation of carbon emissions, financial
transactions, and arms trade, and the creation of
Special Drawing Rights and of International Financial
Facility.
At another special UN event, also in September
2004, the World Commission on the Social
Dimension of Globalization, co-chaired by Finnish
President Tarja Halonen and Tanzanian President
Benjamin Mkapa, presented a report entitled “A
Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All”.
The report suggested that taxes be imposed on
greenhouse gas emissions, certain financial
transactions, and so on—to build a $50 billion fund
to fight poverty.
Such steps would go far towards improving the
world’s score next year on poverty and hunger
reduction. The elimination of absolute poverty has
emerged as a prominent area for coordinated
global action. It is in the enlightened self-interest
of advanced nations to tackle poverty as a
breeding ground for hatred, desperation, violence
and terrorism. To have a billion people living in
poverty in 2015, despite all the technological and
scientific knowledge, amidst so much affluence,
would be a major blot on the conscience of
humanity.
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What makes 2005 notable is that it is the year in
which the world failed to achieve the very first of
the Millennium Development Targets. About 60%
of countries will not achieve gender parity in
primary and secondary education, and what is
worse, on present trends about 40% will not
make it even by 2015. Improving girls’ and
women’s education is now widely accepted as
critical to achieving a wide range of development
goals—from reducing malnutrition and cutting
child mortality, to increasing economic growth
and raising incomes, to halting the spread of
AIDS.
The imminent failure of reaching this target is thus
cause for very serious concern, and it might be
expected to serve as a clarion call for the
international community. On the contrary: 2004
was characterized by little decisive action on the
education goals. But as the failure to achieve this
first target hits home, the G8 richest nations and
the international financial institutions may finally be
persuaded to act more strongly.
A few of the world’s poorest countries achieved
dramatic increases in girls’ enrolments over the
past few years, proving that the timeline set by
world leaders for reaching education gender parity
was indeed feasible—if resources and political will
had been harnessed on a large enough scale. Their
successes only throw into sharper relief the
inadequacy of the global effort. An estimated 100
million children are out of school, three-quarters of
them in Sub-Saharan Africa and South and West
Asia, a majority of them girls.1 Their numbers are
declining only slowly (by about 1 million a year),
and at these rates, neither universal primary
enrolment nor gender parity will be attained over
the next decade.
This chapter assesses the efforts of governments,
international agencies, NGOs and the private sector
in influencing this recent record, to give an overall
score. A summary assessment of these efforts is
given below, and compared with last year’s.
Governments in Africa made some progress
towards Education for All. Kenya, Zambia,
Mauritania and Nigeria introduced legislation for
free and compulsory education, boosting
enrolments. The gender parity goal has also been
receiving more urgent attention in these and other
countries. In the Arab States pressures to enhance
women’s rights are having some impact on their
participation in education—but many countries still
have far to go. In Latin America and Asia the
qualitative challenges in basic education remain
strong. Resource allocations have improved in
India, but education expenditures in China remain
too dependent on household budgets, holding
down enrolments in the poorer regions.
International agencies cannot take great pride in
their record over the past year. There are promises
of enhanced debt relief, and greater aid to basic
education from Hillary Clinton’s draft legislation—
and pressure in this direction from the United
Kingdom’s Africa Commission. But resource
transfers from official sources remain fundamentally
inadequate. The failure of the Fast Track Initiative to
raise significant additional money for education is
increasing scepticism about whether the needs of
the poorest countries will be met.
Nongovernmental organizations, by contrast, have
done rather better. The Global Campaign’s “Action
Week” had a good mobilizing impact, with more
than 2 million people around the world either
writing a letter to their governments, or directly
Education
Score
3
Goals
Ensure that by 2015 children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able
to complete a full course of primary schooling.
Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education,
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.
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lobbying national parliaments for a sharper focus
on primary education. In Latin America NGOs have
made strategic partnerships with the private sector
to leverage more resources for schooling, with
good results. While this is helping to change mind-
sets in that region, elsewhere the energies of the
private sector have not yet been successfully
mobilized to support Education for All, even though
human resources are central in increasing private
productivity.
International action in support of the Goals
With only a decade left to get all children through
6–8 years of primary school, many advocates have
declared 2005 a crucial year for securing much-
needed political and financial commitments to
education. Real progress will require a major
increase in the funding from G8 countries, and the
G8 Summit in 2005 has the potential to spark such
a transformation. The United Kingdom, as chair of
the Summit, has said it will focus the Summit on
development issues and the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), holding out some
prospect of increased assistance for education. In
part this is because Prime Minister Blair’s
Commission on Africa will issue a report to guide
decisions on policy and funding in the region, and for
it, education, particularly of girls, seems a priority.
The United Kingdom’s pledge of £1 billion for the
education MDGs during the summer of 2004
augurs well for the future. France, too, made a
commitment to increase its education spending
over the next few years, albeit without specific
details. Canadian prime minister Paul Martin has
also supported basic education—he spoke about it
passionately when he was finance minister in the
run-up to the G8 summit hosted by Canada in
2002. But these intentions remain only words. The
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South
Asia
Middle East
and North Africa
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
Europe and
Central Asia
East Asia
and Pacific
1990
2000
19
97
19
98
19
98
Many girls still do not have equal access to education
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004, 2004.
G8 leaders have yet to champion and throw real
international financial support behind education, as
the recent experience of the Fast Track Initiative
illustrates.
The Education for All Fast Track Initiative
Following the 2000 World Education Forum in
Dakar, Senegal, when more than 180 countries
pledged that all children should complete at least a
basic education by 2015, a concerted effort began
to create a coordinated global financing framework
to fulfil that promise. The Dakar Framework of
Action called on poor countries to “develop or
strengthen national plans…including responsive,
participatory and accountable systems of
educational governance”. In return, it called on
donors to affirm the notion that “no country
seriously committed to education for all will be
thwarted in its achievement of this goal by a lack of
resources”.2 This idea of a compact between
donors and developing countries gained support
after the Millennium Summit in autumn 2000, as an
important way of achieving the MDGs for
education.
In response, NGOs and other advocates pushed
for a viable financing structure for all donors to
support developing countries’ progress towards
universal education. The Education for All (EFA)
Fast Track Initiative (FTI), launched in 2002, was
endorsed by the Development Committee of the
World Bank as a “process that would provide quick
and incremental technical and financial support to
countries that have policies but are not on track to
attain Universal Primary Completion by 2015”.3
Under its rubric, countries having both a poverty
reduction strategy and an agreed “credible”
education sector plan became eligible to develop
proposals for FTI financing.
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Initially, 18 low-income countries were judged
eligible for early funding. But in November 2003
donors expanded the eligibility criteria to include “all
low-income countries with acceptable educational
plans that have not yet achieved universal primary
completion”. Roughly 32 additional countries make
up this group. At a donor meeting in Oslo in
November 2003, FTI partners felt that this broader
coverage would help it to develop into the most
important international instrument in support of
Education for All.
The particular needs of countries in extreme
difficulty, which lack the educational planning and
implementation capacities required by the FTI, have
also been recognized. In late 2003 a Catalytic Fund
was established, with pledges of about $256 million
over three years, to respond to their needs.
Although significant, these comparatively small
sums do not yet provide the needed assurance that
enough international support will be forthcoming to
secure the educational goals for these countries.
More generally, many low-income developing
countries with credible education plans have no
guarantee of support and have yet to see serious
financing commitments through the FTI or any
other mechanism. Only 12 developing countries (of
the 60 or so countries at serious risk of not
achieving the universal primary education and
gender parity goals by 2015) have so far received
support from FTI. In late 2004 that support stood
at only about $430 million, far short of the more
than $1 billion needed.
These sums are small in comparison with the
aggregate resources needed to achieve the MDGs.
Taking all developing countries together, the best
estimates suggest that an additional $5.6 billion a
year in aid (beyond the $1.5 billion now supplied by
all donors) will be needed to ensure universal
primary education and gender parity by 2015.4 The
FTI risks looking like little more than a pilot initiative.
The absence of significant funding means a likely
failure of incentives on several fronts. First, even for
the countries funded through the FTI, the levels are
not sufficient for them to fully implement their plans.
It is likely, then, that targets for EFA will not be met
even in the countries supported. Second, the flows
of funding are not predictable. Even if substantial
support is received by some countries, the funding
framework used by FTI is not long-term, and there
are no particular grounds for confidence that the
reforms and expansions will be sustained. Needed
are timely, predictable and long-term commitments
of aid—if the reform processes in the poorest
countries are to be consistently implemented.
Partly in recognition that the FTI had not yet
succeeded in mobilizing significant funding from its
partners, some significant structural changes were
made in 2003 and 2004. The notion of a “virtual”
fund is being adopted—whereby FTI mechanisms
coordinate and extend existing bilateral and
multilateral programming, rather than create a new,
independent global fund. As part of this new
approach, decisionmaking has shifted to the
country. Donor representatives working in countries
are now expected to review national education
plans and recommend whether and how much
additional funding the FTI should provide to close
financing gaps. Support is to be pledged only after
that process has been completed, not after an
international review of country proposals.
The changes offer many positive benefits, but for
them to succeed, donors need to reconfirm their
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commitment to finance all credible plans. The
continuing existence of the FTI, and its recent
extension to all countries, keeps alive the notion of a
global compact. But without substantial resources,
without a sense of future funding being predictable
and without a clear time-line to ensure that all
countries will have enough resources to meet the
2015 goals, the FTI will have to make much faster
progress to achieve its aims. It is uncertain whether
leaders at the 2005 G8 Summit will launch a bold
initiative on education with substantial funding—or
again deliver only the small and rather piecemeal
support, unconnected to any longer term strategy,
that has typified the last few years.
Education as a tool to prevent extremism
During 2004 the importance of education burst into
the mainstream foreign policy discussion in the
United States and United Kingdom as
investigations into the events of 11 September
2001 revealed the failures of public schooling in
many predominantly Muslim countries. Concerns
grew about the droves of students turning to
madrassahs of poor quality or extremist ideologies
for their education. The U.S. 9/11 Commission
identified the all-too-familiar story of fundamentalist
schools in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan capitalizing
on weak public school systems and substituting
extremism for good quality education.
The results of this discussion could yield both
positive and negative outcomes. One advantage has
been engaging more stakeholders from the foreign
policy, national security and defence establishments
in the conversation on basic education. With the
failure of public schooling in many countries as an
opening for extremists to preach hate and anti-
westernism, education appeared naturally as a
foreign policy priority—and high-level officials in the
Bush Administration began to stress the need for
investing in education systems.5 As a result, this
may generate at least some modest increases for
education, probably focused on Muslim nations. For
instance, at the 2004 G8 Summit, the United States
announced a small, $10 million initiative to promote
adult literacy programmes in a few Middle East
countries. This effort, and the $40 million in funding
included as part of the U.S. 9/11 Commission bill, is
only a fraction of what these countries need to
achieve universal education.
Policymakers in donor countries still do not see the
larger picture. Even in their own terms, investing in
education in all countries is important to preventing
violence and promoting development. A pre-
emptive investment in countries’ education systems
before extremism and conflict take hold is critical,
not only to make real progress to the 2015 goal but
to make the world more secure.6
Civil society
In 2004 civil society increased the visibility and
strength of its pressure on governments and
international agencies to make Education for All a
reality. Building on the success of the 2003 Global
Action Week on EFA, the Global Campaign for
Education in April 2004 organized the “World’s
Biggest Lobby” in which 2 million people in 117
countries spoke directly to politicians and expressed
their views about what needs to be done to achieve
universal education in their country. Thousands of
parliamentarians and 14 heads of state met with
groups of children during the lobby, and many
politicians committed themselves to specific actions
in response to the children’s demands.
At national and regional levels, the formation of
coalitions or networks has proved an important
vehicle for NGOs, teachers’ unions and other civil
society actors to establish a more coherent,
constructive and consistent voice in education
policy forums.7 During 2004 there were
encouraging signs of the growing maturity and
effectiveness of many of these coalitions, thanks in
part to more systematic capacity-building efforts by
international NGOs and regional networks.
In addition to mobilizing impressive popular support
and media exposure during the Action Week, many
national coalitions are making efforts to strengthen
their advocacy, monitoring learning achievements
and literacy outcomes and systematically tracking
In 2004 civil society increased
the visibility and strength of its
pressure on governments and
international agencies to make
Education for All a reality
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government spending on education.8 For example,
having had a major influence on the Free Primary
Education policy in Kenya, the national Elimu Yetu
Coalition in 2004 trained hundreds of district school
inspectors, PTA members, headteachers and
community organizations to understand and monitor
the implementation of the new policy. Districts
involved in the programme report less leakage and
waste of funds than districts not covered.
Although teachers are perhaps the most important
constituency in education reform, they are frequently
ignored in policy dialogue, monitoring and
implementation. But over the past two years
Education International, representing some 29 million
teachers worldwide, has initiated programmes to
help national unions engage more systematically in
EFA-related processes, including HIV/AIDS
prevention and the development of sector plans.
Cross-cutting themes at national and
regional levels
Although education is important to everyone’s life
chances, it is especially vital for poor and vulnerable
children, who seldom inherit many other assets. Yet
it is precisely these children who are often denied
even a primary education—simply because it costs
too much. Fees and charges keep children,
particularly girls, out of school, making education
free is one of the most important policy steps that
governments can take towards the universal primary
education and gender parity targets. However, more
than 100 developing countries continue to impose
fees, many of them despite constitutional or legal
commitments to free education. In more than three-
quarters of the countries at risk of not achieving
gender parity in primary schooling, fees were still
charged at primary level in 2003.9
Costs
There is evidence of change. Over the past two
years Kenya, Philippines,10 Zambia, Lesotho, Nigeria
and two states in Pakistan removed primary school
tuition fees. Bangladesh, which provides not only
free tuition but free textbooks, announced that it will
further expand the free textbook scheme to cover
NGO-run as well as government-run schools.11
India’s new government announced a new tax of 2%
on turnover in 2004, which will be earmarked to
deliver on the 2001 constitutional amendment
guaranteeing the right to free and compulsory
education for children ages 6–14.
• In many other countries, however,
governments took no action in 2004 to reduce
the costs to parents of educating their
children. Nor did donors act to catalyse and
support more efforts in this direction. On the
contrary, education costs seem to be a
growing problem in many countries:
• Over the two decades to 2000, China
achieved virtually universal enrolment in
primary schooling. Over the past few years
however, parents have had to raise more
resources for the schools. These rising private
costs, for the first time in China’s recent
history, have caused enrolments to fall and
threatened universal primary education.
• Charges and hidden costs are reported to be
on the rise in Indonesia, Vanuatu and
Cambodia.
• In South Africa communities affected by
HIV/AIDS find it more difficult to afford school
uniforms and tuition fees. Last year the
government announced plans to implement
fee waivers in the poorest areas, but stopped
short of making free education universal.
• Primary education is officially free in Nepal but
the authorities turn a blind eye to charges
imposed (illegally) by schools.
One reason developing country governments are
reluctant to make education free is the high cost of
funding the schools, to compensate them for the
loss in operating revenue, are high. Where schools
have funding shortfalls, per pupil funding declines,
teacher shortages develop, quality deteriorates and
schools start reintroducing charges through the
back door.
A far more generous response from donors will be
needed to make primary education truly affordable
In more than three-quarters of the
countries at risk of not achieving
gender parity in primary schooling,
fees were still charged at primary
level in 2003
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to the poor. According to Tanzanian NGO Maarifa,
the direct costs of education paid by parents have
dropped substantially since Tanzania abolished
tuition fees, to just over 4,000 Tsh. But other costs,
including exercise books and uniforms, amount to
more than three times as much. Donor funding is
helping to underwrite capitation grants to schools
to replace some of the lost revenue from fees.
Further reducing the costs to parents would require
increases in (and more effective disbursement of)
the capitation grant, which amounts to only about
$5 a pupil a year.12 Similar challenges exist in
Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.
The dramatic increases in girls’ enrolment and
completion in Bangladesh suggest that steps to
eliminate costs should be accompanied by
additional incentives for excluded groups. Part of
the proceeds of India’s new education tax will be
used to provide a free cooked meal to every
elementary school pupil nationwide (implementing a
2001 Supreme Court decision). Elsewhere, cash
transfers for education are increasingly used as a
means of targeting the poor. Such programmes,
providing cash payments to parents who keep their
children in school, have been developed in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Mexico.
Although there is growing international interest in
cash transfers as a possible “solution” for achieving
the universal primary education goal, their relatively
high cost and administrative complexity means
they will not be right for every country.13 Nor are
they designed to address the fundamental
shortcomings in the supply and quality of education
that so many developing countries face. In Latin
American countries, where they originated, the
Conditional cash transfers for education have become popu-
lar in Latin American countries for reducing poverty and
increasing schooling among the poor.
Oportunidades in Mexico
Implemented countrywide from 1997, Oportunidades provides
monthly cash transfers to mothers of students in grades 3–9
with an 85% attendance rate in marginal rural communities.
Eligible communities and households are chosen on the basis
of census information on poverty. A community promoter (a
beneficiary selected by other beneficiaries) ensures that bene-
ficiaries get the transfers and monitors available education
services. The average grant is around $25 per household a
month. Higher grants amounts are given for students in higher
grades and for girls in secondary school. Benefits are capped
at $79 per household. In 1999 the programme cost $780 mil-
lion a year (0.2% of GDP) and covered 2.6 million households
(roughly 10% of all families in Mexico). Oportunidades is being
extended to urban areas.
Programme evaluations have found that students in partici-
pating communities are more likely to enter school earlier,
repeat and drop out less and to progress from one grade to
the next. The biggest impact is in transition year between pri-
mary and middle school, when many children drop out. The
programme has resulted in an average gain of 0.66 years of
schooling in participating communities. But there has not yet
been a documented improvement in achievement test scores
or school attendance.
Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua
Since 2000 RPS has provided an education subsidy to eligi-
ble households with children in grades 1–4 of primary school
(ages 7–13) who have at least an 85% monthly attendance
rate. All children in the relevant age group must attend
school for a family to qualify. The programme covers all
households in 42 of the poorest districts in two states, cho-
sen on basis of need, infrastructure and the capacity to
implement the programme. The average yearly subsidy per
household is $112, plus $21 yearly per child for materials.
Each child also gets $4.25 a year to give the school when
they enrol—for teacher salaries and other inputs. In 2000 the
programme budget was $10 million, or about 0.2% of GDP
and 2.5% of current government spending on health and
education. 90% of this funding came from an Inter-American
Development Bank loan.
RPS’s rigorous evaluation strategy includes random treat-
ment and control groups. Preliminary results show that enrol-
ments have increased 22 percentage points (from a base of
69%) in treatment groups, 30 points for the poorest house-
holds. Participating students were also more likely to stay
enrolled. Surprisingly progression rates increased the most
(12%) from grades 4 to 5, even though students in grade 5
are no longer eligible for the programme.
Enrolment impacts for RPS were higher than for
Oportunidades, in part because starting levels were lower.
Increases in years of education estimated suggest that in low-
income countries such as Nicaragua, with their tighter budg-
et constraints and greater need for educational resources to
address inferior educational outcomes, lower transfers can
achieve large impacts on human capital accumulation, espe-
cially among the poor.
Source: Morley and Coady 2003.
Programmes targeted at education and poverty reduction
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those who have completed primary school, are
strongly related to national incomes, with students
in the poorest countries scoring least well.
Within countries, poor rural children and those from
ethnic minorities tend to get the worst deal from
schools. National results from Ecuador’s grade five
language and math tests show that indigenous
children have raw scores 20% below nonindigenous
children. And the UNESCO/OREALC test in Peru
showed indigenous students with scores 15% lower
than nonindigenous students in public urban
schools and 9% lower in rural schools (Winkler
2004). Similar disparities have been noted in Ghana,
India and South Africa. So it is not just access to
schooling that counts—it is access to schooling of a
reasonable quality, which is far from being equally
distributed in the poorer countries of the world.
What makes a difference?
There is growing evidence that school
performance—measured by test scores—is
significantly improved by smaller class sizes,
teaching practices, adequate instructional time and
textbook provision. This is particularly true for
children from disadvantaged social backgrounds,
yet poor communities tend to get fewer, and less
well-trained, teachers. Schools serving
impoverished communities often need special
support to raise learning achievement.
The need for greater investment in training teachers
is especially compelling. More than half the
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa faced a ratio of
more than 44 pupils per teacher in 2002, up from
40 in 1990. In the Central African Republic and
Chad the ratio exceeds 70:1. More than half the
countries of South Asia also have pupil-teacher
ratios of more than 40:1. Other regions have
basic infrastructure of mass public education is
already in place. Even in such countries, cash
transfers without complementary programmes to
improve education services, and to better
coordinate education and employment policies,
may not always have an adequate impact.14
Even with these limitations, the potential benefits of
cash transfers for education—poverty reduction,
greater participation in education and the improved
health and education effects from educating girls—
and their political implications—societies are more
likely to give to the poor if benefits are tied to
something they value—make them an attractive
option for some countries.
Quality in question
The goal for universal primary education implies not
only that all children have access to school, and that
they complete it, but also that they receive an
education of good quality. Improving quality is no
mystical mantra. In developing countries it starts with
thoroughly practical issues such as reducing class
sizes, increasing average hours of instruction,
supplying enough textbooks and employing teachers
who are adequately trained, paid and motivated.
As average years of schooling and scores on
achievement tests continue to rise in rich
countries, poor countries are not raising their own
attainment levels fast enough to avoid falling
farther behind. Children in Sub-Saharan Africa can
expect to receive, on average, 7 years of
education—only about half of their counterparts in
Western Europe and North America. Children in
South Asia fare scarcely better with an average of
8.6 years. In the Arab countries and the
developing countries of East Asia and the Pacific,
children can expect to receive between 10 and 11
years of education.
Not only are the expected years of schooling low, a
significant proportion of those who do complete
primary school will fail to acquire minimum mastery
levels as defined by their own national
governments. Scores in achievement tests, for
Poor countries are not raising their
own attainment levels fast enough
to avoid falling farther behind Average student performance score
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teacher shortages in the very countries that still
need to increase the coverage of their primary
school systems. In Cambodia and Timor-Leste, for
example, the pupil-teacher ratio exceeds 50:1.
Placing further demands on teachers in these
circumstances is detrimental to teacher capacity
and morale, diminishing the learning outcomes of
students. Many countries facing teacher shortages
have to cut the school day short so that each
teacher can teach two groups of students a day
(double-shifting).
Teacher qualifications remain generally low,
especially in Africa and South Asia. In some African
countries, up to 60% of primary school teachers
have received no pedagogical training. Across 26
countries surveyed in 2001, less than 10% of the
teaching force had even completed lower
secondary schooling, and many others fell short of
standards set at the upper secondary level. A
recent study in seven southern African countries
found that some math teachers at the primary level
possess only basic numeracy and score lower than
students on tests. The percentage of trained
teachers in South Asia varies from 66% in
Bangladesh to almost 97% in the Islamic Republic
of Iran. In Lao People’s Democratic Republic about
a quarter of primary-school teachers were
untrained in 2001.15
The distribution of teachers is unequal within
countries, with rural and otherwise disadvantaged
areas typically receiving fewer trained teachers. The
situation is worse in conflict and post conflict
countries and areas hard hit by the AIDS
pandemic. Deploying teachers in their own
community has proven a successful approach in
some countries facing such disparities, such as
Bangladesh, perhaps because locals feel more
commitment to their home area.16
It is encouraging that some countries have sharply
improved the training of teachers in recent years.
Egypt has taken significant steps to increase
spending on teacher salaries, reduce class sizes,
improve in-service teacher training and strengthen
support systems. Decentralization and information
and communication technology-based
management help ensure that these investments
are effectively managed. Teachers with training now
make up more than 90% of the teaching force in
Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Almost
all teachers have received some training in
Cambodia and China, and all in Niue, Papua New
Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu.
What is worrying, however, is that some countries
are making unqualified teachers (sometimes
referred to as voluntary, community or para-
teachers) a permanent part of their education
system. Typically high school graduates, the
recruits receive a few weeks or months of training
and a job with little security, few contractual rights
and a salary that is usually less than half a qualified
teacher’s starting wage. Although governments
needing to dramatically expand their education
systems face real financial constraints, it is dubious
whether reducing teacher qualifications and pay are
in the best interests of students.
The pressures on teachers are exacerbated by
widespread absenteeism. Investigators making
random visits to 200 primary schools in India
found no teaching activity in half of them at the
time of the visit. Poor educational support and
supervision and weak community involvement are
part of the reason. Another is the need for poorly
paid teachers to hold second jobs. Teachers in
Honduras make just $50 more than the cost of a
monthly basket of staple foods, and less than half
the average per capita income. Wages in Zambia
do not even cover a month’s food needs.
Teacher shortages and high pupil-teacher ratios are
linked to insufficient instruction time. A broadly
agreed benchmark of 850–1,000 hours a year is
recommended for effective learning. UNESCO’s
Global Monitoring Report 2005 reports that in
South and West Asia, the average annual number
of schooling hours in the region fell sharply over the
past two decades, reflecting the pressure of
Some countries have sharply
improved the training of teachers in
recent years
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meeting higher demand for schooling under
tightening resource constraints. Teacher and pupil
absenteeism, shortage of classrooms, lack of
learning materials and weak discipline all lead to
pressures to reduce the burdens on teachers—and
to reduce the number of instructional hours.
Quality and the financing constraint
Improving quality while pursuing universal primary
education requires that governments sustain or even
increase per student funding as they substantially
expand student numbers. Countries that have
increased enrolments but not maintained previous
levels of per student funding have seen quality
plummet. In Malawi, for example, the abolition of
school fees doubled enrolments, but neither
government spending nor donor funding kept pace.
Pupil-teacher ratios rose precipitously, drop-outs
increased and learning achievements hit dismal lows.
More efficient management of public expenditure
could free up some of the necessary resources.
World Bank studies in Uganda and Ghana suggest
that up to half the intended funds were not
reaching the schools, until funding allocations and
school accounts were publicized. But much greater
sustained investment is required on the parts of
both governments and aid agencies. While
increased spending is not in itself a guarantee of
quality, none of the improvements discussed
here—more and better trained teachers, more
textbooks and increased hours of instruction,
special support to schools in impoverished
communities—will come free of charge.
A particular concern, therefore, is the continuing
insistence of the international financial institutions,
and of the IMF in particular, for countries to reduce
fiscal deficits without due consideration of their social
consequences. Zambia, for example, needs
thousands more teachers just to cope with AIDS
deaths and keep pupil-teacher ratios from rising
beyond the current 57:1. But early in 2004, plans to
deploy thousands of newly qualified teachers to rural
schools had to be shelved to keep the public sector
wage bill to no more than 7% of GDP, as stipulated
by the IMF. Meanwhile, Zambia was due to pay the
Fund the equivalent of 50% of its education budget
in debt servicing. Similar problems may well arise in
Malawi where the government, desperate to resume
its IMF programme after a three-year suspension of
aid and loans, has written an 8% limit on the public
sector wage bill into its Letter of Intent.
The IMF suspended its programme in Honduras,
and declared Honduras “off-track” for HIPC
completion, following disputes over teacher wage
increases. Having lost out on two years’ worth of
aid and interim debt relief, the government had little
choice but to freeze teacher salaries to get back
“on track”. In Mozambique plans to increase
teacher salaries were “renegotiated” in 2003 after
the World Bank advised the government that it was
unlikely to qualify for Fast Track Initiative support if
the full increases were implemented.
Wage constraints and debt servicing burdens hit
impoverished countries even harder because few
donors are willing to allocate aid to underwrite
salaries and other recurrent costs. Even where
donors do fund recurrent costs, their commitments
are often too short-term and unpredictable to give
finance ministers confidence that even modest
increases in the education wage bill will be
sustainable.
HIV/AIDS
Schools provide a critical opportunity to provide
children, particularly girls, with the self-confidence,
information and cognitive skills that can prevent
them becoming infected with HIV/AIDS later in life.
Even a good foundation in primary education
makes a difference. A 32-country UN study shows
that literate young women are three times more
likely than their illiterate peers to know how
HIV/AIDS is transmitted and how to protect
themselves. The preventative impact of schooling is
even greater if HIV/AIDS education is included in
the general school curriculum.
Evidence from a number of African and Asian
countries suggests that the AIDS epidemic forces
Improving quality while pursuing
universal primary education requires
that governments sustain or even
increase per student funding
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children—not just AIDS orphans, but children
whose families’ livelihoods have been undermined
by the epidemic in a wide range of ways—to drop
out of school. Providing free education and
additional support, such as free school meals, is
thus an especially compelling imperative.
AIDS is an increasing threat not just to families’
ability to keep children in school but also to
government’s ability to provide schooling. Zambia
will lose 20 million teacher hours to AIDS-related
absenteeism over the first decade of this century.17
From 2004 onwards Zambia expects upwards of
1,600 teacher deaths a year.
It is inexcusable, therefore, that governments and
donors are allowing education’s “window of hope”
to slip past. A recent survey of Ministry of
Education policy responses to AIDS in 19
countries showed that in only three countries did
primary students have a good chance of receiving
some education on HIV/AIDS during the course of
their education. Likewise, rich countries are
directing far too little of their resources towards
HIV/AIDS prevention and towards making primary
education free and universal. Merely to maintain
current levels of enrolment and learning
achievement—let alone increase access and
completion to better fight AIDS—education
systems in hard-hit countries will require greater
donor support hand-in-hand with a considerably
stronger policy response from governments.
Neither was forthcoming in 2004.
Small steps forward from the private sector
Although its impact has so far been very limited, the
private sector is initiating some efforts to support
basic education. The Commonwealth Education
Fund has engaged business leaders in the United
Kingdom and India in supporting civil society
advocacy for the education goals in low-income
Commonwealth countries. Private sector efforts are
perhaps most advanced in Latin America, where
business leaders across the region are beginning to
use their influence, and their funds, to promote
system reform instead of one-off philanthropy.
Some examples: The Federación Nacional de
Cafeteros de Colombia believes that, “more
elevated levels of education permit better
appreciation of modern technology, which at the
same time contributes to diminished production
costs and more profitable investments.” A group of
business leaders in Peru came together to form
Peru 2021, a nonprofit organization that has
developed a national vision, with the hope of
completing its goals by 2021, the 200th anniversary
of Peru’s independence. Education is a key part of
their platform. An Argentinian group of business
foundations (Grupo de Fundaciones), having
endowed funds which are used to support a variety
of social initiatives, has noted that education is a
key concern of its members. Brazilian business
leaders have also marked education as their
primary focus and goal.
Regional projects are also emerging. BellSouth,
through its ProNiño Program, is working in the
South American countries of Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
It aims to improve the educational opportunities and
achievement of working students throughout Latin
America. The programme is implemented through
external organizations that receive money and
management supervision from BellSouth. Another
company with a regional approach is Telefónica,
which has developed an internet portal for
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. It has also taken a
role in providing technology resources for schools in
each of these countries. Fundación BankBoston
also operates in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Uruguay, supporting education programmes in all of
them. There are similar schemes in Mexico, El
Salvador and the Dominican Republic. In these
ways, South America as a whole is moving towards
greater business involvement in education, partly
because corporate social responsibility has become
a goal of many business leaders.
Concerned about the lack of educational
opportunities in the broader Middle East, several
companies have started small technology-driven
programmes in Jordan, Morocco and other
The private sector is initiating
some efforts to support basic
education
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countries. Through the Jordan Education Initiative,
the World Economic Forum and U.S. technology
giant Cisco Systems have, in 2003 and 2004, set
up internet-driven learning in classrooms. And
Cisco opened 10 Networking Academies, teaching
high-tech skills to 600 students—almost two-thirds
of them women. In addition, the foundation of
former AOL chief Stephen Case, UNDP, USAID and
the Japanese International Cooperation Agency
have created “knowledge stations” to improve
computer skills for employment. Meanwhile, the
Education for Employment Foundation is working in
Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt and Morocco to create
technical schools that can improve young people’s
employment prospects—and to build primary and
secondary schools in some areas to expand the
pipeline of qualified students.
While it is encouraging that companies and
policymakers seek to address the roots of violence,
and that they see investing in education as a long-
term solution, the one-off nature of some of these
efforts risks diverting attention from the collective
goal of ensuring that all children are completing a
basic education by 2015. The current political
climate focuses much private sector effort on the
Middle East, but the need is overwhelming in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
While all new efforts to support education are
welcome, it is critical that their combined impact
delivers strong progress towards the goal for 2015.
Three steps are needed to encourage this.
First, the legal structure and new tax incentives
should support donations to the education
system and be widely publicized and explained to
business leaders. In Chile a tax incentive exists
for company donations to education (Law 19.247
of 1993), but business leaders and educators
have generally been dissatisfied with its use and
effects. In Uruguay 60% of companies
interviewed were unaware of the laws that
regulate donations. Most other Latin American
countries have no tax incentives for corporate
donations to education.
Second, umbrella groups should be formed in each
country, and across regions, to promote a systematic
approach to business involvement in education, and
to represent business in the education debate.
Groups like the National Alliance of Business and the
Business Roundtable have led the call for education
reform in the United States. These groups are a
powerful force for change, because they represent
the business community and show that business
leaders care about the quality of education.
Similar organizations are needed in other
countries, to represent business leaders who care
about education and to disseminate information
and best practices on how business can help
improve national education systems. As a first
step, business leaders need to become
comfortable with sharing knowledge of their
activities, so that others can learn from their
experiences. In Latin America, for example,
businesses across the region have historically
been loath to publicize their activities in the social
sector. A survey of Uruguayan businesses revealed
that 67% preferred to make donations privately,
without the public’s knowledge. Argentinean and
Chilean business leaders have a similar attitude,
fearing that to publicize their actions would result
in an “avalanche” of requests.
Third, in all cases, public-private partnerships need
to be coordinated with ongoing education
assistance programmes to avoid duplication and
leverage funding. The challenge for the private
sector, and for its advocates and advisers, is how
best to harness these new investments and to direct
high-profile leaders to work towards Education for All
in all countries, not just a select few.
Endnotes
1. UNESCO (2004).
2. UNESCO (2000).
3. World Bank (2003).
4. UNESCO (2002).
Umbrella groups should be formed in
each country, and across regions, to
promote a systematic approach to
business involvement in education
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5. Congressional hearing on the 9/11 Commission
Report (2004).
6. Sperling (2004).
7. Although a few such coalitions existed before
2000, many more have been formed over the
past four years through the efforts of the Global
Campaign for Education and the international
and regional organizations belonging to the
Global Campaign for Education such as
Education International, ANCEFA, ASPBAE,
ActionAid, Oxfam, Save the Children, PLAN and
CARE. 
8. Some of the national coalitions involved in such
efforts include Bangladesh, Brazil, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi and Ghana.
9. UNESCO (2003).
10. Free, compulsory and universal education is
included in the new Philippines constitution but
statutes for its implementation were introduced only
in 2002. 
11. Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania removed fees in
1994–2001.
12. Maarifa (2003). 
13. Effective programme design and
implementation—including how projects are
targeted, benefits and coverage levels, and how
programmes are monitored and evaluated—are
crucial to the success of CTEs.
14. Despite these promising new programmes, the
Latin America and the Caribbean region needs to
do far more to provide equitable access to
education. The focus should be on urban slums and
rural and indigenous populations, providing a range
of equity-enhancing policies. Increased pre-
schooling targeted to the poor and to rural areas
should be a priority. Programmes that deserve to be
considered include demand-based programmes
providing scholarships or stipends to the poor,
mass media programmes directed at out-of-school,
overage or rural youth, and targeted programmes
providing money, resources and training to the
worst performing schools. Reducing the number of
overage students through on-time start of schooling
and lower repetition will help lower the opportunity
cost of schooling for low-income students. As more
students from disadvantaged backgrounds stay in
school, it will also be necessary to provide tools to
facilitate their success. 
15. UNESCO (2004).
16. Children who attend schools run by the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee—
where teachers are hand picked and locally
recruited, but often have very little formal training—
perform significantly better on life skills and writing
than their peers in regular schools and do equally
well in reading and numeracy.
17. Education International (2003).
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As it did the year before, the world earned only a 4
in 2004 for its efforts on global health, thus slipping
further off track. Four million more people, mainly in
Sub-Saharan Africa, have become infected with
HIV/AIDS. Malaria remains rampant. And efforts to
improve child and maternal survival remain
seriously inadequate. Despite massive publicity
about newly announced partnerships and funds,
and even real progress in developing frameworks
for obtaining vital and otherwise expensive drugs,
the infrastructure needed to distribute them—and
to provide the vaccine, micronutrient and
reproductive services to reduce under-five and
maternal mortality—simply do not exist. And
because progress on health depends in large part
on progress on other fronts—education, poverty,
hunger, peace—the lack of adequate investments
in these areas made it all the more difficult to
advance towards the health goals.
The inadequate effort on health is a great, and sad,
paradox. Enormous strides can be made with the
technologies and tools already at hand. The main
problem is that they are not being applied, or are
being applied poorly. Part of the problem is the lack
of adequate investment by governments and
international donors. Newly announced funding
sources such as the U.S. President’s Emergency
Fund for HIV/AIDS Relief are large in historical terms
but small in relation to the need. The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, a major
international financing mechanism launched just
three years ago, has received only a small fraction
of the contributions originally promised by the donor
community, with the amount declining each year.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the proliferation of
new health “partnerships”, each is receiving less
attention than it deserves. Indeed, competition
between the narrowly defined interests of major
agencies and partnerships has led to discord. For
example, the President’s Emergency Fund is
directed by regulations and policies divorced from
those of the Global Fund or such other donors as
Britain’s DfID, adding more strain to reporting and
management capacities of recipient countries. In
the most challenged countries, many now
dependent on aid for more than half of health
budgets, the cacophony of donor actions and
American insistence on doing things alone is
creating a chaotic and dysfunctional situation.
Performance is hindered, and accountability is hard
to trace or track.
In some instances, ideology and politics have
interfered with scientifically grounded best
practices. The fundamentalist local government of
Nigeria’s Kano State halted all polio immunization
because of wholly unsubstantiated fears that the
vaccine was a plot to sterilize Muslim girls. That,
despite the fact that polio vaccination has safely
and successfully eradicated the disease from all of
the Americas and most of the rest of the world.
The result: polio has already spread to 12 African
countries previously freed of the disease,
dramatically setting back expectations for global
eradication and requiring continuing worldwide
immunization coverage.
Ideology has similarly plagued the potential impact
of the otherwise magnanimous U.S. President’s
Emergency Fund. It insists that “abstinence” be a
major mechanism for prevention in cultures where
young women often have little choice in sexual
relations. It also insists that one-third of all funds be
channeled through “faith-based institutions” whose
leaders readily admit they are uncomfortable talking
about condoms—perhaps the single-most effective
Health
Score
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Goals
Stop and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria.
Reduce by two-thirds the under-five mortality rate and by three-quarters
the maternal mortality ratio, by 2015.
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intervention to prevent HIV. That insistence ensures
that the programme’s well-meaning impact will be
far smaller than it otherwise could be.
The South African government has finally agreed to
treat all HIV patients needing treatment, but little
has happened. It seems highly unlikely that the
World Health Organization’s declared aim of
treating 3 million AIDS patients by 2005 (“3 by 5”)
has even a remote chance of success. Indeed,
some knowledgeable groups and individuals are
questioning whether this enormous focus on
treatment is counterproductive, diverting attention
and effort from preventing the disease. If the
epidemic is not prevented, the number of people
needing treatment (and dying of AIDS) will simply
keep growing. Many health officials are even
concerned that the HIV epidemic, horrendous as it
is, has drained resources and attention from other
major global health threats—micronutrient
deficiency, child survival, malaria and tuberculosis.
The application of existing tools and strategies can
make an enormous difference, but they require a
functioning healthcare infrastructure. That infra-
structure includes first of all the trained and motivated
workers that all health functions need. Workers must
in turn be supported, equipped, backed up with
drugs, supplies and information. These workers and
systems demand investments far beyond the cost
simply of drugs or a project. Many countries have not
been investing adequately in such infrastructure for
decades, and it will require comprehensive and
sustained investments over extended periods to
create or re-create such systems.
The unique and important “demonstration”
programme launched through a partnership of the
government of Botswana, the pharmaceutical
company Merck and the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation to treat all AIDS patients in this small,
wealthy population had a slow start because the
inadequacies of the existing health infrastructure
had not been appreciated. The Integrated
Management of Childhood Illness programme, the
major global child health strategy proposed by
WHO and the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) in the mid-1990s, has proved a
resounding failure because it depends on a health
system infrastructure that is not available in most
countries. Trained health workers increasingly
migrate from poorer to wealthier African countries,
and thence to the United Kingdom and the United
States. Enhanced research may yet produce
“magic bullets” that are simpler to administer and
require less-highly trained delivery systems, but as
the recent polio setback makes clear, even a
simple, inexpensive and highly effective vaccine
requires political and social support for success.
Although new global health threats, particularly
SARS and Avian Influenza, reawakened recognition
of the global threat posed by “local infections”, that
recognition has produced too little in the way of
lasting infrastructural enhancements or long-term
strategic investments. As already noted, the new
threats may have diverted attention and resources
from the persistent problems targeted in the global
health goals.
In keeping with the overall theme of this report, this
chapter pays special attention to the role of private
enterprise. Business is perhaps the most focused,
disciplined and best organized of all the sectors
that can contribute to health. And businesses have
slowly begun to recognize they have both a role
and a self-interest in improving health.
Healthy workers are more productive than those who
are ill, reducing the need to train large numbers of
reserve or replacement employees. A more
productive and healthy society also creates more
wealth, more purchasing power and therefore more
profitable markets. Businesses have immediate and
long-term self-interest in better health of their workers
and families and the communities they serve. Anglo
American, for example, has invested heavily in HIV
prevention and treatment, just as global oil
companies have invested in local malaria control.
Businesses also have a direct interest in providing
affordable goods that improve the health of poorer
Existing tools and strategies can
make an enormous difference,
but they require a functioning
healthcare infrastructure
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populations. Proctor and Gamble is developing an
inexpensive version of its “point of use” water
purification system, originally designed for middle-
income families.
Businesses also share common interests and
responsibilities in communities and societies.
Pharmaceutical companies in particular have donated
important drugs, but perhaps more important, they
have helped develop global contracts approving
“tiered pricing” and modifications of global
agreements on patent protections. Some argue that
businesses could and should go further. Coca-Cola
can (and increasingly does) use its formidable
marketing and distributions system to provide access
to drugs, vaccines and condoms—and the global
community could reimburse Coke for these marginal
costs. But recognition within the business community
of its potential formidable role, and the compelling
business case for accepting that role, has come
slowly, and for the most part, primarily in reaction to
HIV/AIDS. Why that is the case, and what it
portends, is contained in this chapter’s special
theme: “HIV/AIDS—a case study of private sector
involvement”.
HIV/AIDS—a case study of private sector
involvement
The private sector has paid attention to HIV/AIDS
because of its negative macroeconomic impact,
the consequent reduction in profits, especially in
the most affected countries, and the desire to be
good corporate citizens.
The negative macroeconomic impact has been
studied extensively, mostly in Africa. While estimates
vary, there is a consensus that HIV/AIDS has the
potential to cut as much as 2.6% off annual GDP
growth—because of a reduction in human capital,
the cost of treating the disease, a reduction in
savings and possibly a reduction in foreign direct
investment. When the effect of reduced life
expectancy is considered in addition to the standard
income and product accounts usually reflected in the
conventional measures of GDP, the true welfare
costs of AIDS are considerably higher than initially
thought. The only businesses that thrive in countries
hit hardest by AIDS are those concerned with the
preparations for death and burial.
Reduced profitability comes about in part from the
sheer increase in the cost of doing business.
Adverse effects of AIDS on the labour force are
multiple. Assuming current trends, 18 Sub-Saharan
African countries are projected to lose more than
10% of their labour force by 2020 to AIDS. Wage
costs and turnover are pushed higher. Productivity
falls with absenteeism.1 The International Labour
Organization projects that the cumulative losses of
labour force participants worldwide will reach 28
million in 2010 and 74 million in 2015 in the
absence of greater access to treatment. Other
factors will also reduce productivity and increase
costs, including lower employee morale, disability
requirements and higher insurance and healthcare.
As the labour force declines, so does the customer
base. And because so many victims are in their
most productive years, the population becomes
skewed towards dependents with less purchasing
power. South Africa faces customer declines in all
but one of its provinces by 2010.
In addition to these direct impacts on the supply of
labour and demand for products, firms face moral
pressures and opportunities to “do well by doing
good”. Pharmaceutical companies have become
conscious of their image in relation to drug prices
Millions
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(see the case studies below). It is difficult, however,
to find data on the extent to which the reputation of
firms has changed as a result of their programmes
to fight AIDS. In the Caribbean, it is accepted that
any major social change to control AIDS needs the
involvement of the “Social Partners”—that is, the
public sector, the private sector, civil society,
organized labour and the media.
Unfortunately, examples of businesses stepping up
to the plate are isolated. The growing attractiveness
of the Global Business Coalition may be due to the
recognition by firms that they might enhance their
reputations by being good corporate citizens and
contributing to work on AIDS. A few corporate
customers are taking this a step further, pressuring
firms to demonstrate good corporate social
responsibility and participate in activities to prevent
and control HIV/AIDS.
What can the private sector do, and what is it
doing?
The first step in evaluating how well business is
addressing the AIDS crisis is to think through the
steps that the private sector can and should take.
A variety of analyses suggest that, while the range
of potential workplace interventions is wide,
businesses concerned with HIV/AIDS should:2
• Start in the workplace, with employees as the
initial target audience. Once a company has
gained local capabilities, confidence and
credibility, it can extend its energies to cover
relevant high-priority groups in its social and
business environment.
• Establish workplace policies to promote
nondiscrimination, and maintain
confidentiality—and not to link HIV testing or
status to employment.3
• Increase worker awareness and prevention
through activities aimed at reducing high-risk
behaviours, promoting condom use and
promoting treatment of sexually transmitted
infections.
• Encourage employees to know their HIV status
by providing access to Voluntary Counseling
and Testing, not only as an education tool but
as an entry point for wellness, treatment and
care programmes.
• Ensure worker access to treatment, care and
support. That means ensuring access to
affordable treatment for opportunistic
infections and ensuring access to affordable
antiretroviral therapy. It also means supporting
HIV-positive employees with a receptive and
accepting work environment and access to
counselling. And it means supporting HIV-
positive employees who can no longer work
with home visits and home-based care. This is
a particularly challenging task. While these
programmes can be highly effective for HIV-
positive employees, even leading companies
struggle to sign up most of the patients
thought to require these services.4
• Regularly monitor and evaluate all the
foregoing activities.
Although the data are far from complete, there is
more information on business practices related to
HIV/AIDS than on business’s role in achieving any
other global goal. Surveys and case study research
indicate that on a global level, corporate leaders are
aware of the impact of HIV/AIDS on their
businesses. In a survey by the Global Health Initiative
of the World Economic Forum, nearly half of
business leaders surveyed report that HIV/AIDS has
had or will have some effect on their business, with
21% estimating a serious impact. But fewer
executives have a deep understanding of these
impacts. Only 10% identified a current and specific
impact of HIV/AIDS on their revenues or costs, and
less than 6% of executives surveyed reported having
developed written policies to combat HIV/AIDS.5
How seriously firms take the issue seems to
depend on how much they perceive the HIV/AIDS
threat to their operations and whether they believe
that host governments can handle the problem.
But even when they perceive a high level of threat,
only a few develop policies or programmes. A
recent study in the English-speaking Caribbean
found high concern, indeed inflated perceptions of
The private sector has paid
attention to HIV/AIDS because of
its negative macroeconomic
impact, the consequent reduction
in profits and the desire to be
good corporate citizens
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the threat, but little effort to incorporate HIV/AIDS
into company budgets and strategies. Fear of
stigma and discrimination figured as a reason for
unwillingness to implement HIV/AIDS programmes.
Another survey of leading companies in Indonesia,
India, Thailand and South Africa found that
companies in all four countries are undertaking
activities, but that the intensity of their interventions
decline in parallel with HIV-prevalence estimates.6
The African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships
(ACHAP) is a collaborative effort between Merck,
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the
government of Botswana aimed at comprehensively
addressing the AIDS epidemic there, which afflicts
39% of the adult population.7 Established in July
2000 as a five-year effort (likely to be extended
further), the partnership will receive $50 million each
from the Gates Foundation and Merck, which also
provides its two patented antiretroviral medicines,
Crixivan and Stocrin, free of charge.
ACHAP takes seriously the need for local
ownership and involvement of local actors. A
Botswanan, Mrs. Tsetsele Fantan was named
director of the partnership in November 2003 to
replace Merck’s Dr. Donald de Korte, who returned
to headquarters to coordinate the company’s
HIV/AIDS initiatives on a broader scale. Thanks to
the National Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS,
funding is allocated to capacity building at
government institutions, such as the National AIDS
Coordinating Agency, with a heavy emphasis on
training personnel and planning. A substantial share
of the funds goes towards condom education and
distribution as well as innovative prevention
programmes, particularly the Teacher Capacity
Building Program, which partners with UNDP and
the Ministry of Education to disseminate
videocassettes about AIDS to schoolteachers.
ACHAP also supports treatment and care, primarily
through the pioneer national programme Masa.
This programme calls for every Botswanan who
needs antiretroviral therapy to have free access to
care. By 2005 30 treatment centres are to be
operational, but only 24,000 persons are now
enrolled in the antiretroviral programme and only
14,000 receive treatment, a small fraction of the
300,000 HIV-positive people.
Pfizer’s Diflucan Partnership. Pfizer, the
pharmaceutical company, has initiated an effort—
without limits in time or money—to distribute at
company expense its medication Diflucan, which
treats HIV/AIDS opportunistic fungal infections.8
Started in 2001 in South Africa after lengthy
negotiations with that government, the programme
has now expanded to several other African
countries and Haiti, countries where the HIV
prevalence is higher than 1%, usually considered
the “tipping point” for the spread of the disease. In
all, Pfizer has already donated Diflucan through 915
sites in 22 countries. Capacity building has turned
out to be an important part of the Diflucan
partnership. Realizing that without training medical
personnel drug donation is insufficient, Pfizer opted
for a regional approach, teaming up with American
NGOs and Uganda’s Makerere University to open a
regional Infectious Disease Institute in Kampala,
Uganda. Pfizer has provided a training grant to the
International Association of Physicians for AIDS
Care for sessions in every country with Diflucan
donations.9
Bristol-Myers Squibb—Secure the Future. Bristol-
Myers Squibb’s programme is targeted specifically
at nine of the worst-hit countries in southern and
western Africa, with $115 million in funding from
1999 to 2005.10 Like ACHAP, it provides grants to
support local initiatives, including education,
community care, a state-of-the-art research centre
and training of qualified nurses. It also has an
independent evaluation mechanism directed by the
Yale School of Public Health. The lesson is that
success is possible only with support from local
actors and governments.
Anglo American. The biggest mining company and
largest private employer in South Africa, Anglo
American began focusing on HIV/AIDS more than a
decade ago when it became apparent that the
There is more information on
business practices related to
HIV/AIDS than on business’s role in
achieving any other global goal
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lifestyle of mine workers made them particularly
vulnerable to AIDS.11 Some 30% of AngloGold’s
workforce is now HIV-positive. The company
moved progressively from workforce prevention
activities to providing antiretrovirals to its
employees for free in 2002—to contributing in
October 2003 to loveLife, South Africa’s national
youth outreach funded in large part by the Kaiser
Foundation. Most importantly, Anglo American has
an HIV/AIDS workplace policy in compliance with
International Labour Organization standards for
confidentiality, nondiscrimination and voluntary
counseling and testing provisions.
Standard Chartered Bank in Malaysia developed a
global HIV/AIDS workplace policy in 1999, featuring
nondiscrimination and confidentiality.12 The Bank
soon followed with a public “Living with HIV”
campaign, aimed at educating its global workforce.
The financial commitment is modest—the global
2003 budget for the “Living with HIV” campaign
was $300,000 (or about $10 per employee) divided
equally among training kits, training conferences
and external facilitator time and travel.
Imperial Life Financial. The Bahamas has one of the
highest HIV infection rates in the Caribbean,
standing at 3% of the adult population. In 1994
Imperial Life, a major insurance company with a
long history in the Bahamas, signed a sponsorship
agreement with one of the largest NGOs, the AIDS
Foundation of the Bahamas. In 1995 the AIDS
Foundation provided free treatment to every
infected mother, reducing mother to child
transmission rates from 30% before the
programme to 5% in 2000–01. In 2000 Imperial
Life donated a facility to house a clinic and
administrative offices. In addition, Imperial Life
hosts an annual Red Ribbon Ball, the main
fundraiser for AIDS, attended traditionally by the
country’s first couple.13
Global Health Initiative, World Economic Forum. To
broaden and deepen the private sector response,
the World Economic Forum established the Global
Health Initiative in 2001. Now working with over
170 companies in southern Africa, India and South-
East Asia, the Initiative develops business policy
and programmatic tools such as disease
management guidelines, guidelines for national
business coalitions and case study libraries. It
supports private sector engagement with global
partnerships such as the Global Fund, Stop TB and
Roll Back Malaria. It fosters partnerships at the
country level, such as the Indian Business Alliance
to Stop TB. And it conducts global and country-
level advocacy. Like the Global Business Coalition
and other business organizations, the Initiative has
an important role in building the scope and scale of
the business response.
Maternal mortality
In 2004 the picture on maternal mortality did not
change much. The world continues to lose a
mother a minute, largely from preventable causes.
To be on track to achieve the goal, maternal
mortality should be falling by 5.4% a year. But the
decline in developing countries was only about 3%
in the 1990s, and there is little reason to believe the
trend is improving.14 Improvements are occurring
largely in countries already doing well, while those
with high levels of maternal mortality continue to do
badly—in part due to the low coverage of health
services.
The global Safe Motherhood Initiative was launched
in 1987 in response to the unacceptably high
maternal mortality in the developing world. Since
then, much has been learned about effective and
affordable strategies for saving women’s lives
during pregnancy and childbirth—and about the
linkages between maternal and newborn well-
being. In January 2004 a broad Partnership for
Safe Motherhood and Newborn Health was
established to reinvigorate and expand the global
Initiative.15
Building on the opportunity provided by the
Millennium Development Goals, the Partnership
aims to develop close linkages with broader health
and global initiatives, and to respond effectively to
needs and priorities at the country level. It is
The world continues to lose a
mother a minute, largely from
preventable causes
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overseen by a steering committee representing 21
organizations ranging from academic centres to
NGOs to foundations to governments and inter-
governmental organizations. The steering
committee has three standing task forces (on
advocacy and information sharing, technical
advancement, and country-level support and
partnership). The Secretariat is housed as an
independent entity at World Health Organization
headquarters in Geneva. It is too early to assess
the Partnership’s contribution, but it could bring
new energy and focus.
Experts from a wide range of countries and
organizations agree that the problem is not a lack of
stated commitment by developing country
governments. For example, India’s Tenth Five Year
Plan (2002–07) sets goals and targets that for the
most part are more ambitious than the Millennium
Development Goals. The target was set for reducing
the maternal mortality rate to 200 per 100,000 by
2007—and to 100 by 2012. The plan specifies
universal screening of all pregnant women,
identifying women with complications in pregnancy,
referring them to an appropriate care centre and
preventing and managing anemia in pregnancy.
To address unsafe abortion the Indian Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare in June 2003 amended
the rules of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Act. The new rules have the potential to increase
the number of registered and legal sites for first
trimester abortions. Despite these policy
commitments, the effort has been limited. A 2003
World Bank report observed that there is limited
capacity to ensure the implementation and
monitoring of maternal health programmes related
to the provision of emergency obstetric care,
prophylaxis against nutritional anemia with iron and
folic acid, antenatal care or ensuring high-quality
abortion services.
Maternal mortality seems to be a “hard sell” to the
private sector. One reason is the absence of a
single intervention that will produce immediate and
tangible results. Another is the political sensitivity to
abortion, an important cause of maternal deaths.
Yet business would benefit substantially from
measures that reduce maternal mortality, measures
that would simultaneously improve women’s
productivity and strengthen family health, with gains
in productivity and learning capacity.
There are some isolated examples of corporate
philanthropy. Unilever Pakistan, for example,
donated 3.6 million bars of soap for clean delivery
kits. In Mexico the government’s “Fair Start in Life”
programme incorporates specific efforts to involve
private business. The Telmex Foundation,
supported by Mexico’s telephone company
Teléfonos de México, has contributed in-kind gifts
worth more than US$24 million. Equipment valued
at almost US$13 million was donated in 2003,
including ultrasound monitors, tococardiographs,
thermal cribs, mobile and fixed incubators,
neonatal ventilators, monitoring equipment and
phototherapy lamps. In earlier years, the
Foundation donated more than $11 million worth of
medical equipment. Last year’s report mentioned
the $750,000 donation by the pharmaceutical
company Pharmacia (before its merger with
Upjohn) to the International Federation of
Gynecology and Obstetrics to help the Federation
launch a “Save the Mothers Fund”. The donation
has not been replicated by other companies.
On World Health Day 1998 (7 April) a high-level
meeting at the World Bank launched a Corporate
Initiative for Safe Motherhood. But there was no
follow-up. There is new interest in the World Bank
to somehow revive the initiative, and explore ways
to get the corporate world engaged, possibly in
collaboration with the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation.
The slow progress on maternal mortality and the
lack of business involvement is especially
disappointing because it would not be difficult to
do much better.
Such preventable and treatable conditions as
severe bleeding (25% of maternal deaths), sepsis
Maternal mortality seems to be a
“hard sell” to the private sector
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(15%), eclampsia (hypertensive disease/convulsions
12%), obstructed labour (8%) and unsafe abortion
(13%) still account for the majority of maternal
deaths in the world today. Simple and inexpensive
technologies to reduce maternal mortality are
appropriate for low-resource settings.16 Making
emergency obstetric care accessible to all women
who develop life-threatening complications is not
an impossible mission. In most cases, it does not
mean building new facilities. It means more rational
allocation of available resources and an affordable
infusion of new resources to upgrade existing
facilities and improve the skills and performance of
health personnel.
In general, coverage of maternity care is poor in
developing countries, with only about half of all
deliveries attended by skilled personnel and only
about 65% of mothers receiving antenatal care.17
In most countries with high maternal mortality,
basic maternal health services, augmented by
programmes to strengthen women’s opportunities,
could probably reduce the number of deaths by
half or more at fairly modest cost—a dollar or two
per person per year—within a decade or so.18
There will be much to watch for in 2005. The World
Health Assembly selected Maternal and child health
as the topic of 2005 World Health Day (7 April). It
will also be the topic for the 2005 World Health
Report. Plans are afoot to sound the drum very
loudly on World Health Day. A summit meeting is
being planned in New Delhi, with heads of
agencies and some heads of states. To ensure that
the messages developed for the Summit are well
grounded in country realities, two regional meetings
are planned, one in Africa and one in Asia. These
two meetings would provide an opportunity to work
with women’s groups and healthcare providers’
associations in order to make this a strong
movement of people.
The White Ribbon Alliance (www.whiteribbon
alliance.org) has members active in 24 countries,
adapting the activities and messages on safe
motherhood to their own settings. Its members are
developing new methods and techniques to raise
awareness and promote safe motherhood in their
communities and countries. The Alliance’s Global
Secretariat in Washington, D.C., is planning a
National Safe Motherhood Campaign in the United
States, around Mother’s Day 2005.
Under-five mortality
The story on child mortality is similar to that on
maternal mortality—no improvement in resources
devoted to the problem in 2004. There was no
noticeable change in the investments or the activities
at country level, except some commitments on
malaria through the Global Fund. But there has been
a flurry of activities at the policy level in the last 12
months. Thanks in part to a widely reported series of
articles in The Lancet last year—showing that about
two-thirds of each year’s 10.8 million deaths of
children under five could be prevented by reaching
universal coverage for a handful of existing cost-
effective interventions19—the place of child survival
in the global health agenda has been strengthened.
There is widespread agreement that the number one
challenge is to reach universal coverage with
existing, cost-effective interventions in the world’s
poorest countries.
Partly as a result of the series, the following events
took place in the last 12 months:20
• UNICEF identified child survival as its number
one priority for 2004.
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• WHO decided to dedicate its 2005 World
Health Report to maternal and child health.
• Interest was renewed in child survival at the
World Bank, including participation in joint
country missions to develop plans for scaling
up essential interventions.
• A Child Survival Partnership was formed
including UN agencies, bilateral donors, NGOs
and interested scientists. The partnership is
expected to coordinate global advocacy,
develop partnership strategy, produce
benchmark reports and organize meetings of
interested parties. An interim director was
appointed, based at UNICEF in New York.
• Several countries welcomed renewed
recognition of child survival. Ministers of health
in Africa and the Western Pacific reinstated
child survival as a priority. Ethiopia, Cambodia,
India and Pakistan joined the Child Survival
Partnership.
• There were some positive signs on
immunizations. The Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization has invested $429
million in 70 countries since 2000. The
Measles Initiative, a massive campaign to
control measles in Africa, was launched. Even
so, vaccine coverage in the world’s poorest
countries is well behind what is required to
reach the child survival goal.
Research and evaluation activities relevant to child
survival include work on standardizing indicators for
child survival across different surveys, improving the
quality of information on causes of death, building
country capacity in child health epidemiology,
costing basic child survival interventions and
conducting research on specific treatments. Issues
of how to deliver existing (and future) interventions
at high coverage rates have also received more
attention. The key child survival strategy adopted
by WHO and UNICEF—Integrated Management of
Childhood Illnesses—is being critically examined in
the light of a multicountry evaluation identifying the
major health system barriers that precluded
effective implementation of the strategy. More
attention is also going to community-level delivery
of interventions, in addition to making these
available at health facilities.
None of this has as yet led to increased funding—
or to concrete actions at the country level. Current
interest in child survival remains far below the levels
attained in the Child Survival Revolution of the
1980s. Rates of reduction in child mortality are still
much too slow to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.21 The child mortality goal
requires an annual reduction of 4.2%, but the
global rate in the 1990s was only 2.5%. The
average reduction for Sub-Saharan Africa was a
staggeringly low 0.3%. The best performance was
in Latin America—a 3.6% annual reduction, still
below the target of 4.2%.
The only countries on target are the high-income
countries, demonstrating that high percentage
reductions in child mortality are possible even at
Summary statistics for scores assigned by 15 key informants (0–10 range)
Item Median Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
Global score 4 2 6 4.0 1.1
Financial investment 3 1 5 3.3 1.0
Partnerships 5 2 7 4.9 1.5
Fifteen key informants rate the progress of investments and partnerships toward those
needed to attain the goals, on a scale from 0 (none) to 10 (on track)
Summary statistics for scores assigned by 26 key informants (0–10 range)
Item Median Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
Global score 4 2 6 4.3 1.0
Twenty-six key informants rate the level of investment and partnerships for malaria, on a
scale of 0 (none) to 10 (on track)
Note: For malaria responses, informants consistently provided a global score, but not individual scores for the efforts of specific groups: endemic-
country governments, developed country governments, intergovernmental organizations, philanthropic organizations, nongovernmental organizations
or the private sector.
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low mortality rates.22 Next come the upper middle-
income countries, which are just on track, while
lower middle-income countries are badly off track.
On average, child mortality rates for the poorest
20% of the world’s population fell only half as fast
as the global rate. Only 16% of all countries are on
track for the under-five mortality target, and not a
single Sub-Saharan country is on track. And in
most parts of the world, the rate of decline was
faster in the 1980s than in the 1990s.
Malaria
Each year malaria causes more than 300 million
cases of illness and one million deaths. It remains a
major impediment to health and a common cause
of death of young children, particularly in Africa,
where it contributes to about one in every four
deaths of young children. The disease places an
enormous burden on the continent’s fragile health
infrastructure, where a third of outpatient visits and
a quarter of child hospital admissions may be due
to malaria. Progress against malaria remains
disappointing. Scores on progress from key
informants this year mimic the scores of last year—
indicating continued underperformance in the
efforts against malaria.
Far more rapid progress on malaria is clearly possible.
Preventive approaches using insecticides for treating
mosquito nets or for indoor residual spraying and
drugs for treatment and prevention are available and
highly effective. And there are ways to get those
interventions to the people who need them. For
example, most pregnant women in Sub-Saharan
Africa attend antenatal care clinics and could receive
important malaria prevention measures there. African
leaders committed themselves in 2000 to “halve
malaria mortality for Africa’s people by 2010”, and by
2005 to reach at least 60% coverage of those most
at risk, particularly women and children under five,
with protective measures and prompt treatment. The
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
has begun disbursing significant amounts for
malaria—$895 million approved for malaria over two
years, more than 75% of it for Africa. Countries are
increasingly mainstreaming malaria control in their
health sector budgets, and bilateral funding has
increased in the past five years. There are also more
partnerships with such corporations, such as Exxon-
Mobile, Glaxo-Smith Kline and Novartis, and with
groups such as the International Federation of the
Red Cross/Red Crescent and the Expanded
Programme on Immunizations.
But efforts lag, and the targets will not be met on
current trends. As of 2004 only Malawi has met even
one of the 2005 goals (for prevention in pregnant
women). Insecticide-treated-net coverage was
abysmally low in 1999–2000 with an overall coverage
of approximately 2% of households in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Documented sales of insecticide-treated nets
in 2001, 2002 and 2003 were increasing annually (~3
million, ~7.5 million and 17 million respectively),
however these numbers fall far short of covering the
more than 500 million people at risk of malaria in
Africa or even the 125 million high-risk population of
African pregnant women and young children. The
Roll Back Malaria Partnership—formed in 1998
through the joint leadership of WHO, UNICEF, the
World Bank and national governments—has suffered
from numerous changes in leadership (five in five
years). And despite some successes, it has failed to
live up to its potential. Some of the Global Fund’s
funding decisions have for political reasons been
forced into a “one-size-fits-all” approach favouring
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT), even
though reliance on ACTs would require at least an
order of magnitude increase in antimalarial treatment
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expenditures for Africa—and even then the current
availability of ACTs is sharply limited by production
constraints.
Of particular note this year, a field trial of a malaria
vaccine given to young Mozambican children
reported a 30% efficacy in reducing first clinical
episodes and a 58% efficacy in reducing severe
malaria—demonstrating that an effective vaccine
against malaria is feasible (Alonso and others 2004).
In response, the British government has just
announced a £300 million contribution to boost the
development of this vaccine. Time will tell if this or
other malaria vaccines can move through the
required steps to become additional useful tools in
the battle against malaria. In the near term, it will be
important to have new resources to evaluate vac-
cines in addition to expanded resources to scale up
current proven interventions—and avoid the diversion
of resources from proven tools to promising ones.
In summary, we remain at a defining moment for
malaria prevention and control, and for the Roll
Back Malaria Partnership. The political wrangling
must cease, interventions must be scaled up soon
and widely, and flexibility must be established to
appropriately incorporate new tools as they
become available.
Endnotes
1. World Economic Forum (2004).
2.World Economic Forum (2004).
3. ILO (2001). 
4. Fraser (2004). Although an estimated 25% 
of the company’s 140,000 workers in Africa 
are HIV-positive, only 1,500 have enrolled 
in the antiretroviral programme. 80%–90% of
patients involved with Anglo American’s 
treatment programme have returned to full-time
work.
5. World Economic Forum (2004).
6. www.weforum.org/pdf/Initiatives/
GHI_Bangkok2004_GlobalSnapshot.pdf.
7. Information taken from ACHAP website
(www.achap.org).
8. DeYoung and Pfizer Inc. (undated). 
9. The programme’s website is
www.diflucanpartnership.org/en/welcome/.
10. [www.ippph.org]; [www.securethefuture.com].
11. See [www.angloamerican.co.uk/hivaids/
ourresponse/pressreleases.asp] and DeYoung and
Anglovaal Mining Ltd. (undated). 
12. DeYoung and Standard Chartered Bank
(undated).
13. Campbell (2002). 
Efficacious tools Current Medium-term
Insecticide-treated bednets (and Several varieties available and Long-lasting insecticide-treated bednets
indoor residual spraying in certain affordable; some produced in Africa; from multiple manufacturers
settings) to reduce malaria exposure while some require re-dipping 
and transmission required every 6–12 months, long-
lasting insecticide-treated bednets  
are now increasingly available and  
affordable at approximately $5/net 
Intermittent Preventive Treatment Proved effective and feasible for For both pregnant women and for infants
to reduce the consequences of delivery for pregnant women at with delivery linked to the routine visits
malaria in pregnancy and infancy routine antenatal clinic visits for immunizations
Prompt and effective treatment of Co-packaged combinations of Artemisinin-based combination therapy
malaria illness efficacious antimalarials (CTs) (ACT); multiple products and sources 
close to the home; effective of co-formulated ACTs; possibly 
antimalarials including drugs for artesunate rectal suppositories available
severe malaria in health facilities— for initial management of severe malaria 
employing artemisinin-based pending referral to appropriate health 
combination therapy (ACT) or other facilities
currently effective regimens 
Summary of malaria interventions available today and in the medium-term
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14. Wagstaff and Claeson (2004). 
15. www.safemotherhood.org/.
16. Tsu (2004).
17. In 1997 the World Health Organization
published a listing of available information on
coverage of maternity care (WHO/RHT/MSM/
96.28). It was estimated that in less developed
regions as a whole 40% of deliveries were in health
facilities (with a range of 26%–78% among all
areas), 53% of deliveries were attended by skilled
personnel (with a range of 34%–86%) and 65% of
deliveries were followed by antenatal care (with a
range from 52%–73%).
18. World Bank report submitted to the Nairobi
International Conference on Safe Motherhood.
19. Jones and others (2003).
20. Bryce and others (2004).
21. Wagstaff and Claeson (2003).
22. In high-income countries, baseline child mortality
levels are already quite low, and typically fewer than
10 in each thousand newborns died before reaching
their fifth birthday. In spite of such low baseline rates
wealthy countries have managed to reduce child
mortality at faster rates (expressed as percentages
of their baseline level) than any other country. For
example, a country with a baseline rate of 5 deaths
per 1,000 live births that reduces mortality to 4 per
1,000 will have an absolute reduction of only 1 per
1,000, but a large relative reduction of 20%.
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Despite a few promising steps, 2004 was a bleak
year for the global environmental goals. Even with
more than 500 international environmental
agreements on issues ranging from energy
efficiency to preserving sensitive ecosystems, the
record of effective environmental protection and
the provision of basic environmental services
remains abysmal. Greenhouse gas emissions
continue to rise. The clearing of land and the
depletion of marine environments are accelerating.
Hundreds of millions of people lack access to
clean water and sanitation, with no significant
change in sight. The world continues to lose
species and habitats.
The global environment is deteriorating because
economic signals do not encourage its
preservation. Indeed, far too many economic
signals encourage people to cause such
deterioration. A vast array of taxes, regulations,
subsidies and other incentives have been put in
place without consideration of their impacts on the
climate and biological systems that human
prosperity depends on. It is hard to insist that
businesses or individuals should act in one way for
the greater global good when their economic well-
being drives them to behave in another.
But the tight connection between human economic
activity and the environment offers scope for real
progress towards the world’s agreed environmental
goals. Economic incentives can be realigned, and
definitions of economic self-interest expanded. On
that front, 2004 saw what may be the beginnings
of progress on climate change. The Kyoto Accord
to rein in greenhouse gas emissions, nearly
consigned to the dustbin of history, has come
back, thanks to Russia’s ratification in October. Its
signatories, among them all the world’s rich
countries except the United States, are now
required to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by
at least 5% from 1990 levels by 2012. A crucial
mechanism to bring about such reductions—
emissions trading arrangements—received a boost
when the emissions trading system of the
European Union came into force at the very end of
the year.
Elsewhere, however, neither governments nor
business are doing anywhere near what is needed.
Sub-Saharan Africa is not on track to reach the
water access goal, and few developing regions are
likely to achieve the sanitation goals. Biodiversity
preservation continues to lag far behind what is
necessary. Unless incentives are shifted, we are
unlikely to achieve the international environmental
commitments.
What the private sector can do
Business involvement is critical to achieving the
global environmental goals. Governments retain the
responsibility for writing the rules that define
environmentally responsible behaviour. But
businesses can take a lead by designing products
and production systems that generate few or no
environmental spillovers, by transferring
environmental know-how around the world and by
helping society adapt to global change.
On climate change, the chorus of supportive
statements by political leaders, the rising energy
and disaster costs and the business opportunities
in emissions trading have made the business case,
pushing many companies ahead of their
governments in tackling climate change. But for
preserving biodiversity, the business case has only
begun to emerge, and few indeed are the
companies pushing the envelope.
Environment
Score
3
Goals
Stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.
Implement conventions related to the conservation of biodiversity.
Halve the proportions of people without access to water and sanitation by
2015.
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A small group of leaders has elaborated guidelines
for managing biodiversity but what is needed is a
commitment to “no net harm”. Agribusinesses are
beginning to move towards measures to ensure
supply chain quality and to protect their reputations.
But the incentives and subsidies for clearing land and
rapidly—often illicitly—exploiting resources overwhelm
limited resource stewardship regimes both on land
and at sea. Meanwhile, trade is accelerating the
spread of harmful invasive species. And the push to
privatize water systems to overcome the gap in
finance for providing this vital service to the unserved
has run into significant difficulties.
But some broad tools and trends are worth noting,
including an awakening environmental sensitivity in
the financial sector. Cross-cutting environmental
management tools have been developed to help
companies internalize environmental stewardship in
their processes and products. Environmental
impact assessments are mandated in over 100
countries and required for finance from the World
Bank. Influential firms have implemented formal
environmental management systems, such as ISO
14001, and called on their suppliers to do the
same. Others have adopted end-of-life product
take-back schemes, or experimented with Life
Cycle Assessment and Design-for-Environment
tools. But these are often a checkbox activity or
sideshow to core business practices.
Consistent and comparable disclosures of
environmental performance across an industry are
necessary for markets to judge links with financial
performance. Of the world’s 100 largest companies
by revenue, 49 published a sustainability report in
2003, up from 44 in 1999, half referencing the
Global Reporting Initiative guidelines.1 Numerous
regulatory agencies have required some form of
environmental disclosure, including France, South
Africa, several Scandinavian countries and the
United States.2
Global climate change
Global mean temperature increases may have
already begun to affect physical and biological
systems, increasing the frequency of climatic
extremes while making some species more
vulnerable to extinction. The Kyoto Protocol to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997),
committed industrial countries to significant
reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions by
2012. The benchmark for ratification—36 industrial
nations with 55% percent or more of emissions—
was achieved in late 2004, when the Russian
Parliament ratified the treaty.
But with notable exceptions, few of the Kyoto
signatory countries are on track to meet their
commitments. And even if the protocol is fully
implemented, global greenhouse gas emissions will
continue to rise for the foreseeable future, because
the United States and China are not parties. To
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations by 2100 at
what is believed a safe level, emissions must begin
to fall before 2020, because time must be allowed
to change energy infrastructure. Except for the UK,
The incentives and subsidies for
clearing land and rapidly—often
illicitly—exploiting resources
overwhelm limited resource
stewardship regimes both on land
and at sea
Beginning in June 2003 several leading banks representing
more than 75% of the project finance market announced
sustainability guidelines for project finance—the Equator
Principles. Based on World Bank safeguards, the banks will
require environmental assessments where the risk of harm-
ing biodiversity is high (Equator Principles [www.equator-
principles.com/index.html]).
The Carbon Disclosure Project, launched in 2002 by insti-
tutional investors representing $10 trillion in assets, identi-
fies the market implications of climate change. The project
has written to the world’s 500 largest companies, request-
ing disclosure about greenhouse gas emissions and strate-
gies for adapting to regulation. The response rate rose from
47% in 2002 to 59% in 2003 (Innovest Strategic Value
Advisors 2004).
In this context—and building on work with a group of 21
fund managers and brokerage houses to explore the impact
of environmental, social and governance issues on share
prices—the UN Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative
and the UN Global Compact will aim to launch in fall 2005 a
dialogue with institutional investors, with $1 trillion in assets
(UNEP FI 2004). The goal is to develop broader principles
for aligning international development objectives, Global
Compact norms and the long-term interests of fund benefi-
ciaries (UNEP 2004). In addition, some leading European
investors have committed 5% of their research budgets—
more than $7 million in 2005—to commission studies on
social responsibility and governance and their impact on
long-term financial performance (Financial Times 2004).
The financial sector is waking up to
environmental risks and opportunities
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Russia and the Scandinavian countries, none of the
Kyoto signatory countries is on track to meet its
emission reduction commitments by 2010.3 This
lack of commitment imperils efforts to bring
developing countries into the deal. China is already
the world’s second largest consumer of oil and
emitter of greenhouse gases, behind only the
United States.4 Its automobile production capacity
now outpaces that of France.
Unless greater investments are made in renewable
and more efficient energy generation alternatives, in
conservation and in carbon capture, the goal is
unlikely to be achieved. The nuclear energy industry
may be reinvigorated in coming years, if waste
vitrification can be perfected and lingering disputes
over disposal siting resolved. But the shift to
renewable energy alternatives may be hastened by
the recent spike in petroleum prices above $50 per
barrel of crude. And the terrorist threat has raised
capital and insurance costs for centralized power
generation stations, such as dams and nuclear
stations, buttressing the case for decentralized
energy generation technologies, such as stationary
fuel cells. If sustained, both will drive investment
towards carbon-friendlier solutions.
Several governments have set sizable renewable
energy generation targets—Brazil, the United
Kingdom and Texas among them. Denmark has
committed to 50% by 2030, China to 10% by
2010. The barriers to broader investment: high
upfront capital and transaction costs, political and
regulatory uncertainty, community opposition and
lingering reliability questions. Despite the
challenges, wind power is becoming competitive as
efficiency improves and fossil fuel prices continue
to rise. And not only in rich countries. India, for
example, has the world’s largest windfarm industry,
while China leads the world in installation of solar
hot water heaters. These technologies compete
against what one study has estimated as $150
billion in public sector subsidies for fossil fuel
industries.5
Emissions trading systems (ETSs) are believed to
be the most-cost effective means of putting the
world on a low-carbon path. In an ETS market
participants can buy and sell carbon emission
credits, gain credits by reducing emissions in their
operations and sell these credits to others seeking
to increase their emissions. For the moment, it
appears that regional carbon markets will emerge
first, and that these may one day be linked globally.
Most significant, the European Community’s ETS,
launched in January 2005, affects 12,000 industrial
facilities in 25 countries, putting global pressure on
companies manufacturing or marketing in Europe.
Absent in the first phase, however, are the
transport and aviation sectors. Aviation alone
accounts for 12% of global emissions.6 In the
United States, several states have committed to
launching an ETS. And the members of the
Chicago Climate Exchange, a pilot ETS established
in December 2003, have committed to 1%
emission reductions each year until 2007. The
exchange has registered more than $1 million in
trades in its first year. Other entities, including the
state of California and the World Economic Forum,
have voluntary carbon emission registries.
The flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto
Protocol are unlikely to deliver on their promise of
lowering emission-reduction costs, because they
do not respond to the needs of the private sector.
Established to allow firms to buy and gain credit for
emission reductions in the developing world, the
Clean Development Mechanism is impeded by high
Per capita income, 1995
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
GermanyUnited
States
United
Kingdom
Korea,
Rep. of
BrazilEgyptChinaGhanaIndia
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Per capita consumption of 
commercial energy, 1994 (gigajoules)
Per capita income (left axis)
Per capita consumption of 
commercial energy
(right axis)
Per capita incomes and per capita consumption of commercial
energy for selected developing and industrial countries
Source: UNDP, UN DESA and WEC 2000.
 
82
E
n
viro
n
m
e
n
t
5
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
transaction costs and a narrow scope of allowable
activities.
But business is finding other reasons to play a role
in climate change. The financial sector is engaged in
climate change discussions, recognizing that even a
small increase in disaster severity could generate
multiple increases in damage7—and that emissions
regulations could substantially affect the market
value of automakers, oil companies and coal-
dependent electric utilities.8 Insurers are already
doubtful about the long-term viability of underwriting
catastrophic losses in small island nations, slowing
disaster recovery in these vulnerable economies.9
The business case is spurring a wave of innovation
in the private sector. Some firms have set emissions
reduction targets—Dupont, BP, Rio Tinto and 10
leading cement companies10—and found sizable
cost savings, proving that cheap and often
profitable ways to achieve compliance will emerge
when market signals support change.
Access to water and sanitation
More than 1 billion people lack access to safe
drinking water, so indispensable for human survival,
and 2.6 billion lack even basic sanitation. Between
1990 and 2002, 1.1 billion additional people gained
access to safe water, a dramatic feat. According to
an interim assessment of progress, if it stays the
course, the world is on track to meet the drinking
water target, everywhere except Sub-Saharan
Africa.11
This figure disguises some serious gaps. Most
progress reflects the economic boom in China. But
one in five people in Asia lack access to safe water,
as do nearly half of all people in Sub-Saharan
Africa.12 And the urban-rural gulf is widening: for
every person without access to safe water in an
urban centre, six are unserved in the countryside.13
In addition to the direct health benefits of clean
water, the time taken gathering water represents a
huge opportunity cost, carried disproportionately by
women. Poor people also tend to pay more for
access to water services.
For access to basic sanitation, the situation is
much worse. The lack of access to sanitation is
recognized as the primary cause of 80% of
illnesses, responsible for the deaths of some 4,000
children a day to waterborne disease. And unless
urgent measures are taken, we will fall 500 million
people short of the sanitation target. The
proportion of the world’s population with improved
sanitation has increased by just nine percentage
points since 1990, a far slower rate than
required.14 Servicing urban slums, remote rural
villages and arid areas will require particular effort.
By the second half of this century, the world’s
freshwater will in all likelihood need to be stretched
to accommodate 3 billion more people.
Overcoming the water and sanitation access gap
will require expanding access areas, protecting
water quality in the face of industrial development
and population growth, and increasing the
productivity of water for food production. All this,
while ensuring that enough water remains to
maintain delicate ecosystems. We need to get
much more from every drop.
The world has plenty of freshwater, if only it were
better distributed geographically—and managed
more strategically. Too much rainfall at the wrong
time leads to flooding, with little captured for later
Emissions trading systems are
believed to be the most-cost
effective means of putting the
world on a low-carbon path
Measurement and reporting of greenhouse gas emission
reductions are essential to functioning emissions trading.
Revised in 2004, the multistakeholder WRI/WBCSD protocol
has become the global standard for greenhouse gas emissions
accounting (WBCSD and WRI 2004). It is used by more than
150 companies, several industry associations and numerous
emission-reduction and trading programmes: U.S. EPA
Climate Leaders Initiative, Global Reporting Initiative, World
Wildlife Fund’s Climate Savers Program, California Climate
Action Registry, World Economic Forum’s Global Greenhouse
Gas Register, the UK Trading Scheme, the Chicago Climate
Exchange, and the monitoring protocols of the EU Trading
Scheme.
Greenhouse gas reporting protocol
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use. Too little rainfall leads to drought, with
calamitous consequences for subsistence. Half of
humanity already lives in areas under severe water
stress.15
Irrigation for food production accounts for 70% of
withdrawals, industrial production about 20% and
drinking water only 10%.16 Little is invested in
efficiency and conservation. Only 0.7% of irrigated
farmland worldwide was using high-productivity
micro-irrigation in 1991.17
It takes 1,000 litres of water to produce one loaf of
bread.18 At the current rate of population growth,
and with demand rising not only for grain but for
meat and consumer goods as well, the gap
between water availability and use is sure to shrink.
In many regions, the pressure on scarce water
resources will generate competition between rural
and urban demands—and local conflict.19
The world’s cities will swell from 2.86 billion
inhabitants in 2000 to 4.98 billion by 2030, with
90% of the growth in the developing world. Water
infrastructure, where it exists, is simply not up to the
task.20 Jakarta’s water and sanitation systems, for
example, were designed to meet the needs of a
population of 500,000. Today, its population has
surpassed 15 million, placing unsustainable stress
on groundwater levels even though the city provides
water to only 25% of its inhabitants.21 Even in richer
countries, public investment in infrastructure renewal
lags behind maintenance needs.22
Financing and reforming governments and water
utility institutions are the two critical needs.
Financing for water comes from water users,
taxpayers and donors. In the mid-1990s, two-thirds
of water sector finance came from the government,
with the remaining third divided between
international donors and private sector companies,
both international and domestic.23
The Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative
Council estimates that the water and sanitation
targets could be met spending as little as $23 billion
a year until 2015. But providing individual
connections and primary wastewater treatment
would raise the annual cost to $17 billion for water
and $32 billion for sanitation. Today, annual
investments total $1 billion and $14 billion
respectively. And donor support for water and
sanitation service provision is falling (to $3.1 billion in
1999–2001 from $3.5 billion in preceding years).24
Privatization. Many industrial and developing
country governments have devolved the
management and development of national water
systems to private companies, a policy strongly
supported by the international financial institutions.
A number of IMF and World Bank loan packages
were conditional on opening the water sector to
privatization.25 Global water corporations emerged
in response, and then invested, and sometimes
lost, vast sums in the reform process.26
The business case for private sector participation in
water and sanitation provision rests on being able
to earn a profit by charging users for services, while
reducing operational inefficiencies, labour costs,
patronage and leakage. In theory, as water prices
rise and competition in the sector grows, innovative
technologies and operational strategies will emerge
to deliver better services for more people at lower
cost.
Poor people do appear to benefit from private water
service delivery where they receive expanded
Percent of population with improved drinking water, 2002
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access and reduced costs. Some operators,
notably Suez, have sought to deliver services cost-
effectively to the poor. A recent study found that
privatization of water systems in Argentina under
Suez was associated with a decrease in urban child
mortality of 5%–8% between 1990 and 1999.27
But in Bolivia, Ghana and South Africa the
privatization process has come under heavy
criticism. Opponents cite corruption, usurious
service and connection charges and the termination
of services to those unable to pay. They ask whether
access to water is an economic issue, or a human
right. They also ask whether the same funds—if
invested in upgrading public utilities—would deliver
the same benefits. Some major companies are
withdrawing from developing countries because they
have found that the economic cost of delivering
water to the poor is very high—and that the political
cost of not doing so is higher still.28 The owners of
some of the most widely celebrated projects—
Manila and Buenos Aires among them—are today
seeking to offload or renegotiate their investments in
the light of currency depreciation.29
The difficulties in privatization are clear: Companies
will invest only where markets are concentrated,
the regulatory environment is stable, and it is
possible to charge (and collect) rates for service
that not only enable cost recovery but permit a
profit. Companies face reputation risks, exchange
rate risks, political risks and the threat of
nationalization or a reduction in their capacity to
make a profit. And public commitments to offer free
water to meet basic needs or freeze user charges
can conflict with financial imperatives.
For all the controversy, international private
investment in water and sanitation represents only
one dollar for every twenty spent in this sector,
though this is projected to grow to two by 2010.30
No one suggests that the international private
sector can fill the financing gap anymore as the
business case simply is too limited. Alternatives are
needed.
The water sector business models of the future
may already be in operation. Though often informal,
and sometimes actively opposed by authorities,
local private operators already deliver water to a
vast population, particularly urban slum dwellers.
According to a 2004 survey of 10 African cities,
“city-wide water authorities, while in theory
providing service to all residents, in practice serve
at most 70% in a few cities and more like a third or
less in most; independent operators do the rest”.31
Similarly, in 1995, some 30% of the population of
metro Manila met their water needs from
independent water providers.32 These local
entrepreneurs have rarely been engaged in policy
decisions.
Percent of population with improved sanitation, 2002
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Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have become
the foundation for governments and donors to arrive at a
common strategy for meeting development goals. A recent
review of PRSPs in Sub-Saharan Africa revealed that the
water sector is often underrepresented and thus under-
funded (Slaymaker and Newborne 2004). Reasons include
the fragmentation of authority in the water sector between
local administration, water resources, agriculture and other
agencies; the lack of civil society engagement in the PRSP
process around water issues and the tradition of water
being a donor-funded (off-budget) activity rather than core
government expenditure.
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers neglect
the water sector
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Demand for bottled water is also on the rise.
Middle-class consumers in the developing and
developed world are demanding bottled water,
insulating themselves from the municipal water
system, and reducing the political demand for
service improvements that would assist the poor as
well. Global bottled water sales have grown from
57 billion litres in 1996 to a projected 144 billion
litres in 2006, with the market value growing
5%–25% a year (80% in India). These trends have
brought Coca-Cola, Danone and Nestle into the
water business.33
The choice between private and public delivery of
water is highly polarizing, though ultimately a false
choice. Some argue against any private
involvement on moral grounds. Others assert that
water is too cheap—encouraging waste and
making it impossible to cover the costs of
infrastructure, operations and maintenance. Still
others allege that public utility models have failed,
with their high capital costs, urban bias and
widespread incentives for graft—that what is
needed is empowering communities to take charge
of meeting their own needs. The answer is likely to
be a mix of all three—and to depend critically on
the effectiveness of public institutions charged with
regulating or delivering water.
Meanwhile, there are many mechanisms for the
private sector to help achieve the international
water and sanitation targets:
• Service and management contracts, leases
and concessions where the technical expertise
of companies is harnessed, but with the public
sector maintaining overall responsibility.
• Public education, especially on water
conservation issues, which may be of interest
to companies relying on a clean water supply
for their products (softdrink companies, food
and textile companies).
• Water resource management innovations, to
reduce the use of water and increase the
reuse of wastewater in industrial processes.
• Providing water supply and sanitation to
communities in the immediate vicinity of
factories or other facilities where these
services are provided to employees.
While some barriers to access—efficiency and
technical capacity—are amenable to resolution
through private participation, others are not. There is
a need to reform the institutions governing this
sector, including the laws, regulations and
perceptions that lie at the heart of the poor
performance of utilities—public or private. Businesses
can play an effective role only if the appropriate
framework conditions are in place, in tandem with
investments from the public sector in regulatory
capacity, subsidies to enable the meeting of minimum
needs for the poor, ways of offsetting political and
currency risk and mechanisms to stem corruption.
What else is needed? Eliminate the exclusivity built
into infrastructure contracts, unbundle integrated
services and facilitate interconnection and
coordination between service providers. Greater
flexibility would permit such innovations as placing
maintenance responsibility with customers, creating
deferred payment plans, establishing group
connections and working in collaboration with the
water vendors who reach the poor in informal
settlements, helping them integrate with the formal
economy while meeting minimum quality standards.34
A greater commitment to reforming water sector
institutions and legislation is essential not only for
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polarizing, though ultimately a
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productive engagement of the private sector, but also
for improving the performance of public utility
services. Effective and transparent public utilities,
working in a well-functioning regulatory environment,
are the best clients for the international private sector.
It is thus in the interest of companies to join the call
for reforming public water utilities, eliminating the
requirement of water service privatization as a
condition for country access to international aid
packages and increasing public finance to support
access to this critical resource.
Biodiversity
Biodiversity—the variety of animal, plant and
microorganic life on earth—is disappearing at a rate
100–1,000 times faster than ever before,
threatening the life-sustaining systems of our planet.
Biodiversity has value for the services it provides,
such as purifying air and water, from its use for
food, shelter and heating and from its undiscovered
potential (undiscovered medicinal uses).
The Convention on Biodiversity, ratified in 1993
with 188 parties, promotes conservation of
biological diversity, sustainable use of its many
elements and fair and equitable sharing of benefits
from using genetic resources. But there has been
little progress in elaborating a policy framework and
financing mechanism to safeguard the world’s
animal and plant life.35
Conservation has made some strides in recent
years, mobilizing significant financing and
protecting vast areas of land (12% of total terrestrial
area), at least on paper.36 Even so, forests and
wetlands continue to disappear, within and outside
park boundaries. Land-clearing for agriculture and
pasture remains the primary driver of biodiversity
loss.37 Nearly half of all forestland, and a third of
temperate grass and shrubland, have been
converted to agricultural use.38 About 50% of
protected areas are being partly used for
agriculture. Many protected areas do not carry
enough members of a species for it to be viable in
the long term.39
Fisheries are under pressure from subsidized
trawler fleets and environmental change. Subsidies
of $10–$30 billion a year overwhelm modest
efforts at conservation. A global network of marine
parks could protect and replenish dwindling fish
stocks, at a cost comparable to that of fishery
subsidies.40 Yet a paltry 1% of marine area is
protected.41
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Source: World Bank 2003.
Can a multistakeholder dialogue break the logjam on hav-
ing the private sector meet water needs? Government offi-
cials, labour representatives, company and civil society
members from North and South completed a needs
assessment in April 2004, under the “Global Water Sector
Scoping Process on Private Sector Participation” (Moore
and Urquhart 2004). Their consultations with more than
300 stakeholders and opinion leaders concluded that there
is broad interest in support for, and value in, pursuing a
multistakeholder review. Their report lays out the parame-
ters for how the review should be organized to maintain
objectivity and relevance. In June 2004 an international
panel was assembled, and finances are being raised.
Similarly, the Swiss government, in cooperation with rein-
surer Swiss Re, have convened a multistakeholder expert
process to identify policy principles and tools for private
sector participation in the water sector. It was to report its
results in late 2004 (see www.pspwater.org/public/
index.html).
Multistakeholder reviews of good practice
in private water sector participation
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Recent conflicts fuelled by traffic in timber—notably
in Cambodia and Liberia—have drawn attention to
the harm wrought by the illegal or complicit timber
trade. The government of Indonesia, for example,
estimates that about 75% of domestic logging
activities are illegal in some way, spurring forest
loss and costing the state $1–2 billion a year in lost
tax revenues.42 And unprecedented mobility in
recent decades is carrying more organisms from
one habitat to another than ever before. “Alien
invasive species” displace indigenous flora and
fauna, destroying biodiversity by stealth.43
Engaging business on biodiversity. The business
case for protecting biodiversity rests largely on
branding, reputation and maintaining a social
“license to operate”.44 Some companies depend
greatly on biodiversity, in the form of natural
products or services.45 Regulatory threats, civil
society campaigns and emerging international
norms, such as “World Heritage” labelling, may
affect location or manufacturing process decisions
for other companies.
Public and private interests are aligning to invest in
conservation, identify and manage biodiversity-
related risks, create markets for products and
services that preserve biodiversity’s integrity and
enhance natural resource supply chain security and
quality.
Corporate giving for conservation far outpaces that
for other environmental aims. Intel co-founder and
billionaire Gordon Moore granted $261.2 million to
Conservation International in 2001 to support its
efforts to conserve the world’s biodiversity
hotspots.46 With 1,900 corporate members, and
an annual revenue of $972 million, the Nature
Conservancy manages or owns nearly 10 million
acres of land (40,470 km2), making it the world’s
largest private sanctuary system.47
Companies in the extractive and energy sectors are
working with other actors to define “no go areas”
and guidelines for working in ecologically sensitive
regions. For many, this is a business imperative, as
companies investigate “frontier” areas, with higher
political and environmental risks.48 Three-quarters
of active mines and exploratory sites are in or
within 10 kilometres of areas that have high
conservation value.49 As a consequence of this
pressure, several mining and oil and gas
companies have committed to forgo investment in
World Heritage Sites, opening the door to
considering other “no go areas” as well.50 A few
leading companies have committed in policy
statements to “no net harm” or even “net positive
benefit” to biodiversity (Rio Tinto and Waste
Management Inc., among others).
A handful of venture capital funds were established
in the early 1990s to identify and invest in
biodiversity-related businesses, with modest
success. Bioprospecting by international life
science companies was expected to deliver a wave
of new medicines—and profits for local
communities. But success has been modest.51
More promising appears to be the conversion of
low-productivity farms into private game reserves in
Southern Africa. About 80% of South Africa’s
priority conservation land is in communal and
private hands. In 2003 the South African
government added a tax credit to support the
protection of these lands.52
There is also an emerging consumer market for
more sustainably and equitably produced products
Sanitation, the poor cousin to water service, receives less
attention. This report is no exception.
Access to safe disposal of human excreta is vital to human
health and environmental integrity, particularly in urban envi-
ronments. The lack of will to take action among governments
and industry is striking in the light of the potential benefits in
avoided healthcare costs and reduced employee absen-
teeism. Objectives for action range from installation of on-plot
dry latrines managed by employees, households or commu-
nities—to centrally managed sewage networks.
The networks have been the focus of donors, because man-
aging many small projects would have high transaction
costs. But years of large investment have demonstrated that
the problem is not the lack of finance but of appropriate insti-
tutions. Big infrastructure may not always be affordable or
appropriate. Demand for sanitation must in many cases be
created where social norms do not support its use.
Hardware alone is insufficient without changes in social
behaviour—to no open defecation and regular handwashing
with soap.
Where demand exists, small and informal entrepreneurs may
already be providing sanitation services. They often need help
in scaling up solutions and raising health and safety stan-
dards. There is no substitute for engaged local authorities
with the resources to assist this process.
Source: Cairncross 2003a,b; Heierli and others 2004.
Access to sanitation
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and services. Sustainability certification in
agricultural commodities, timber, fisheries and
tourism could one day initiate a market
transformation. The global retail market for organic-
certified products is $20 billion and growing
10%–30% a year in industrialized nations.53
Rainforest Alliance-certified bananas today account
for 15% of all bananas in international trade.54 For
the moment, these are niche products. Certified
coffee accounts for less than 1% of total sales in
North America, for example, and few expect it to
exceed 6% of the market by 2010.55
Concerns about the quality and long-term viability
of agricultural raw materials have pushed several
companies to integrate sustainability considerations
in their supply chains. In the face of declining
stocks and rising prices, Unilever, buyer of about
15% of the world fish catch, seeks to source 75%
of its inputs from sustainable fisheries by 2005. To
achieve this it has worked with the World Wildlife
Fund to establish a fishery certification system—the
Marine Stewardship Council.
Building on this experience, Unilever forged a
partnership with 16 other food industry and trade
groups to ensure the long-term supply of higher
quality agricultural raw materials and to improve
social and economic conditions for local
communities. The Sustainable Agriculture Initiative
is working commodity-by-commodity to define
good practice, beginning with coffee, palm oil,
potatoes, vegetables, cereals and dairy products.56
Reshaping incentives for private sector
conservation
Liability for harming biodiversity is emerging. In
Europe the Environmental Liabilities Directive, which
entered into force in April 2004, holds operators
financially liable for environmental damage to 980
species and 14% of Europe’s land area.57
Access to capital or markets may also be affected
by biodiversity considerations. The Equator
Principles specifically cite the protection of
endangered species and sensitive ecosystems
among the issues that must be managed. National
export credit agencies—often decisive in foreign
investment—have recently agreed to minimum
environmental safeguards similar to those of the
Equator signatories.58
National governments can use their purchasing
power to favour environmentally sourced suppliers.
The European Union’s Forest Law, Enforcement,
Governance and Trade initiative, announced in
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Source: UN Secretary-General 2004.
Genetically modified crops and livestock hold the promise
of higher productivity and reduced chemical inputs and
land-clearing. This is balanced by risks of consumer rejec-
tion, further reductions in the genetic diversity of the food
supply and cross-species pollination (“superweeds” and
contamination of wild varieties). The global market for
genetically modified food products was estimated at $4.8
billion in 2003, accounting for 15% for the planted area, up
from 12% in 2002 (Global Knowledge Centre on Crop
Biotechnology 2003).
The Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, which came into force in September 2003,
requires that exporters obtain an Advance Informed
Agreement for international trade in genetically modified
products. Importers can invoke the “precautionary princi-
ple” in rejecting imports.
Risks—and opportunities—from genetically
modified crops
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2003, will seek to ban the import of illegal timber by
establishing a licensing scheme, providing capacity-
building to producer countries and implementing
favourable government procurement policy.59
Small but innovative domestic financial
mechanisms that return value to communities and
companies for conservation of biodiversity are
beginning to emerge. These include tax incentives,
environmental performance bonds and revenue
sharing from hunting and resource trade.60
At the international level, both the Clean
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation
under the Kyoto Protocol could spur investment in
biodiversity conservation for carbon sequestration.
But neither is functioning as intended (see above).
And efforts to support biodiversity-favourable
businesses have largely failed, partly because of the
cumbersome bureaucratic processes of the
multilateral agencies and bilateral donors—and partly
an inherent contradiction between achieving ‘above-
market’ returns and sustaining experimentation.
These need to be reformed to better channel private
sector activity in support of biodiversity.
Conclusions
Business has an emerging case for addressing
global environmental challenges. But some
companies are schizophrenic, establishing
innovative and effective programmes in the front
office while their industry associations lobby behind
the scenes to slow or derail real action.
To resolve the dissonance, companies could be
more active within their associations in addressing
internal barriers to environmental protection, such
as complicity in corruption and law-breaking. The
voice of industry could be more widespread in
calls for reform of governance shortcomings:
feeble statutory institutions; declining public
financing and indebtedness; weak citizen
engagement and awareness; perverse
development policy, aid and subsidies; and lack of
political will. Civil society, for its part, needs to
accept that business can be a force for good, and
give credit where due for risky environmental-
leadership efforts.
On a practical level, business could significantly
advance the international environmental goals with
the following commitments:
• Participate in emission trading and reduction
efforts.
The 10 countries joining the European Union in 2004 har-
bour 17% of the remaining natural or virgin forests of
Europe (European Environment Agency 2004). The EU’s
Common Agricultural Policy might channel resources to
expansion of arable cropland and increased use of pesti-
cides, fertilizers and machinery, threatening this rich natural
patrimony. Or it might contribute to better management of
fertilizers and pesticides—and reducing the negative
impacts on soil and water.
Biodiversity incentives and a larger EU
About half the projects of the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF), established in 1991, focus on biodiversity. Business
has played only a marginal role to date, in part due to the
delays from project approval to implementation—averaging
409 days in 2002.
The $15 million Terra Capital Fund was launched by the GEF
in 1998 with private sector participation under the
International Finance Corporation (IFC). It was to invest in
small-to-medium biodiversity-benefiting enterprises in Latin
America. It brought long-term financing to a sector without
traditional access to capital, seeking a 20% return on invest-
ment. Challenges included the small size and high transac-
tion costs of projects—and the inexperience of the entrepre-
neurs being supported. Only $5.5 million in investments
were made in 1999–2002. A 2003 IFC evaluation conclud-
ed that despite a cautious approach, the Terra portfolio was
likely to underperform because of its high risk, and the fund
was closed abruptly, even with projects in mid-course.
Source: GEF Council (2003a,b); Mahendra (2004).
The Global Environmental Facility
Companies could be more active
within their associations in
addressing internal barriers to
environmental protection
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• Set renewable energy sourcing and water use
efficiency targets in their own operations.
• Partner with stakeholders to identify whether
and how to best contribute to attainment of
the water and sanitation targets.
• Support public environmental education.
• Monitor and report on the financial risks of
climate change, declining water quality and
access, and biodiversity loss.
• Embed in their operations an ethic of “no net
harm” to nature.
• Respect “no go areas” of high biodiversity
value.
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The business of rights
As in 2003, the world earned a score of 3 this year
for its efforts to achieve human rights goals,
confirming that far too little is being done to achieve
them. The U.S. Supreme Court challenged the
detention of foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay,
and the International Criminal Court announced its
first cases. But these gains were outweighed by
revelations about torture in the American military
detention system, the spread of human rights
violations associated with the “war on terror” and
the continuing criminalization of migration.
The focus areas of this year’s report remain torture
and ill treatment, migration, the human rights
responsibilities of business and human rights in
daily life. This subset of issues provides reasonable
insights into the human rights developments in
2004.
This year’s emphasis on the private sector is timely.
The privatization of some security matters raised
fundamental questions of legal accountability. The
links between employment, migration and outsourcing
are increasingly salient. And several major corporate
scandals illustrated the corrosive effects of corruption.
It is clear that businesses need to address human
rights more strategically, integrating the promotion of
rights and prevention of abuse into normal business
and project practice. Once violations have occurred,
the damage has been done, however many efforts
are made later to repair it.
Companies should focus both on their behaviour
and on their possible complicity in abuses by
others. Achieving these ends requires:
• Clear policies on human rights conduct and
rules of accountability.
• Effective procedures for enforcement, including
good staff training.
• Sound information, based on monitoring and a
range of relationships.
• A climate of compliance, with strong
leadership by those in authority.
• Methods for predicting and mitigating risk.
Torture and ill treatment
Last year’s report expressed concern that the U.S.
administration’s willingness to disregard the norms
governing treatment of civilian and military detainees,
because of the threat posed by terrorism, would
raise the risk that torture and ill treatment would
result. The concern proved justified.
The revelations of prisoner abuse in the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq demonstrated that suspension of the
rule of law, combined with secrecy, are indeed likely
to lead to violations of rights and abuses of power.
They provoked intensive official inquiries into
interrogation methods used not only in Abu Ghraib
prison but elsewhere in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in
the detention centre at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Under intense public pressure, the administration
reaffirmed that the U.S. government will respect
international law on torture and ill treatment. Yet an
unknown number of detainees from Iraq,
Afghanistan and other countries continue to be held
at unidentified and therefore illegal interrogation
centres. Many do not receive Red Cross monitoring
visits and remain at risk of mistreatment.1 It is not
known how they are being treated, and it remains to
be seen whether the scandal will have a long-lasting
effect on U.S. policy.
Some positive developments occurred. The U.S.
administration had claimed that it could hold
“enemy combatants” (a term without meaning
Score
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under the Geneva Conventions) indefinitely without
trial at Guantanamo Bay because it is outside the
jurisdiction of national or international courts. In July
2004, however, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that U.S. courts do have jurisdiction to consider
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with
hostilities and interned at Guantanamo Bay. It also
pronounced that those detained without recourse
to habeas corpus were held in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.2 This decision represents the first significant
breach of Guantanamo’s perceived status as a
legal “black hole”.3 Several Guantanamo detainees
were released to their countries of origin at the
request of their governments. The United States
allowed journalists and human rights observers to
witness some of the hearings held at the base.
Privatization of military functions
The Abu Ghraib scandal also focused attention on
the privatization of some interrogation and security
functions. A trend to privatize management of
prisons spread from the United States to other
countries in recent decades. Some researchers
noted that what happened in Iraq reflected faults in
the American penal system, and that several staff
with responsibilities at Abu Ghraib had previously
worked in American penal centres and been
associated with allegations of abuse.4
A more specific concern is the U.S. military’s use of
private companies to supply services, including
aspects of interrogation, that military and other law
enforcement personnel formerly managed. By late
2003 several thousand security personnel were
reportedly working in Iraq, hired for tasks ranging
from airport security to VIP protection, from
countries including Chile, Bosnia and The
Philippines.5 Many of these contracts were not
opened to public tender.6
Such privatization raises crucial legal issues that
have yet to be adequately addressed. The first is
whether the command responsibility of military and
political leaders may become legally clouded if they
transfer military tasks to private companies. Under
the UN torture convention and customary law, the
prohibition on torture is absolute. That responsibility
it is not reduced by the presence of threats to
security or by devolving duties to private
companies rather than official institutions. Those
accused of abuses at Abu Ghraib, most of whom
were soldiers, appear to have been strikingly
ignorant of their obligations. Concerns that senior
U.S. decisionmakers favoured privatization of some
interrogation and security functions precisely to
break the link between themselves and actions that
could be considered illegal under national or
international law were supported by the publication
of legal briefs, prepared at the U.S. Attorney
General’s initiative, that attempted to justify
recourse to harsh interrogation techniques that
both American and international lawyers would
consider amounted to torture, and behaviour that
suggested military officials assumed they would not
be held accountable for actions they took.7
Governments that privatize any military functions
need to ensure that they take adequate steps to
prevent torture and ill treatment of detainees in all
circumstances, by officials or private contractors,
and punish misconduct where it occurs.
A second issue concerns the responsibilities and
obligations of companies that provide such services.
Companies that accept such contracts need to
ensure that their staff are adequately trained in
national law, international human rights law and the
laws of war—and are aware of their responsibilities.
The extent of corporate responsibility is likely to be
clarified in court. In June 2004, for example, former
detainees in Iraq filed a class action against two U.S.
companies, alleging their involvement in torture and
ill treatment.8 In their own interest, companies
should familiarize themselves with and apply relevant
standards, including the Convention against Torture,
the Geneva Conventions and standards that apply to
doctors, prison guards, security staff and other
professions.9
A third issue concerns the legal status and
individual legal responsibility of civilians working
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abroad in military environments. Numerous civilians
work in military bases as drivers, guards,
accountants or cooks. It is not always clear what
law they are subject to when abuses or accidents
occur while they are abroad. As civilians, they are
not subject to military law. Being abroad, they are
often outside their country’s jurisdiction. As foreign
citizens, they may not be subject to local courts.
Different countries apply different regulations to deal
with such issues, which also arise in international
peace-keeping operations. Governments have yet
to establish clear definitions of accountability that
cover such cases. Companies (and military
authorities) should take steps to clarify the legal
status of civilians they employ to work in military
installations or operations abroad. (Companies also
need to protect civilian employees working in
militarized environments because as soft targets
they are often abducted or attacked.)
Torture and ill treatment elsewhere
The incidents at Abu Ghraib harmed not only the
U.S. reputation for defending the rule of law but
harmed the rule of law everywhere. Human rights
observers have the clear impression that many
governments have taken advantage of the “war
against terrorism” to weaken protection of rights,
and that a preoccupation with security issues has
had the same effect.
Torture and ill treatment are not, of course, confined
to “political” cases. In numerous countries, detainees
routinely suffer physical and sexual violence following
arrest for quite minor offences. The responsible
officials in most cases go unpunished. Ill treatment of
detainees is regularly reported by human rights
observers in numerous countries, including
Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan.
What relevance does this have for business?
Businesses frequently operate in societies where ill
treatment of detainees and other serious human
rights violations are common and tolerated. Indeed,
some abuses are due directly to a company’s
presence. Host government security forces
detached to protect company staff and facilities
may intimidate or abuse local communities. Acute
dilemmas can arise when companies detect or
detain shoplifters or thieves on their premises or
catch staff embezzling company funds—or when
staff (especially where the judicial process is
corrupt) are detained by police or the authorities for
crimes they did not commit. Many companies
already recognize these issues, and some make
appropriate representations to the authorities.
Positive developments
The European Union took public steps to support
the work of human rights defenders. In July, under
the Irish presidency, the EU agreed to guidelines to
strengthen support and protection of human rights
defenders.10 Several governments, including
Ireland and Germany, made specific arrangements
to increase protection of human rights defenders
at risk.
The International Criminal Court, in announcing its
first cases, will examine violations of human rights
in northern Uganda, where the Lord’s Resistance
Army has been responsible for numerous killings
and attacks on civilians and has abducted
numerous children to serve as fighters and camp
followers.11 The court will also examine violations in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly the
Ituri district, where government troops, and proxy
and independent forces, have been responsible for
numerous killings of civilians and other violations,
notably systematic rape.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone continued to
make progress. Nigeria’s Federal High Court
allowed a private petition challenging Nigeria’s
decision to grant asylum to Charles Taylor, Liberia’s
former president, whom Sierra Leone’s Special
Court indicted for war crimes in 2003.12
In Chile new steps were taken to impeach former
President Pinochet for abuses he committed while
in power. His long-defended claim to impunity may
come undone over allegations of embezzlement
and corruption.
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Louise Arbour’s appointment as UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights was widely
welcomed. In early statements she indicated the
importance she will attach to maintaining a proper
balance between security and human rights. The
appointment of Robert K. Goldman as special
rapporteur on counter-terrorism is also to be
welcomed in view of the UN Security Council’s
2001 decision not to include a human rights
representative on its Counter Terrorism Committee
(Resolution 1373).
Migration, human movement and
employment
Human rights cannot be protected if large numbers
of people cannot earn a living. The Millennium
Declaration makes a single reference to
employment: government leaders resolved to
“develop and implement strategies that give young
people everywhere a real chance to find decent
and productive work”. But the emphasis on youth
is significant. Of the more than 1 billion people
between 15 and 25, 85% live in developing
countries and about 88 million are classed as
unemployed—nearly half of the 186 million
unemployed people worldwide. A far higher
number, some 130 million, do insecure, low-paid or
informal jobs that earn them less than $1 a day.
Worldwide, young people are more than three
times as likely to be unemployed as adults.13
Moreover, youth unemployment is worsening. The
youth population climbed 10.5% between 1993
and 2003, but youth employment rose just 0.2%.14
Only 40% of young people in the Middle East and
North Africa even participate in the labour market.
The formation of a large pool of inactive,
impoverished, disappointed young people has
evident implications when political violence is
spreading. Unemployed young people have long
been the cannon fodder of terrorist forces, militias,
guerrilla movements and official armies. Until
recently, states were expected to manage the
employment market, often as the first providers of
jobs. This is less so today. Privatization and
macroeconomic reforms have reduced the state’s
capacity to employ and create employment, while
liberalized economies offer fewer opportunities to
the unskilled and inexperienced. Worldwide, about
500 million new jobs will need to be created by
2010 to absorb the unemployed and meet new
demand.
Although states should lead international efforts to
promote employment, business interests are clearly
involved.15 While having no direct duty to generate
and sustain employment, companies benefit from
social stability, skilled and educated workforces and
prosperous consumers. Alongside civil society (also
a major employer), they can build momentum for
action and urge governments to balance the
benefits of macroeconomic reform with policies
that assure long-term social stability and social
investment, including employment.
Business can also help define two other global
economic strategies that bear directly on
employment—outsourcing (discussed in the chapter
on the private sector) and migration. Outsourcing
provides important opportunities for employment
and can raise important human rights concerns,
mainly associated with labour conditions and wages.
The need for migration in the industrial countries is
growing. As birth rates fall, the deficit in semiskilled
and skilled jobs will be felt even more, particularly in
service positions that cannot be done at distance.
(Neither outsourcing nor machines can care for the
sick and elderly or children.) Economic arguments
also press in. Industrial economies are unlikely to
sustain their productivity or creativity where
populations are falling and ageing. Pensions and
other financial systems that rely on intergenerational
renewal will not be sustainable either.16 On the other
side, a large reservoir of skilled labour is potentially
available in poorer countries.
Here is a policy challenge that impinges directly
both on the medium-term future of industrial
societies and the long-term prospects of people
worldwide. Rich states have so far responded in
almost the worst way possible. They have blocked
and tended to criminalize migration wherever it
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causes some social cost in their societies.
Simultaneously they have encouraged the inward
migration of skilled workers without generally
defraying the costs that such emigration imposes
on (usually much poorer) countries of origin.
As noted in last year’s report, the tendency to
criminalize economic migration in much of the
industrial world is reinforced by the new concern of
governments with terrorism and security. The effect
has been to plunge many thousands of people into
a state of even deeper insecurity. In many cases,
they have been exposed directly to organized
economic or criminal exploitation.17
These are familiar criticisms of European policies.
Even though the United States has more open
policies, the situation of many undocumented
migrants there is scarcely better. A task force of the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations—chaired by
Jim Edgar, former governor of Illinois, Doris
Meissner, former U.S. immigration commissioner
and Alejandro Silva, president of Evans Foods—
underlined this. “Without action, the contradictions
and pressures will only increase. As the
undocumented population grows, more people die
at the border, families remain separated,
processing backlogs increase, workers are
exploited and certain industries decry labour
shortages, and potential terrorists try to take
advantage of systematic vulnerabilities.”18 The
report estimates that more than 9.3 million
undocumented migrants are living in the United
States, about 6 million of them working.
Draconian approaches are not confined to
industrial countries. Wherever a wide gap opens in
prosperity and economic opportunity, migrants are
attracted to it. Although South Africa has one of the
world’s most liberal constitutions, since 1994 it has
reacted to continued unauthorized migration by
deporting over a million undocumented migrants to
states including Mozambique, Zimbabwe and
Lesotho.19 In China the problem is internal
migration: official regulations penalize millions of
Chinese nationals who move across provincial
boundaries without authorization.
Selective immigration raises different issues. Across
the OECD, richer countries selectively permit skilled
migrants to enter their countries to fill gaps in their
employment market, usually without regard for the
costs that countries of origin incur during their
training—or the effects on local services. In some
cases these have been severe. A report by
Physicians for Human Rights suggests that half
Ghana’s medical school graduates emigrate within
five years of qualifying and 75% leave after 10
years. More than 5,300 doctors trained in African
medical schools were practicing in the United
States in 2002. A similar flow could be reported for
nurses, pharmacists and other skilled categories.20
Roughly one-third of the Caribbean’s secondary
and college-educated population lives in the United
States (to two-thirds for Haiti and Jamaica).21
The effects of unregulated recruitment in very poor
countries have been recognized. For example,
some European countries are exploring ways of
compensating countries of origin for some of the
costs they incur in training medical and other
skilled personnel who emigrate.22 The United
Kingdom no longer permits its National Health
Service to recruit from Sub-Saharan Africa. Private
healthcare institutions still do recruit, however, and
where they play a large role in national healthcare,
as in the United States, this remains an important
issue.
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Set against these impacts are the large benefits
that countries of origin receive from the migrants’
remittances. These amount to more than twice the
volume of official aid, often directly benefiting
families and local communities. Some governments
are trying to reduce the cost of remitting money,
though their efforts are partly motivated by a desire
to clamp down on illegal financial transfers
connected to crime or terrorism.23
Trafficking
Trafficking is attracting more international attention.
President Bush, for example, affirmed his
commitment to eradicate the trafficking of women
and children, and the EU has drawn up proposals
to draft a European convention on trafficking.24 It
remains difficult to say how much forced labour
and sexual trafficking have increased. Most
analysts suggest that the trade is increasingly
controlled by professional criminal organizations.
Another concern is the link between trafficking,
including sexual exploitation, and the immunity of
troops and officials working for international military
or civilian operations. In 2003 there were serious
allegations about the sexual exploitation of refugees
and displaced people in several refugee camps
administered by the UNHCR or organizations under
its supervision, with investigations conducted in
Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kenya and Nepal.
In a separate controversy in Kosovo, the Police,
Trafficking and Prostitution Unit of the UN Interim
Mission acknowledged that more than 20 soldiers
attached to the NATO-led intervention force in
Kosovo were suspected of committing offences
related to trafficking. Amnesty International claimed
that “members of the international community are
estimated to constitute 20% of the people using
trafficked women and girls, and they generate a
significant part of the industry’s income” in
Kosovo.25 In remarks to the press in July, the new
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also
referred to the accountability of international
officials, emphasizing that “international human
rights standards should apply to national
contingents on international peacekeeping
operations, as well as to multinational forces”.26
In 2004 the UN Secretary-General issued
guidelines on sexual conduct to the staff of UN
agencies (and organizations that subcontract work
from the UN). Some NGOs have separately
established staff guidelines on the same issue.
Such guidelines are difficult to devise, given the
difficulty of deciding where the boundaries of
private life begin—a question that also applies to
business executives in a position to exercise
influence over vulnerable people, including children.
Human rights in daily life
Human rights are not just about dreadful abuse.
They give attention to many everyday services from
which all benefit, and this is central to their
legitimacy. Clean water, fresh air, available power,
good schools, healthcare, public transport, efficient
administration, sanitation, street lighting, fair courts,
effective police—these determine the quality of life
for prosperous and poor alike. Where they cannot
be obtained, personal security and quality of life
decline for everyone. This year we look at two
issues that affect delivery of such services—
privatization and corruption.
Privatization
Governments have a duty to guarantee security
and the rule of law and provide decent services.
These are core parts of good government, among
the essential modern justifications for the existence
of states. They are also fundamental to the
realization of human rights, which are anchored in
the responsibility of states to implement human
rights treaties they have signed. For both
governance and human rights reasons, therefore,
H
u
m
a
n
 rig
h
ts
6
Some European countries are
exploring ways of compensating
countries of origin for some of
the costs they incur in training
medical and other skilled
personnel who emigrate
Foreign labour as share of total labour force (%)
United Kingdom
Japan
France
0
3
6
9
12
15
200119951990
United States
Italy
Immigrant labour plays an important role
in some high-income economies
Note: Recent inflows have pushed up the share of the foreign
labour force in the United States and Italy. In Japan foreign workers
make up less than a quarter of a percent of the labour force.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004, 2004.
             
102
G
lobal G
overnance Initiative 2005
reforms that devolve management of public
services to private companies raise important
questions—first about government’s responsibility
for the quality of services, and then about the links
between delivering services and protecting rights.
The human rights framework is neutral about
privatization. Though it asserts that governments
are responsible for ensuring that certain services are
delivered, it does not prescribe who should deliver
them. Two key tests need to be satisfied, however.
Processes of privatization and tendering need to be
transparent, which implies freely available
information and adequate public consultation. And
the outcome of privatization (delivering the services)
must not discriminate between users. This implies
that services should be affordable, accessible and
adapted to local needs. If service delivery worsens
for poor people after privatization, for example, it
may be challenged on human rights grounds, even
if the service is better overall.27
Predictably, the record of privatization is disputed.
The devolution of prison management to private
security companies, mentioned above, is one area
of concern. Abuses as grave as those at Abu
Ghraib occur in numerous civilian prison facilities
across the globe—and receive no publicity. Most of
them occur in publicly run facilities, where the onus
is on governments to ensure that standards are
respected and enforced. But privatization can
reduce accountability (and even create incentives
to build and fill prisons) and is certainly likely to lead
to abuse if security staff are badly trained, lack a
culture of human rights protection or fail to install
enforcement systems that work.
Privatizing water delivery, as described in chapter
5, has also proved contentious. From the
perspective of rights, the tests are whether water
continues to be delivered efficiently and affordably,
especially to those who are least able to pay, and
whether the quality of water and sanitation are
improved and sustained. Although overall access to
water is improving, serious protests have occurred
in some countries over increases in the cost of
water after privatization, and over an alleged
decline in access and quality.
These cases highlight several issues that arose
clearly during the introduction of structural
adjustment programmes in the 1990s and that
remain pertinent today in relation to privatization.
Current development plans put a high premium on
raising public revenues, including those from taxes,
and reducing public liability, notably in public
services. Are public services being sustained at a
level that enables them to do essential tasks,
including oversight and enforcement? Are the
interests of those who are poor (or who may
become poor as a result of reforms) adequately
protected? Who takes responsibility for
guaranteeing such protection, including its costs?
Corruption
This year, a commitment to end corruption became
the tenth principle of the Global Compact. Corruption
is a human rights issue on at least three grounds.
• Corruption at the top of government dissipates
national budgets and destroys a society’s
capacity to deliver services to its people. It
also creates specific dangers to health and
safety—badly constructed bridges and
buildings, dangerous chemical factories and
nuclear installations, unsafe water and
sanitation systems.
• Local corruption creates an everyday
environment of insecurity and intimidation:
police abuse, low-level extortion, corrupt local
services, unfair pricing of goods, nepotism and
the protection of criminal activity. While
corruption at the top of government may be
largely invisible, local corruption makes life
oppressive and unsafe in ways that ordinary
people can see. As usual, the poorest and
most vulnerable people also suffer most.
• Judicial corruption erodes the predictability
and fairness of justice, opening the way to
abuses of all kinds: protecting criminals,
persecuting innocent people, stifling of free
speech, eroding public accountability.
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In the worst cases all three combine, creating an
organized culture, rotten from top to bottom,
extremely difficult to displace or destroy.
Government, and daily life, come to feed upon it,
and the rule of law exists in form only.
Corruption is a global problem. Corporate scandals
reported this year, for example, include the
Hollinger report on Conrad Black (September),
criticism of the Riggs Bank (July), the scandal over
Shell’s misreported oil reserves (January), the
Parmalat crisis (January 2004), the Enron trials,
inquiries into corruption associated with the UN oil-
for-food programme in Iraq and public inquiries into
allegations of profiteering and corruption against
Halliburton in Iraq and Halliburton subsidiaries in
Nigeria.
Georgia’s experience illustrates the effect of
corruption on services. Under former President
Shevardnadze, payments were required at every level
of the system. When his government was overturned
in early 2004, the state coffers were virtually empty.
Georgia’s new government immediately declared its
commitment to end corruption. It is being helped by
an imaginative alliance between UNDP and the
corporate philanthropist George Soros, who provided
$2 million to enable the government to pay its officials
higher salaries while anticorruption measures are
introduced.28
International organizations, governments,
businesses and civil society are devoting more
attention to corruption. In December 2003 a UN
Convention against Corruption was adopted in
Merida, Mexico. In a clear indication of political
commitment, 106 countries had signed it by April
2004.29 The World Bank started a formal
anticorruption programme in 2002. The OECD
runs a programme that includes an Anticorruption
Action Plan in Asia, managed in association with
the Asian Development Bank; 23 countries in the
region belong to it.30 More than 38 countries in the
EU and wider Europe (and including Turkey and
the United States) participate in another
government anticorruption network, GRECO. All
these processes draw attention to corruption, but
its continuing prevalence suggests they will not
have a deep impact until they establish clear
principles of accountability and effective
mechanisms to enforce them.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in the United States
in 2004, offers one strategy for increasing corporate
accountability. Several business-led initiatives also
seek to increase corporate transparency and use
human rights standards to improve corporate
governance. A combination of voluntary and
mandatory mechanisms, which focus on account-
ability and provide working enforcement mech-
anisms, is likely to be required to make a real impact.
In civil society, Transparency International has built
political awareness and created new tools for
identifying and comparing efforts to combat
corruption in different sectors and countries. Its
work spotlights information. Guaranteeing access
to information is a key element in strategies to
control and eliminate all forms of corruption.
Governments should gather and publish essential
information about their activities and services. They
should also ensure that private institutions provide
public information about the services they provide.
Without adequate public sector salaries, local
corruption tends to become endemic and services
decline (regardless of privatization, because oversight
collapses). It is in the interest of business to support
adequate public taxes and public sector salaries,
because their efficiency depends on that of the public
sector. Businesses should support the principle that
public sector and macroeconomic reform
programmes ought not starve the public sector of
resources to the point where it cannot function and
corruption becomes inevitable. Businesses can also
work with other actors to strengthen public agencies,
particularly at the local level.
Business accountability
UN norms on business accountability
In 2004 the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights released draft
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norms on the human rights responsibilities of
transnational corporations and other business
enterprises. The norms were elaborated over a
period of several years in consultation with
governments, businesses and business
associations, labour unions and NGOs.
The UN Commission on Human Rights discussed
the norms in April 2004. Many business
corporations and associations, and some
governments, lobbied actively against their further
consideration. Labour unions were publicly
lukewarm and privately critical. Many NGOs, and
some companies and governments, lobbied for
more consultation around the draft.
In the end, after considerable negotiation and
discussion, the commission confirmed “the
importance and priority it accords to the
responsibilities” of private businesses. It asked the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to
consult further and report on the scope and legal
status of existing initiatives and standards so that
the commission could “identify options for
strengthening standards on the responsibilities of
transnational corporations and related business
enterprises with regard to human rights and
possible means of implementation”. It also stated
that the document “has not been requested by the
Commission and, as a draft proposal, has no legal
standing”. Those sympathetic to some international
regulation of business considered the resolution’s
passage as a victory, its ambivalent wording the
best that could be achieved in the circumstances.
How should companies and other actors interpret
this decision, which occurred against a background
of public suspicion of corporate probity,
compounded by the scandals mentioned earlier?
There is agreement that most regulation should be
at national level using national law. Most companies
argue that, when additional regulation is necessary,
it should be exercised through voluntary codes.
Codes can be useful, but they will not indefinitely
protect company reputations because they are
difficult to monitor, rarely test performance against
objective standards and tend to inflate public
expectations. Two questions arise. How can
abuses that remain outside the reach of existing
procedures be addressed? Are international
standards required to raise the bar of national
regulation and provide objective tests against which
national law and voluntary codes can be assessed?
Other initiatives
Set up in 2000, the UN Global Compact requires
companies that join it to sign up to 10 principles.
The first two engage them to support and protect
human rights. But the initiative is defined only as a
forum for dialogue and sharing experience. It lacks
enforcement procedures of any kind, and no
provision exists to penalize companies that breach
its principles. As reported last year, NGO
participants in the Global Compact are critical of
the absence of enforcement provisions, and the
compact again failed to address this question at its
annual conference in June 2004. The compact’s
main problem is that its positive role is unclear. As
long as this remains true, it will continue to face
criticism.
We reported last year on the Kimberley process that
seeks to eliminate illegal trading in diamonds sold to
finance conflict. In July the Republic of Congo
became the first country to be expelled from the
Kimberley process following an inspection review.
“The Republic of Congo authorities were unable to
account for a massive discrepancy between the
Recognizing that the UN norms cross all these areas, the
Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, launched in
London in December 2003, will test-run the norms to
assess their value and usefulness. The group includes the
CEOs of Barclays Bank, ABB, Hewlett Packard, the Body
Shop, Novartis, National Grid Transco, MTV, Statoil, Gap
and Novo Nordisk. This is a good example of business tak-
ing a positive and practical approach to accountability in
relation to human rights.
The Business Leaders Initiative on Human
Rights
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scale of rough diamond exports and the absence of
any reported production or imports.”31 The decision
shows how difficult it is to make such voluntary
compacts stick. It is also praiseworthy that those
behind this UN-supported process are determined
to hold the signatories to account.
Taking rights seriously
Businesses face growing pressure to be more
accountable on human rights. “Ethical investment”
continues to grow, and businesses are commonly
required to report on their human rights policies.
Such indices as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index
or FTSE4Good and reporting programmes like the
Global Reporting Initiative also lead companies to
think more carefully about human rights. While
much more discussion is needed about whether
businesses should support international
regulation—or any particular approach to it—it is
clear that they will need to address human rights
more strategically and proactively.
The primary objectives for businesses that adopt
such a strategic approach should be to prevent
abuses from occurring in the workplace or within
their sphere of influence—and to avoid complicity
in abuses that others commit. Human rights
problems will eventually arise if nothing is done to
prevent them. Action after the event, including
reparation, is always second best, because the
damage has been done. Careful preparation is the
key to protection, including protection of
reputation. In addition, although human rights
standards apply first and mainly to states,
businesses can explore their responsibilities and
enlarge their capacity to work with others to fully
implement human rights.
Endnotes
1. Campbell and Goldenberg (2004); Human Rights
Watch (2004).
2. BBC News (2004). 
3. Steyn (2003). Judge Steyn is a Lord of Appeal in
Ordinary in the United Kingdom. 
4. John Armstrong, assistant director of operations
in Iraq, formerly worked in a maximum security
prison in Virginia where hooding and excessive use
of force had been reported; he resigned from his
post there when he was named in two wrongful
death suits. Charles Graner, directly charged with
abuse at Abu Ghraib, had worked since 1996 for a
maximum security prison in Pennsylvania, where a
1998 inquiry revealed videotapes of routine
beatings and rituals of humiliation (Perkinson
2004).
5. The Pentagon contractor Blackwater USA, for
example, privately hired 60 Chilean soldiers to
serve in Iraq; many had trained under the
government of Augusto Pinochet (Franklin 2004).
6. Wayne (2004) describes such a contract with the
Pentagon under which Wackenhut Services and
Vance International recruited security staff from
native tribal groups in Alaska. 
7. See for example Lewis (2004); Danner (2004a,b). 
8. CACI International (Virginia) and Titan
Corporation (San Diego) dispute the claims,
brought by the Centre for Constitutional Rights and
a Philadelphia Law firm using the Alien Torts Act
(Stockman 2004).
9. See for example UN OHCHR, Human Rights
Committee (2004).
10. Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs (2004). 
11. 14,000 children were abducted in the two
years prior to May 2004 (Global IDP Project 2004).
12. Nigeria Coalition on the International Criminal
Court (2004).
13. ILO (2004a).
14. Unemployment is lowest in East Asia (7%), and
rises through South Asia (13%), Latin America and
South East Asia (16%) to peak at 21% in Sub-
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Saharan Africa and 25% the Middle East and North
Africa (ILO 2004b). 
15. ILO (2001).
16. Wagstyl (2004).
17. “The smuggling of human beings by criminal
syndicates amounts to one of the most serious
violations of human rights the world now confronts;
a modern day slave trade that nations,
governments and law enforcement must do their
utmost to stop….” (Interpol 2004)
18. Daniel and Grant (2004).
19. Cush (2003).
20. Physicians for Human Rights (2004).
21. Lowell (2003).
22. Kazmin and Dyer (2004).
23. De Haan (2000).
24. Kurbiel (2004).
25. Amnesty International (2004a,b). 
26. Arbour (2004). 
27. Tsemo (2003).
28. U.S. Department of State (2004); UNDP (2004). 
29. UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (2004).
30. Palau and Viet Nam joined the Initiative in July
2004 (Asian Development Bank 2004). 
31. Innocenti (2004).
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